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 Abstract 
During the economic boom of the late nineties and early noughties, the last Labour 
government identified paid employment obtained from the competitive labour market as 
a realistic goal for people disabled by mental illness. Despite the effects of the financial 
crash of 2008 and the consequent recession, its successors have continued to argue this is 
the case.  
One of the foundation stones of the policies they have used to pursue this goal is a 
biopsychosocial model of health, which sides with medicine in the longstanding dispute 
about the validity of the concept of mental illness. This model was used by the UK 
government to identify paid employment obtained from the competitive labour market as 
evidence of recovery in and recovery from mental illness. It did this by drawing on the 
belief recovery is an individual journey, the outcomes of disabled people's lives are 
determined by acts of agency; the language, but not the thinking, used by the disability 
movement to draw a distinction between disability and impairment; and research arguing 
people with a history of mental illness want to work and that they can obtain work from 
the competitive market when they are provided with appropriate support. 
Another one is neoclassical economics: a static, deductive and utilitarian theory-driven 
economic model that has dominated UK policy since the late seventies. Like the 
government's preferred approach to recovery, neoclassical economics prioritises agency 
over structure. It argues labour market activity is a risk-driven endeavour and that 
economies have natural rates of unemployment, which can only be reduced by the state 
dismantling institutions preventing scarce resources such as labour from being distributed 
via price competition. As with medical thinking about mental distress, the neoclassical 
idealisation of the labour market has its critics. Amongst them are the old institutional 
economics, the new institutional economics, stratification economics and the new 
economic sociology. Different mixtures of empiricism, inductive thinking, theorising and 
attitudes towards neoclassicism ranging from relative enthusiasm to outright hostility, 
have for different reasons, led them to conclude to various degrees that institutions are 
necessary to impose order on uncertainty, unemployment can be a consequence of their 
influence and the state has to take this on board when taking policy initiatives. 
 The disputes within economics and between economics and sociology about the role of 
agency, structure and the state in the labour market raise doubts about the efficacy of the 
UK government's welfare to work policies regarding people disabled by mental illness. 
Doubts that have been echoed in comments made by the OECD in 2014, which voiced 
concern about the UK governments marginalisation of structural influences on the labour 
market. Surprisingly, the literature on disability and employability has not engaged with 
this dispute. This study starts to address this failure by drawing on the above models 
mental illness and the labour market activity to analyse how the UK government's 
welfare to work policies have affected demand from private sector employers in Scotland 
for labour from jobless people who have been disabled by mental illness. The analysis 
was conducted in two stages. First, it used evidence about the financial crisis of 2008 and 
statistics from the Westminster and Holyrood governments to paint a macroeconomic 
picture of the Scottish labour market for the period between 2008 and 2013. Then it 
conducted semi-structured interviews with thirty private sector employers about their 
understanding of mental illness and the labour market. 
The initial part of the analysis argues rational price competition between private financial 
organisations caused the flow of money through western economies to dry up and that 
this caused the global financial crisis of 2008 and the deepest worldwide recession since 
the 1930's. Then it shows the UK government's adherence to neoclassicism led it to 
respond to these developments by directing government spending away from 
redistribution and service provision towards facilitating market competition and that the 
current tranche of welfare to work policies are part of this response. Finally, it uses 
figures from the Scottish and UK government for the period between March 2008 and 
March 2013 to look at the challenges facing these policies. Here it is shown that although 
the rise in unemployment has been relatively small given the depth of the recession. 
However it is also shown that there has been a sharp rise in underemployment, a 
significant drop in the number of vacancies and that private sector demand for labour will 
have to grow by as much as a third if the Scottish labour market is to successfully absorb 
those people with a history of mental illness the UK government hopes to move off 
disability benefits. 
 The second part found employers tend to link mental illness with strange and 
unpredictable behaviour; hold stigmatising beliefs about people with a history of these 
conditions; only hire them when information, which has been obtained independently of 
any vacancy, suggests they possess the technical and social skills necessary to fit in with 
how they do business; and they can discount the value of their labour. It then goes on to 
demonstrate five things. The first is that employers think workplace teams are different 
from the sum of their parts and that this has led them to believe the outcomes of 
recruitment decisions are always uncertain. The second is they protect themselves against 
uncertainty by taking a sequential approach to recruitment, one that involves ranking the 
sources of information they use to make recruitment decisions in terms of cost and 
reliability. In order of preference, these are personal experience, the experience of people 
they trust, recruitment agencies and open competition. The third is that their behaviour as 
they descend this hierarchy initially mirrors the thinking of the new economic sociology 
and stratification economists, then the new institutional economics until finally, it comes 
to bear its closest resemblance to neoclassical economics. The fourth is that employers 
descend the hierarchy for as long as their desire for profit outweighs their fear of harm.    
The implications of this sequential multifaceted approach to recruitment for the ability of 
the UK governments welfare to work policies to improve the employability of people 
disabled by mental illness are identified by drawing on Zelizer's ideas about the role of 
connected worlds, circuits of commerce and media of exchange in economic activity. 
These ideas emerged in response to the under and over socialised thinking about the 
economy such as that offered by the new neoclassical economics, the new institutional 
economics and the new economic sociology. They form a line of thought that resonates 
strongly with the heterodox approach to economic analysis of the old institutional 
economics and stratification economics. They also provide a theoretical framework - that 
does not automatically blame the jobless for being unemployed - to hang the findings of 
this study about employers’ multifaceted approach to recruitment;  the co-existence of 
large numbers of vacancies and high rates of unemployment; the peripheral role played 
by human resources professionals in most recruitment decisions; the ignorance of 
employers about the UK government's welfare to work policies; and employers’ hostility 
towards welfare to work contractors.  
 Taken together, the findings of this study indicate the people with a history of mental 
illness who will benefit most from the UK government's welfare to work policies will be 
those who inhabit the same social circles as private sector employers or those who have 
access to them. They also suggest these policies will be unlikely to increase the demand 
for their labour to anything like the degree necessary to absorb the numbers of them that 
will be moving off disability benefits. However, by using Zelizer's thinking about circuits 
of commerce and connected worlds to frame them, they offer hope welfare to work 
policies can be developed that recognise the importance of paid employment to recovery 
without conflating them. A set of policies that acknowledge the influence of impairments, 
social structures, job-related skills, and competition on employability, which accepts 
people diagnosed with mental illnesses will often need to be provided with rights and 
access to resources over and above those that support them to look for work. 
Realising this possibility will require researchers in disability studies to engage with the 
economic and sociological debates about the labour market and build relationships with 
businesses, economists and other branches of sociology that are conducive to 
investigating how the economic and social lives of employers influence their targeting of 
pools of labour; clarifying when it is possible to include people with a history of mental 
illness in these pools, establishing how to go about doing this, determining when it is in 
their interests to do so and identifying what to do when it is not. 
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Chapter One:  
Introduction. 
1.1 The need for the research. 
During the last economic boom, the UK experienced a shortage of labour (Dustmann et 
al. 2005). At the same time, the numbers of people in the UK who were leaving the 
labour market because of their mental illness had been continually rising (Social 
Exclusion Unit 2004; DWP 2012). By 2003 half of the people in the UK and Scotland 
receiving disability benefits did so because of their mental health (Social Exclusion Unit 
2004). The response of the last Labour government to these developments was to 
introduce a tranche of market focused welfare to work policies whose aim was to increase 
the supply of labour by moving welfare spending way from the provision of services 
towards incentivising disabled people to engage with the labour market.  
However, these policies failed to reverse this trend (DWP 2016a, b). Then in the latter 
half of 2008, the western economies experienced a financial crisis, and the UK economy 
suffered the deepest recession since the 1930's (Hay 2010; Stiglitz 2010). Automatic 
stabilisers meant the demand for labour did not drop as much as it did then (Doll et al. 
2009; Veld et al. 2012), with unemployment rising by 2%, in the UK and 4% in Scotland 
(Lambert 2010; Scottish Government 2011). At first glance, these figures seem relatively 
benign, but they obfuscate an increase in underemployment of 25% (Scottish Parliament 
2014) and a considerable drop in the number of vacancies (Nomis 2014).    
Two responses by subsequent governments to the recession were to try and increase the 
role of the market in distributing resources by reducing public sector employment and 
adapting the supply side approach of the last Labour government to increase the pressure 
on people to move off disability benefits and into the labour market. The disputes within 
economics and between economics and sociology about market activity, together with 
concerns voiced by the OECD (2014) about the failure of the UK governments welfare to 
work policies to address the structural influences on employability, raise doubts about the 
efficacy of the UK governments welfare to work policies. Given the proportion of people 
who receive disability benefits because of their mental health, it becomes reasonable to 
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ask, how will the UK government's welfare to work policies affect the attitudes of 
Scottish private sector employers towards hiring jobless people who have been disabled 
by mental illness?  
1.2 The goals of the research. 
This thesis aims to address this question by conducting a quantitative and qualitative 
sociological study. The first part will use the literature and government statistics to look 
at the labour market employers operate in. The second will present evidence from 
employers about their experience, and understanding of mental illness and hiring staff.  In 
the course of addressing the research question, I hope to help jobless people with a 
history of mental illness better protect their interests by introducing lines of thinking 
about the labour market that has been hitherto absent from the disability literature, and 
pinpointing areas that would benefit from further research. 
1.3 The catalyst for the research. 
As the recession was making its presence felt, someone close to me was diagnosed with a 
mental illness. Consequently, this person was hospitalised periodically, which eventually 
cost them their job. I supported them to deal with mental health professionals and manage 
the personal, social and economic impact of these events. Afterwards, when their well-
being improved, they decided to return to work. At first, they were optimistic about being 
able to do this, because before becoming unwell they had worked since they had left 
school. Gradually, successive rejections disheartened them. When we discussed this, I 
made an offer, which was accepted, to use the contacts I had developed in thirty years of 
working in management at operational and strategic levels to introduce them to 
employers. Shortly afterwards, one of my contacts hired them, and since then they have 
not been out of work.  
This experience made me believe the routine exclusion of people with a history of mental 
illness from the workplace represents an injustice. Consequently, I reflected on the role of 
personal contacts, trust, and competition in shaping employment opportunities and the 
clash between my current beliefs and my past actions as an employer, when I often 
rejected applications from job seekers, without talking to them, if felt their history 
 Page 3 of 292 
 
signalled the potential to disrupt production. As a result, I became interested in attempts 
by policymakers to move people with a history of mental illness off disability benefits. 
Why they said they were doing it; how it was being done, the justifications given for their 
approach, whether they took account of labour market conditions, and the results of these 
endeavours. When I retired, I took the opportunity to pursue this interest further and 
immersed myself in two different bodies of work: sociology and economics. Here, I 
discovered two things. Disability studies had concentrated on identifying, investigating 
and quantifying barriers that were preventing people disabled by their mental health from 
supplying their labour to the market and it had failed to engage with the debate within 
economics and between economics and sociology about the role of agency and structure 
in shaping labour market structures and outcomes. As a result, I decided to take on the 
challenge offered by the research question.     
1.4 Preparing for the research. 
The geographic reach of these policies is considerable. The academic ground relevant to 
them is, enormous. The disability literature shows medicine, psychology, psychoanalysis 
and sociology offering different perspectives on mental illness (Rogers and Pilgrim 
2010). Meanwhile, the economic literature indicates that insights into the labour market 
are provided by, amongst others, neoclassical, Austrian, behavioural, classical, 
developmental, feminist, Keynesian, Marxist, old institutional, new institutional, 
Schumpeterian and stratification economics and the new economic sociology (Ha 2014; 
Swedberg and Granovetter 1992; Darity Hamilton and Stewart 2015). Because of this; I 
concluded that my investigation would have to start by addressing the question of breadth 
versus depth.  
Because I was a sole researcher with limited resources living in Scotland looking at 
something new, I believed it was reasonable to focus my activities on the Scottish labour 
market. To decide on the academic ground that needed to be covered, I marked out the 
opposite ends of the debate about mental illness and economic activity.  
The antipodes of the debate about mental illness are represented by those who see it as a 
biological phenomenon: a body’s reaction to a pathogen or physical trauma and those 
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who view it as a social construction. Criticisms of psychiatry made by social 
constructionists argue many of its diagnostic categories are myths because of the lack of 
physical evidence to support their existence (Szass 1987). Biological determinists argue 
improvements in analytical techniques and technology will enable investigations into 
mental illness to provide continually improving descriptions of reality (Rogers and 
Pilgrim 2012). Social constructionists argue mental illnesses are by-products of the 
activities of mental health professionals. In other words, the application of psychiatric 
labels brings into play social pressures that cause the labelled person to manifest the 
behaviour associated with that label (Scheff 1984).  
The debates about the labour market can be captured by the questions, what came first, 
agency in the form of price competition or the structure created by the institutions that 
regulate this competition, is the market best described as a closed static mechanism or an 
open evolving multi-faceted organism, what is the preferred form of market activity, 
agreements between private individuals or agreements regulated by institutional pressure 
and are such institutions exogenous or endogenous to the market? Neoclassical 
economics and its new institutional offshoot argue agency precedes structure, the market 
is a mechanism, and private ordering is preferable to that created by institutions, with the 
former identifying institutions as exogenous to the market and the latter as endogenous 
(Ehrenburg and Smith 2012; Williamson 1975). On the other hand, the new economic 
sociology argues structure precedes agency, the market is an open multi-faceted organism 
and market activity influences and is influenced by social structures with their fostering 
of groups and their associated habits, identities, intimacies, rivalries and media of 
exchange (Granovetter 1985; Zelizer 2007; 2011).   
Medicine, neoclassical economics and the new institutional economics offer under 
socialised views of mental illness and economic activity while sociology and the new 
economic sociology offers over socialised perspectives on these topics (Pilgrim and 
Rogers and Pilgrim 2010; Granovetter 1985; 1995a; Uzzi 1996; 1997). These under and 
over socialised understandings of mental illness and the labour market each offer 
valuable insights into the reality of the relationship between people who have been 
disabled by mental illness and the labour market that the other struggles to accommodate. 
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Drawing on one would maintain the depth of the study and hold out the prospect of some 
exciting theoretical challenges. But utilising them all would allow new lines of economic 
thought to be introduced to disability studies, hold out the possibility of providing a more 
rounded description of the relationship between people who have been disabled by 
mental illness and the labour market and offer hope that bridges can be built between 
researchers interested in disability studies, economics and economic sociology. The 
ultimate goal of this study is helping people with a history of mental illness to protect 
their interests. Because of this, I decided to sacrifice depth for breadth and take a 
heterodox approach to the research question, one resonating with the tack taken by old 
institutional economics, its close relation stratification economics and the later work of 
Zelizer.  
1.5 The approach to the research. 
To understand how multiple understandings of mental distress and the labour market 
influenced the methodological approach I took to this study, it is worthwhile reflecting on 
the nature of theory. Theories are developed by abstraction. Theorists identify a variable 
influencing a phenomenon as pivotal, either a or post priori, then they look at what 
happens when this variable is altered, and everything else is held constant (Bhaskar 1989; 
2008). Gradually, this process is used to paint a picture of the world. Implicit in this 
approach is a belief that this world can be understood, it exists independent of our 
knowledge of it, and our understanding of it can change it (Bhaskar 1989; 2008). 
However, outside of the laboratory, such practice is not possible except as an intellectual 
exercise. Consequently, people’s understanding of events, especially social ones, is often 
a matter of perspective. As a result, people react to the same phenomenon in different 
ways and come to different conclusions about whether things are physical or spiritual, 
complex or complicated, good or bad, important or unimportant, normal or abnormal and 
the influence of agency and structure on a move from a less desirable state to a more 
desirable one (Bhaskar 1989; 2008). It is therefore inevitable there will be a variety of 
theories with different strengths and weaknesses about the same phenomena. From this, it 
is reasonable to conclude location, beliefs and values influence what people research, 
how they research it, where they research it, their goals in doing so and how they 
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interpret its results. All of this is compatible with my belief that the literature shows the 
various models of mental distress and economic activity to offer valuable insights. 
However, making use of them demands I find an approach to the research question that 
can accommodate the influence of perspective, the possibility of transcendence, the 
concepts of risk and uncertainty and the power of narrative. Because of this, I decided to 
take a critical realist approach to the research question. 
1.6 The structure of the thesis. 
The second chapter: ‘Mental illness, recovery and the UK government’s welfare to work 
policies’, discusses the history of the relationship between people diagnosed as mentally 
ill and the labour market. It opens with a look at the medical model of mental distress, 
how criticisms of psychiatry and the concept of mental illness gradually changed the 
locus and provision of care, and how this gave rise to debates amongst people who had 
been diagnosed as mentally ill about the nature of mental distress, the effect of being 
labelled mentally ill, and the idea of recovery. Then it introduces two lines of thought that 
along with medicine informed these discussions: social causation following Marx and 
social action in the form of symbolic interactionalism. From here, it goes on to show that 
in Scotland the dominant understanding of recovery to emerge from these debates is one 
that demands people accept the reality of mental illness and the limitations it imposes, 
identify realistic goals, and then pursue these goals in an enthusiastic manner (Brown and 
Kandirikirira (2007). Next, it discusses how disabled scholars redefined disability as a 
social rather than a biological problem. Then it shows that policymakers at an 
international level responded to the challenges thrown up by the social model of 
disability to the hegemony of medicine over disabled people by adopting Engels's 
complex biopsychosocial model of health (Imrie 2004). A move that enabled them to use 
the language of the social model while rejecting its central premise. It then goes on to 
show that in the UK, Waddell and Aylward (2006) and Waddell and Burton (2006a) 
adapted this model by reducing it to a complicated one. Consequently, they were able to 
argue the role of medicine should be to identify what impairments allow people to do and 
that the outcomes of disability are determined by acts of agency, which is a move that 
made the biopsychosocial model more friendly to market-orientated policies. After this, it 
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shows that as this was happening, Waddell and Burton (2006b) had published work 
identifying paid employment as being beneficial to mental health. It is then argued that 
UK policymakers yoked these developments to research showing people disabled by 
mental illness want the same type of work as their non-disabled peers (Boardman 2003; 
Boardman et al. 2003; Bond 2004; Dunn Grasso and Saunders 2014; Rinaldi et al. 2008) 
and that they could achieve this ambition if they were provided with appropriate support 
(Drake et al. 1996; Becker and Drake 2003; Bond 2004). The aim here being to identify 
paid employment obtained from the competitive market as evidence of recovery in and 
recovery from mental illness (HM Government 2009). The chapter then introduces the 
welfare to work policies the UK government is using to pursue this vision of recovery. 
Finally, it concludes by arguing that because these policies marginalise structural 
influences on employability, there is a need to investigate whether they will increase the 
demand from employers for people with a history of mental illness.  
The third chapter: ‘Welfare, theories of the labour market and welfare to work policies’ 
explores the relationship between neoclassical economics and the UK government’s 
welfare to work policies by juxtaposing it with the old institutional economics, the new 
institutional economics, stratification economics and the new economic sociology. It 
starts with a brief piece of economic history, which shows that after a long struggle, first 
with the old institutional economics and then Keynesianism, neoclassical economics 
came to dominate the thinking of academics and policymakers. Here, the emergence of 
the welfare state, how it is viewed, and the role of economic crisis in shaping 
relationships between academia and policymaking will be touched on.  
The discussion will then turn to neoclassical economics' understanding of the labour 
market. The first thing that will be looked at here will be its use of unrealistic axioms to 
deductively construct a theoretical ideal: the mechanical perfectly competitive market. 
Then it will turn to its attention to its use as a benchmark with which to judge economic 
activity in the real world, the beliefs this use generates about unemployment, the 
unemployed and the state's policymaking role and how neoclassicists address criticisms 
of their approach to economic analysis. After this, the work of Friedman (1968), Phelps 
(1968) is used to introduce the neoclassical concept of a natural rate of unemployment. 
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Then work by Layard al.(1991), Layard and Nickell (2003) and Layard (2001) will be 
drawn on to identify the relationship between the idea of a natural rate of unemployment 
and the UK government's welfare to work policies. Next, the focus will be on the longest 
standing critic of neoclassicism: the old institutional economics. Leaning heavily on work 
by Hodgson and Rutherford it will show this heterodox approach to economic analysis 
views the economy as an open evolving system, which approaches economy analysis 
from the opposite direction to neoclassicism. Moving from general ideas about the 
interaction of agency and structure in the real world and how it evolves to the 
development of explanations for economic activity in a particular time, place and 
institutional setting. During this reflection, the bridge Minsky built between the old 
institutional economics and Keynesianism, with his work on the role of money in shaping 
inflation and unemployment rates will be introduced. 
The next part of the discussion looks at three lines of economic thought that have 
emerged relatively recently: the new institutional economics, stratification economics and 
the new economic sociology. This will show the new institutional economics leans 
heavily on the neoclassical theory to explain the existence of institutions in terms of the 
efficient management of transaction costs (Williamson 1975; 1985; 2000), stratification 
economics follows in the footsteps of the old institutional economics by using a 
heterodox approach to economic analysis to argue cooperation within and competition 
between groups has produced results that require policies that pursue full employment 
and address historical injustices (Darity 2012; Darity Hamilton and Stewart 2015) and 
that the new economic sociology is a backlash against the under socialised understanding 
of economic activity on offer from the neoclassicism and the new institutional economics 
(Granovetter 1985), whose limitations led led Zelizer (2011) to conduct heterodox 
investigations into the role played by intimacy, connected worlds, circuits of commerce 
and multiple media of exchange in economic activity. 
At this point, the discussion will come to three conclusions. The first is neoclassical 
economics, the new institutional economics and the new economic sociology all offer 
valuable insights into the buying and selling of labour in the real world. The second is 
Granovetter is correct to argue neoclassicism, and the new institutional economics offer 
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an under socialised approach to economic activity as is Uzzi (1996; 1997) who concludes 
the new economic sociology provides an over socialised one. The last conclusion is 
Granovetter (1985) has good reason to mourn the decline in influence of the old 
institutional economics for its heterodox approach to economic analysis has built bridges 
with Keynesianism while being able to draw on, whenever appropriate, theories and 
insights from neoclassical economics, new institutional economics, the new economic 
sociology and stratification economics. 
The chapter closes by looking at the influence on the literature on improving the 
employability of people disabled by their mental health of the debates within economics 
and between economics and sociology. Here it will be shown that the focus of this body 
of work has been barriers to the market rather than the workings of the market and how 
this influences the reactions of employers to real people in actual recruitment situations 
(Hayward and Bright 1997; Sharac et al. 2010). It will argue this means there has been no 
engagement with four issues relevant to the research question. The state of the labour 
market; employers’understanding and experience of mental illness, their beliefs about 
what is involved in purchasing labour, their actions when they do so and how welfare to 
work policies have influenced this behaviour. The chapter will then close by concluding 
cutbacks in the public sector influenced by neoclassical thinking mean the best way to 
address these issues is by concentrating on the private sector.   
The fourth chapter: ‘A macro-level exploration of the Scottish labour market at the time 
the UK government was implementing its welfare to work policies’, addresses the first of 
the above issues by looking at the state of the Scottish labour market. It does this in four 
parts. It revisits the financial crisis of 2008 and the subsequent recession and draws on 
work influenced by Hyman Minsky to argue the demand for labour and how money flows 
through an economy are interrelated. Then it demonstrates that the policy response of the 
UK government to the recession, which was to address it with supply-side initiatives 
means the quality of life of people with a history of mental illness will become 
increasingly reliant on having the ability to sell their labour to private sector employers. 
Next, the economic and sociological literature is used to unpack what government 
statistics tell us about the effect of the recession on private sector demand for labour. 
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Here it will be shown that currently there is an excess supply of labour, that the 
surprisingly small drop in unemployment given the depth of the recession disguises a 
sharp increase in underemployment, and that employers tend to stick with existing 
suppliers of labour even when cheaper ones are available. Finally, it discusses the 
numbers of people receiving benefits that the government hopes to move into 
employment. In doing so, it will demonstrate that not only would the market at the height 
of the last boom have struggled to absorb the numbers in question; the private sector will 
have to grow by a third if it is to do so in the future. However, it will argue that because 
the evidence shows employers currently hire some people with a history of mental illness, 
we are not yet in a position to ascertain what effect the UK government's welfare to work 
policies will have on employers demand for labour from those of them who entered the 
labour market after being in receipt of disability benefits. It will conclude that to arrive at 
this destination employers need to be spoken to.       
The fifth chapter,‘Researching the attitudes of employers to hiring people with a history 
of mental illnesses’, prepares the ground for this investigation. It opens with a reflection 
on an appropriate methodological approach to the research question that was driven by a 
desire to capture the reality of employers beliefs and experiences about mental illness and 
the labour market. I decided that to do this; I needed to be able to draw on the important 
insights into these topics offered by the under socialised perspectives of medicine, 
neoclassical economics and the equally important but over socialised ones provided by 
sociology and the new institutional economics. These demands led me to draw two 
conclusions: I would take a heterodox approach to economic analysis, one consistent with 
approach of the old institutional economics, stratification economics and the later work of 
Zelizer; and that taking such an approach will be best served by taking a critical realist 
approach to analysing the data. Adopting the stratified transcendental view of reality held 
by critical realists meant I had to define the research subjects tightly, be cautious about 
identifying universal causal links, and word the research question in a way that precluded 
a simple yes-no answer (Bhaskar 1989; 2008). From here the discussion moves on to 
explore the challenges facing a researcher when they investigate elite groups such as 
employers and the issues surrounding the relationship between the researcher, the topic 
under research and the research subjects. This will show researchers have struggled to get 
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employers to take part in sociological research (Winkler 1987; USEOC 2003; The 
Observatory 2003; Wood et al. 2009), some of them have essentialised employers in 
ways that would be unacceptable if it was done to other research subjects (Ostrander and 
Welch 2002) and that this has led to them being treated disrespectfully (Kogan 1994). 
Then, the discussion goes on to make a presentation about the study’s sampling strategy; 
approach to recruitment and the gathering of information, which will show that in line 
with the thinking of Wood et al. (2009) employers are more likely to take part in such 
research when appropriate lines of communication are identified and opened up. After 
this, there is a consideration of issues relating to ethics, research quality, data collection 
and data analysis. The first part uses my experience of interacting with employers and 
work by Coggan (2007) to conclude that the line taken on ethics by the University is not 
fit for purpose as far as researching employers is concerned. The second part leans on the 
work of Kuhn 1970 and Winter (2000) to argue that for qualitative research, construct 
validity and trustworthiness are better measures of research quality than reliability and 
validity. Then hindsight is drawn upon to claim, contrary to Bogacz (1989), that 
interviews with employers need not be conducted on a one-off basis. Finally, I use my 
immersion in the data to conclude that analysing it always requires context to be borne in 
mind.   
The next three chapters explore employers’ experience of mental illness; why they trade 
for labour in the way that they do and the influence of the government’s welfare to work 
policies on their recruitment practices by analysing evidence obtained from them as a 
result of conducting a set of semi-structured interviews.   
The sixth chapter, ‘Employers and their beliefs about, experiences of and reactions to 
people with a history of mental illness’, starts with a discussion about what employers 
have identified as their three primary sources of information about mental illness: 
medicine, the media and the workplace. In doing so, it will demonstrate that they have led 
employers to believe a history of mental illness signals the potential for strange and 
unpredictable behaviour and that hiring people with such a background poses a threat to 
production. After this, it will show that despite this, employers will employ them as long 
as shared group membership has generated and circulated information showing they have 
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the attributes necessary to fit in with how they and their employees do business. Then it 
reflects on how this behaviour enables employers to accept that stigma influences the life 
chances of people with a history of mental illness and reject the idea stigma shapes their 
recruitment practices while using it to discount the value of the people they hired who 
have been mentally ill. The discussion then closes by asking whether preferring to use 
information generated independently of a vacancy to fill a vacancy is standard 
recruitment practice or whether it is something that is peculiar to the presence of mental 
illness.   
The seventh chapter, ‘What private sector employers think shapes their demand for 
labour’, prepares the ground for investigating this by juxtaposing the beliefs of employers 
about hiring staff with those held by policymakers. It does this in four parts. The first 
shows their views about the relationship between the demand for goods and services and 
the demand for labour coincides with those held by neoclassical economics. Next, it 
shows they want a new employee to be technically competent and a social fit with 
existing staff. Then it goes on to demonstrate that unlike neoclassicism, but like both 
schools of institutionalism and the new economic sociology, employers believe 
identifying someone with these attributes is an endeavour that has uncertain and 
potentially hazardous cost implications. Finally, the chapter comes to a close by 
considering the impact of the differences between employers beliefs about trading for 
labour and those held by policymakers.   
The eighth chapter,  ‘Employers recruitment practices and the influence of the UK 
government’s welfare to work policies’, explores evidence from employers about how 
they recruit staff. It shows they try and make a task with an uncertain outcome more 
predictable and less hazardous by using a two-stage process. First, independent of any 
vacancy they rank sources of information about someone's employability in a hierarchy 
based on their beliefs about its reliability and cost. In descending order these tend to be 
information generated by personal experience, people they trust, obtained for a fee, and 
open competition. When they decide to recruit staff they descend this hierarchy for as 
long the vacancy remains unfilled, and their desire for profit outweighs their fear of harm. 
When discussing this hierarchy it will show that as they descend it, their hiring practices 
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resonate in turn with the work of Zelizer (2007) on intimacy, Granovetter (1985; 1995a) 
on embeddedness, Darity (2005; 2009a) on cooperation within and competition between 
groups and Williamson (1975; 1985; 2000; 2007) on transactional costs until finally it 
bears its closest resemblance to neoclassical arguments about price competition. It 
concludes that the use of this hierarchy by employers explains why they knowingly hired 
individuals from a stigmatised group, people with a history of illness, their reluctance to 
hire human resources professionals, the existence of vacancies when high unemployment 
means there is an accessible supply of suitably qualified labour, their ignorance of the 
UK government’s welfare to work policies and their hostility towards welfare to work 
contractors.     
The final chapter, ‘Conclusions’ discusses the analysis that has taken place in the four 
data chapters. It begins with a summary of the thesis. It then reaches two conclusions 
about the effect of the UK welfare to work policies on the demand from Scottish 
employers for labour from jobless people who have been disabled by mental illness. The 
first is that any increase in demand is unlikely to be enough to prevent the vast majority 
of people from remaining out of work and the second is the people who will benefit most 
from any increase will be those whose social circles include employers or people known 
to them. It does this by drawing together the work of Granovetter (1985; 1995) on 
embeddedness; Williamson (1975; 1985; 2000) on transaction costs; Minsky (1982; 
1992) on the correlation of the demand for labour and how strongly money flows through 
an economy; and Darity (2005; 2009); Darity Mason and Stewart (2010) and Darity 
Hamilton and Stewart (2015) on the economic experience of stigmatised groups by 
utilising the work of Zelizer (2011) on connected worlds, circuits of commerce and media 
of exchange.    
The discussion then goes on to argue the findings of this study show two things. First, 
there is a need to develop a less reductive model of demand to guide research into 
improving the employability of people who have been disabled by mental health 
problems and second, doing this requires researchers from the field of disability studies to 
engage with employers and debates about trade within economics and between 
economics and sociology far more than they have done in the past. As a platform for 
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developing such a model, this study offers the arguments Zelizer (2011) about trade being 
conducted in circuits of commerce that are regulated by different rules, which use various 
media of exchange. The thesis ends by suggesting her work opens the door to developing 
a set of welfare to work policies whose conferring of rights is not informed by a desire to 
restructure society as a market. In other words, policies, which acknowledge the conceit 
involved in identifying paid employment as evidence of recovery from and recovery in 
mental illness and demonstrate less hostility to the redistribution of wealth by the state.     
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Chapter Two: 
 Mental illness, recovery, paid employment and the UK government’s welfare to 
work policies. 
2.1 Introduction.  
This chapter has three aims. The first is to explore changes in the relationship between 
medicine and the mentally distressed. In the course of doing this, it will show that the 
idea that mental distress is a consequence of a biological anomaly has been disputed by 
scholars from a variety of disciplines including sociology for a considerable period. Then 
it will show how these changes led to paid employment obtained from the competitive 
labour market being identified by the UK government as evidence of recovery in and 
recovery from mental illness. And finally, to introduce and reflect upon the welfare to 
work policies it put into place to pursue this vision of recovery.    
It will open by looking at how mental distress became mental illness and the emergence 
of the discipline of psychiatry. Then it reflects on how criticisms of psychiatry and 
psychiatric practice together with developments in neuroscience, pharmacology and 
sociology led to changes in the locus, and provision of care for people diagnosed as 
mentally ill. Next, the ground will be prepared for a discussion about how these changes 
facilitated debates about the meaning of recovery as it relates to mental illness with the 
introduction of two lines of thought that have, in addition to medicine, been influential 
here. The first is social causation, specifically Marxism; and the second is social action in 
the form of symbolic interactionalism. In the course of doing this, consideration will be 
given to the different insights into mental distress and recovery on offer from these 
epistemes.     
The discussion on the debates about the meaning of recovery will show how people 
disabled by their mental health and their allies used insights offered by medicine, 
Marxism and symbolic interactionalism to generate different understandings of recovery 
that are unique, partial, frequently antagonistic, and therefore ontologically problematic. 
Then, it will show how the emergence of a social model of disability led policymakers at 
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an international level to frame disability as a complex biopsychosocial phenomenon.  
Following this, it will discuss how the UK government was able to identify paid 
employment as evidence of recovery in and recovery from mental illness by drawing on 
work that adapted the biopsychosocial model of well-being, thinking about recovery and 
disability that emphasised agency, and research indicating people with a history of mental 
illness could, with appropriate support, successfully compete for work in the competitive 
labour market. The discussion will start to draw to a close by introducing the welfare to 
work policies the UK government believes will enable people with a history of mental 
illness to compete for work in the labour market: changes to the benefits system, anti-
stigma campaigns and vocational support programmes. Finally, it will close by asking 
what questions arise from the presumption of these policies that agency is the 
determinant of employability.           
2.2 The changing relationship between psychiatry and the mentally distressed.    
In the 18
th
 century, the Enlightenment and the Industrial Revolution established science 
rather than religion as the lens through which the world should be viewed (Thompson 
1967; Foucault 2001; Hobsbawn 2006). Demographically they heralded a massive 
increase in the population and a move from a rural to an urban society (Thompson 1967; 
Hobsbawn 2006). Economically, they produced enormous increases in and unequal 
distributions of wealth (Hobsbawn 2006). Socially, these changes led to huge rises in the 
numbers of people who were destitute and involved in activity deemed criminal or 
deviant (Thompson 1967; Foucault 2001; Hobsbawn 2006). Consequently, the authorities 
confined a significant proportion of the poor in prisons or workhouses where the 
conditions were often horrific (Thompson 1967; Hobsbawn (2006). Here, mental distress 
often manifested itself as strange, unusual, unpredictable and disruptive behaviour, which 
their guards struggled to cope with (Porter 2002; Scull 1975). Together these 
developments enabled medicine to succeed in having three related arguments accepted by 
the state: abnormal behaviour that is not directed at material gain is a symptom of an 
illness, not a reaction to intolerable living conditions, successful diagnosis and treatment 
will return the behaviour of the mentally ill to normal; and the symptoms of mental 
illnesses mean medical practitioners have to have the power to impose their authority on 
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the mentally ill (Foucault 2006; Porter 1987; 2002; Scull 2011; Rogers and Pilgrim 
2010).  
Medicine’s success gave rise to the institution of the asylum and the new profession of 
psychiatry (Foucault 2006; Scull 1975; Porter 2002). Forcible confinement in remote 
locations allowed psychiatrists to continually examine monitor and test those they had 
diagnosed as mentally ill (Porter 2002; Rogers and Pilgrim 2010; Scull 1975). Despite 
this level of access and control, they often failed to link diagnostic categories to lesions or 
offer patients any hope of a cure and frequently used violence to bring uncooperative 
patients under control (Porter 2002; Roger and Pilgrim 2010; Foucault 2006; Scull 1975; 
Porter 2002). As a result, critics used the failures of psychiatry and the nature of 
psychiatric practice to dispute whether there was such a thing as mental illness (Rogers 
and Pilgrim 2010). To protect itself and the concept of mental illness medicine 
successfully protected itself by adopting a pseudoscience, which was fashionable in the 
late nineteenth and early twentieth century: eugenics (Porter 1987; 2002; Rogers and 
Pilgrim 2010). The effectiveness of this defense was reduced by the First World War 
because it resulted in significant numbers of soldiers, many, members of the upper 
echelons of society and working class volunteers fuelled by a sense of patriotic duty, 
returning home from the battlefield in states of severe mental distress. Now, it became 
politically and socially problematic to argue mental illnesses was the product of breeding, 
or that violence was an appropriate tool to control the behaviour of those who suffered 
from them (Bogacz 1989).  
The space created by this development allowed the emerging disciplines of psychology 
and psychoanalysis to link their insights into mental distress to those of psychiatry’s 
existing critics and mount a challenge to medical authority over the mentally unwell 
(Porter 1987; 2002; Pilgrim and Rogers 2010). Psychiatry's response was two-pronged. 
First, it highlighted its scientific foundations (Rogers and Pilgrim 2010) and then it drew 
attention to the ontological and epistemological weaknesses of its critics. Examples of 
these are psychology’s reliance on arbitrary statistical cut-off points, psychoanalysis’s 
tendency to reframe the symptoms of physical ailments, including pain, as the products of 
unconscious thoughts and the failure of either of them to provide a comprehensive 
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explanation for mental distress (Rogers and Pilgrim 2010). Gradually, these tactics 
enabled psychiatry to subordinate psychology and psychoanalysis to its authority (Porter 
1987; 2002; Rogers and Pilgrim 2010; Bentall 2003)
 1
. However, they also led to a 
refinement of the medical model of mental distress. Although strange, unusual, 
unpredictable and disruptive behaviour was still seen as evidence of mental illness, its 
cause could now be a lesion or a biological response to a significant life event. As a 
result, there were now two categories of mental illnesses: neuroses and psychoses (Porter 
1987; 2002; Rogers and Pilgrim 2010; Bentall 2003).  
With this challenge to its authority behind it, psychiatry used these changes to identify 
more types of behaviour as evidence of mental illness (Porter 1987; 2002; Rogers and 
Pilgrim 2010; Bentall 2003) and diagnose increasing numbers of people as mentally ill 
(Wittaker 2010; Horowitz and Wakefield 2012). However, not only was it still unable to 
link many mental illnesses to lesions or offer its patients hope of a cure it was now also 
unable to explain why many people seemed to recover from mental illnesses without any 
medical intervention (Porter 1987; 2002; Bentall 2003; Rogers and Pilgrim 2010). 
Consequently, critics of psychiatry were able to argue, with increasing force, that the 
evidence showed medicine’s understandings of mental distress was either partial or 
mistaken (Rogers and Pilgrim 2010); its diagnostic categories were often mere 
hypotheses (Mirowsky and Ross 1989a; 1989b) and that its treatments were frequently 
pointless (Szass 1987; Bentall 2003)
2
. These arguments fuelled new concerns about 
psychiatry, psychiatric practice and the cost-effectiveness of asylums. Although these did 
not lead to a rejection of the medical model of mental distress, they did result in 
compulsory confinement in asylums and treatment by psychiatrists being reserved for the 
minority of mentally distressed individuals whose diagnosis signalled the potential for 
dangerous behaviour (Rogers and Pilgrim 2010).  
                                                             
1 Later in the sixties, medicine took the same approach to psychiatric dissidents such as Cooper, Laing and Szasz who 
argued that a diagnosis of mental illness was an oppressive act. In addition to highlighting its science-based approach 
medicine obfuscated the different ideological positions of its critics by labelling them as anti-psychiatry. For more on 
this see Rogers and Pilgrim (2010).  
2 Caution needs to be exercised before embracing these criticisms too enthusiastically: medicine has identified many 
lesions that produce the types of behavior associated with mental illness; amongst them Syphilis, Dementia and 
Alzheimer's.  Furthermore, it has developed treatments that have alleviated the suffering caused by many conditions.   
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For the majority, care was now provided in community settings and coordinated by 
general practitioners (Rogers and Pilgrim 2010). For many, this involved exclusion from 
the workforce and the provision by the state of financial support in the form of disability 
benefits. By the end of the first decade of the twenty-first century, the numbers of people 
who had been identified as being disabled by mental illness had grown to the point where 
they made up almost half of the recipients of these benefits (DWP 2012). However, the 
money provided by these benefits together with low levels of social mobility in the UK 
(Blanden et al. 2005; Social Mobility and Child Poverty Commission 2014) meant a 
disproportionate number of people found themselves trapped in areas with high rates of 
crime, poverty, unemployment and poor access to high-quality education and health care 
(Dohrenwend 1992; Meltzer et al. 1990; Thomas et al. 1996; Marwaha and Johnson 
2004; Butterworth 2009; Crisp 2009). Given this situation, it was not entirely surprising 
to find they were more likely to be unemployed than any other group of disabled people 
(Social Exclusion Unit 2004) or that they were more likely to die than find work (Select 
Committee on Work and Pensions 2014). Perhaps less predictably, it also seems to have 
led them to discuss mental distress, mental illness and the meaning of recovery. In 
addition to medicine, two lines of thought were highly influential here: social causation 
following the thinking of Marx and social action, specifically symbolic interactionalism, 
a body of work rooted in insights provided by Weber and the American pragmatists. So 
before looking at the influence of these discussions on mental health policy, it is 
necessary to consider these lines of thought and their understandings of mental distress.    
2.3 Social causation: Marx and mental illness as a form of alienation.  
According to Marx, securing the resources necessary to survive and thrive requires 
humans, willingly or otherwise, to enter into relationships that subordinate their will to 
that of others (Elster 1985). He argued these relationships constituted the Economic 
structure of society, provided the foundation for its legal, medical and political 
superstructures and acted as determinants of social consciousness (Marx 1859). From this 
perspective, understanding human experiences, such as mental distress, requires 
understanding how people are physically organised and how this organisation affects 
their relationships with each other and with nature (Marx and Engels 1968).  
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In constructing his argument, Marx identified four parameters that determine how people 
are organised: the means, forces, relations and mode of production. The means refers to 
natural resources and technology; the forces comprise of humanity’s physical and 
intellectual power; the relations are the sum of the social relationships a person must 
enter into to thrive, and the mode is a combination of the forces and relations of 
production (Elster 1985). Marx argued that capitalism changes the purpose of work. 
Instead of supporting the physical and mental well-being of the worker, its goal becomes 
the creation of profits for the capitalist. It does this by exploiting the difference between 
labour as something whose value cannot be determined in advance and its ability to be 
measured and priced in terms of hours (Marx 1999). As a result, humans become 
alienated from their work and their social and physical environments, and wealth creation 
becomes defined as the product of individual rather than collective action (Elster 1985).  
At this point, it is necessary to be clear what Marx means by alienation. Some degree of 
estrangement or distance is required for the creation of a relationship (Buber 1957). If 
one adopts the Hegelian notion of distancing through objectification and identifies 
distance as a form of alienation, then it follows that alienation is normal, inevitable and in 
many cases desirable because autonomy is impossible without it. But, although 
relationships imply the existence of distance, this does not mean that distance implies the 
existence of relationships (Samuels 1976). Most writings on alienation share this 
conceptual base, which is one that places great emphasis on the relationship between 
alienation and objectification (Evans 1978).  
The meaning of alienation concerning paid employment emerges by reflecting on what 
happens when someone works for wages. Here, someone puts something of themselves 
into what they produce, which they surrender for money. In doing so, they objectify them 
self, in a way that separates them from the products of their labour. Consequently, goods 
and services can now be valued in terms of exchange rather than usefulness. These 
valuations start a process of reification, where humans gradually become defined by 
when, where, and how they contribute to production (Marx 1999). As a result, the 
experienced world becomes an objective reality. But because people are denied access to 
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or are excluded from aspects of this reality, they become unable to see themselves as they 
are. Because of this, they develop a false consciousness, which alienates them from each 
other and nature (Marx 1999).  
For the most part, false consciousness led Marx’s followers to look on alienation as a 
practical historical problem rather than a subjective experiential one (Evans 1978). 
However, some have used his thinking about capitalism and alienation to argue this is not 
the case. They hypothesised that subconsciously, people are aware of the dissonance 
between their conscious beliefs and a social reality where capitalist production creates 
and reifies social classes. Deep down, they know their destiny is, for the most part, 
beyond their control, a matter of structure rather than agency. As a result, they find their 
social environment stressful, which causes some of them to behave in ways that capitalist 
societies view as deviant. Actions that Berger and Pullberg (1966) have identified as an 
attempt at "dereification"; which is a concept that resonates with the idea of self-
alienation, which has frequently been used in studies of mental illness (Evans 1978). 
Now, instead of being seen as something caused by a lesion, mental distress becomes 
identified as a failure of people to internalise successfully the things capitalism deems to 
be desirable (Scull 1975; 1979; 2006). 
In this schematic, medicine’s authority can be seen as part of the “superstructure” that has 
emerged from the dialectical struggle between capital and labour. From this perspective 
the substitution of monotony for cruelty, the change in the location of care from the 
asylum to the community, the creation of opportunities for psychiatry and drug 
companies to trade in the anguish of the mentally distressed, the identification of people 
with a history of mental illness as a source of labour and the use of multiple media to 
anaesthetize public opinion by contrasting the evils of the past with the beneficence of the 
present reveal themselves as attempts to satisfy the evolving demands of capitalism (Grob 
1990; Scull 1975; 1979; 2006). Here, medicalisation, with its claims about curing and 
caring in a humane environment, is seen as a tool used by the ruling class to affirm the 
moral validity of their system by diverting the attention of an oppressed proletariat away 
from the devastation being wrought on them (Scull 2006).  
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It is an understanding of well-being that has influenced the thinking of many disabled 
people. An important example of this is “Fundamental Principles of Disability” published 
in 1976 by the Union of the Physically Impaired Against Segregation (UPIAS). Here for 
the first time, a distinction was drawn between impairment and disability. In page 14 The 
UPIAS described impairment as a situation where someone is,   
“Lacking part of or all of a limb, or having a defective limb, organism or 
mechanism of the body.” 
On the same page, they went on to define disability as,  
 
“The disadvantage or restriction of activity caused by contemporary 
organisation, which takes no or little account of people who have physical 
impairments and thus excludes them from the mainstream of social activities.” 
 Drawing this distinction between impairment and disability enabled disabled scholars 
such as Oliver, Barnes and Finkelstein to develop a social model of disability 
(Shakespeare and Watson 2002). A succinct description of its central premise is provided 
by Pinder (1995 p 608),  
“Disability is a problem of society; difficulties result from the barriers 
erected by a disabling environment rather than from the defects and 
deficiencies of disabled people as individuals”.  
Here, impairment is biological, and disability is social: the result of capitalism’s failure to 
accommodate people with impairments (Coles 2001). Now, the focus of inquiry can be 
moved away from individual bodies as in the medical model, towards disabling barriers. 
Consequently, it is possible to argue the removal of these barriers will eliminate disability 
(Finkelstein 1980).  
 
Although the social model of disability has provided disabled people with a banner to 
rally round, disabled intellectuals and their allies have been amongst its staunchest critics. 
Hughes and Patterson (1997) argue it fails to take into account the personal experience of 
impairment because it surrenders the body to medicine; Morris (1991) and Pinder (1995) 
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point out that because impairments can cause pain, which is itself limiting, the distinction 
between impairment and disability is not always as clear-cut as the advocates of the 
social model of disability suggest; and Shakespeare (1994) and Pinder (1995) accuse its 
creators of ignoring the role played by culture in oppressing people with impairments. 
Together these criticisms are effectively saying the social model of disability fails to take 
account of the complexity and diversity of disabled people’s lives. 
 
In the light of the above and the earlier observation that medicine has frequently failed to 
identify a biological cause for mental distress, it is easy to understand why most people 
with a history of mental illness do not believe they are disabled and why they reject the 
idea the social model of disability is relevant to them (Beresford 2002; 2010; Mulvany 
2000). Later, we will see these views are, to some degree, mistaken. For now though, it is 
enough to say two things: policy makers at an international level have adopted the 
language used by UPIAS to draw a distinction between disability and impairment and 
used it in a way that allows them to continue to identify disability as a question of 
biology rather than social structures; and the UK government have used research, which 
has built on this development, to create a set of welfare to work policies that identify 
disability as a biological difference and the outcomes it produces as something that 
depends on attitudes towards that difference. But before we can discuss this further, it is 
necessary to address the influence on these policies of social action theorists.  
2.4 Social action: symbolic interactionalism and the relationship between mental 
illness and stigmatising labels.   
Symbolic interactionalism is an approach to mental distress that is more comfortable with 
issues of culture and identity than the social model of disability. It is a line of thought 
rooted in the work of Max Weber and the American pragmatists (Pascale 2011). Weber 
(1968) defined sociology as a science that uses social actions to arrive at a causal 
explanation of their cause and effects. He believed religion, ideas, status, and bureaucracy 
could influence these in ways that were distinct from economics or the physical world. It 
led him to argue knowledge is the product of cultural processes and that because of this 
there are multiple interpretations of reality, which can be both confrontational and subject 
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to change. The American pragmatists used this insight to argue that understanding reality 
is an ongoing process and that scientific laws should be seen as conceptual aids for 
understanding a phenomenon rather than as a definitive explanation of it (Baert, 2005). 
Here, accepted truths and expert status are reduced to credit notes: things whose value 
depends on their ability to resist challenges to their authority (James 2013). From this 
perspective, meaning and status are fluid concepts and consciousness is something 
shaped by the acts, gestures and symbols that constitute social interaction (Mead 1934). It 
is here the basic premise of symbolic interactionalism becomes apparent, which is that 
the individual and society are constituted through shared meanings and because of this 
their reactions to each other are dependent on these meanings (Pascale 2011).     
 
From the above, it can be seen there are two categories of social action: complying with 
and deviating from social norms. For symbolic interactionalists, illness and disability are 
types of deviance (Friedson 1966). Furthermore, they see investigating deviance as 
something that can contribute to understanding how society functions (Friedson 1966). 
However, when they do this, they ignore any role played by inequality or poverty (Liazos 
1972). Instead, they concentrate on the ability of deviance to decouple past identities 
from current ones; destroy hopes for the future and regulate the ability of people to adapt 
to these changes (Strauss and Corbin (1991). It is an approach that has led them to 
identify two types of deviance: primary, which is an act or an attribute before it is 
publicly labelled and secondary, which is their public identification and then use them to 
argue secondary deviance is more important than primary deviance because it can alter 
someone's self-regard and social identity (Lemert 1951; 1967).    
 
Becker (1963) built on the idea that there is more than one type of deviance to divide 
society into four groups of people: those who publically conform to social norms; those 
who are falsely accused of deviating from them; those who secretly deviate from them 
and those who publically deviate from them. By doing so, he was able to argue society 
can only accurately label public conformists and deviants and that because of this a 
deviant is someone who is successfully labelled as such (Becker 1963). At around the 
same time, Goffman (1990) reflected on people’s reactions to labels signalling deviance. 
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It led him to draw two conclusions: primary deviants are haunted by the possibility of 
rejection because even though they have managed successfully to disguise their identity 
from others, they cannot hide it from themselves and secondary deviants not only expect 
to be rejected (enacted stigma) they also feel such rejection is justified (felt stigma). 
Taken together, the work of Lemert, Becker and Goffman generated three insights: 
stereotypes are part of people’s psychological makeup, whether they are defined by them 
or not (Scheff 1984; Link and Phelan 2013); labelling is a process used by society to 
regulate the interactions of its members, which can leave negatively labelled people 
vulnerable to unfair treatment (Hayward and Bright 1997; Scambler 2006; 2009); and 
secondary deviance is more important than primary deviance because it has a more 
significant influence on someone’s self-regard, social identity, social status and psychic 
structure (Scheff 1984; Link and Phelan 2006; 2013).    
 
An empirical study that demonstrates the power of secondary deviance is Robert Scott’s 
1969 book ‘The Making of Blind Men’. In it, he shows that once a medical practitioner 
has labelled someone as being biologically blind, powerful social institutions exert 
pressure on them to behave in ways associated with blindness such as acting docile and 
helpless. In other words, they are subjected to a process that renders them socially blind, 
which is a transformation that society can use to argue separating them from their sighted 
peers and limiting their opportunities is something that is done for their benefit rather 
than its convenience. By demonstrating the role played by diagnostic labels in socially 
defining the people to whom they are attached, Scott showed how problematic they could 
be. The relevance of Scott’s work to mental illness is that it suggests diagnosing someone 
as mentally ill can provoke the behaviour associated with a diagnostic label. 
Consequently, the possibility emerges that the behaviour associated with mental illness is 
the result of a label rather than an undiscovered biological anomaly, which is essentially 
the argument used by Scheff (1984) when he presented his labelling theory of mental 
illness. Once more and from a different direction doubt is cast on the existence of mental 
illness.     
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The response of psychiatry and its allies to Scheff’s work was splenetic. They attacked it 
for lacking scientific rigour (Gove 1970; Gove and Fain 1973); being based on loose 
definitions and selective interpretations of data (Gibbs 1972); and assuming that people 
discriminate against the mentally ill because of diagnostic labels rather than abnormal 
behaviour (Crocetti et al. 1974; Gove and Fain 1973; Huffine and Clausen 1979). He was 
accused of not given due weight to evidence showing symptoms precede diagnosis, the 
expert knowledge of the labellers, the systematic approach they took to applying labels or 
the way labelling and treatment led to an alleviation of suffering (Gove 1975). 
Psychiatry’s defenders took the position that people diagnosed as mentally ill were 
rejected because of the anti-social symptoms of their illness rather than the labels 
attached to them (Gove 1975). Deviant behaviour generated deviant labels, not vice 
versa. For them, identifying and labelling deviance was beneficial rather than harmful 
because it could provide ill people and those close to them with a sense of direction and 
hope for the future. Scheff for his part likened his critics to pots calling a kettle black and 
referred them to longstanding criticisms of the medical model of mental distress and the 
powerful intellectual roots that underpinned labelling theory (Scheff 1984)
3
.    
 
Perhaps as a result of the ferocious criticism of labelling theory by psychiatry and its 
supporters, interest in Scheff’s work was largely confined to sociology (Scheff 2010). It 
started to spread elsewhere after Link and his team published a paper introducing 
modified labelling theory. It accepted the existence of mental illness and rejected the idea 
that labelling could cause its symptoms. However, it still saw being labelled as mentally 
ill as being a negative experience. It argued that when a professional applies this label to 
someone, it confers membership of a disdained group and that with this change in 
identity they not only become vulnerable to social rejection they come to believe such 
rejection is justified. As a result, their confidence and self-esteem are undermined, the 
size and heterogeneity of their social networks are reduced, and their ability to engage in 
                                                             
3 It is hard not to be somewhat cynical about medicine's response to Scheff's work, especially when one recalls a study 
showing how psychiatry treated a cohort of students who faked the symptoms of mental illness to con their way into 
various US asylums. It demonstrated medicine, in some parts of the US, has been guilty of the same crimes it accused 
Scheff of committing. See Rosenhan (1973). ‘On being sane in insane places'. Science 179, 4070, 250-258. 
http://digitalcommons.law.scu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2384&context=lawreview     
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economic activity is degraded. All of which creates a situation where the labelled person 
is more likely to become and remain ill (Link and Phelan 2006).  
 
Modified labelling theory received a more positive response from some critics of Scheff’s 
work. For example, Gove published work in 2004 that tried to integrate its insights with 
those of psychiatry. However, most remained hostile towards the idea that labelling 
caused the behaviour they associated with mental illnesses. The reason for this was their 
conflicting positions on stigma. For labelling theorists stigma is central: it sets into 
motion the application of cultural stereotypes and their related negative images both by 
society and the recipient of the label (Rosenfeld 1997). For supporters of medicine, the 
concept of stigma is dangerous because it can lead people to mistakenly frame a symptom 
of an illness as the product of social pressures and prevent them from seeking treatment 
(Crocetti, Spiro and Siassi 1974; Gove and Fain 1973; Huffine and Clausen 1979). As 
well as failing to win over entirely medicine’s supporters, modified labelling theory’s 
acceptance of the medical model opened it up to criticism from Link’s fellow 
sociologists. They accused it of taking for granted that negative attributes resided in the 
person being labelled rather than the person doing the labelling (Fine and Asch 1988); 
paying too much attention to the processes of category formation and stereotyping and 
not enough to the consequences of discriminatory acts (Oliver 1990); ignoring the causal 
input from social structures such as relations of class, gender, ethnicity and disability 
(Scambler 2006; 2009). This last point is particularly important, for it suggests the ability 
of improvements in information, education, legislation and treatment to improve the 
employability of people who have been diagnosed as being mentally ill will be mediated 
by the influence of social structures.       
2.5 Reframing recovery.  
The medical, social action and social causation explanations of mental distress informed 
debates amongst people living in the community, who had been diagnosed as mentally ill, 
about its causes. Some accepted it was the result of a permanent or temporary biological 
anomaly; others argued it was the product of hostile social structures, and there were 
those who saw it as a consequence of being labelled mentally ill. Unsurprisingly, the 
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advocates of these positions took different positions on recovery: the first focused on a 
cure or managing symptoms, the second on societal change and the third on reclaiming a 
valued social identity. As a result, employment; compulsory treatment, hope, housing, 
medication, personal development, personal responsibility, relationships with 
professionals; types of therapy and social status joined biology as subjects of inquiry 
(Anthony 1993; Davidson 2003; Deegan 1996; Frese and Davis 1997; Mead and 
Copeland 2000; Ridgway 2000; Roe and Chopra 2003; Ramon et al. 2007; Shepherd at al 
2008; Wallcraft et al. 2007). Consequently, recovery became a matter of perspective: it 
could be an individual or collective experience; a medical goal, a social process, or 
compound of any or all of these (Davidson& Roe 2007; Deegan 1998; Liberman and 
Kopelowicz 2005).  
2.5.1 The response of policymakers in Scotland to the reframing of recovery.   
The reaction of the Scottish policymakers to these developments can be seen by 
examining the documents they published in 2003, 2006, 2009 and 2012. In chronological 
order, these are, “The National Programme for Improving Mental Health and Well Being, 
“Delivering for Mental Health”, “Towards a Mentally Flourishing Scotland: Policy and 
Action Plan”, and the “Mental health Strategy for Scotland 2012-2015”. All of them 
describe recovery as something that encompasses the social and clinical aspects of 
someone’s life. However, none of them defines recovery, or what is necessary for it to 
take place. For these, we have to turn to the ‘Scottish Recovery Network’ (SRN), which 
was created by the Scottish government in 2004 as part of its “National Programme for 
Improving Mental Health and Wellbeing.”   
The importance of the medical model to the SRN is shown on page 11 of “Recovering 
Mental Health in Scotland” (Brown and Kandirikirira 2007), which states,   
“Recovery usually follows an acceptance of illness.”   
Predictably, given the content of the policy documents, this does not mean they believe 
recovery is the same as cure. On their web page “What is Recovery” the SRN (2007) 
state,    
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“Recovery is being able to live a meaningful and satisfying life, as 
defined by each person, in the presence or absence of symptoms. It is 
about having control over and input into your own life. Each 
individual’s recovery, like his or  her experience of the mental health 
problems or illness, is a unique and deeply personal process.”   
As for what this means, page 8 of “Recovering Mental Health in Scotland” (Brown and 
Kandirikirira 2007) state:  
 
“Most commentators including Allott & Loganathan (2002) and 
Hatfield & Lefley (1993) agree that the definition and meaning of 
recovery will vary for individuals as it will be based on an individual's 
system of personal values developed through life experience. There is 
an emerging understanding around the basic factors and principles 
which promote it, suggesting that recovery is a unique process, vision, 
attitude or life journey (W A Anthony, 2000; Copeland et al., 1996; P 
E Deegan, 1988). It is about regaining self -esteem and hope for a 
productive present and future, and recognising that you can lead a 
fulfilling life (Leete, 1988, p. 52). It is about embracing the identity 
and self-determination of a healthy and hopeful person, rather than 
living the life of an ill person."  
From the above references, it is evident the SRN is heavily influenced by American 
thinking about recovery. Here, it is about making appropriate choices: choosing to accept 
medical opinion; choosing to be realistic about identifying goals and choosing to change 
their values and attitudes when they obstruct their pursuit. It follows that the SRN holds 
the clinical expert responsible for the elimination or reduction of symptoms and the 
individual responsible for managing the problems associated with mental illness such as 
access to health care, poverty, poor housing and unemployment. Apparently, the SRN 
believes recovery involves recovery of a valued social identity as well as recovery from 
mental illness. In other words, it involves recovery in and recovery from mental illness 
(Davidson and Roe 2007).  
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The SRN has published work claiming its approach to recovery is a paradigm shift 
(McCormack 2007). In this paper, McCormack supports his claim by providing a list of 
negative attributes associated with people who have been diagnosed as mentally ill: 
homelessness, unreliability, drug addiction and periods of crisis and then reframing them 
positively. Instead of describing a client or patient without a roof over their head as 
homeless he describes them someone who has street survival skills, if they have a record 
of missing appointments they are portrayed as having a record of attending some, if they 
are an alcoholic they are depicted as someone who uses alcohol to cope but has periods of 
abstinence, or when they are prone to crises they are identified as someone who continues 
to exist despite the stress they live with. By describing the SRN approach to recovery as a 
paradigm shift, McCormack is overplaying his hand. Why becomes apparent by returning 
to the papers by Brown and Kandirikirira (2007) and the SRN (2007). There, illness is a 
precondition for recovery, which implies that the homelessness, drug addiction, 
unreliability and crises experienced by people with a history of mental illness are 
ultimately a result of biological deviance. In this light, it would have been perhaps more 
accurate for McCormack to claim that although the SRN approach to recovery fails to 
offer an alternative to the deficit model of mental distress, it enables people who have 
been diagnosed as mentally ill to be described more positively.   
Another concern about the SRN’s approach to recovery is its implicit rejection of the idea 
structural inequalities contribute to the onset of mental illness. In the papers published by 
the SRN between 2004 and 2015, there is almost no mention of social structures. Instead, 
they focus on relationships, peer support, personal responsibility and empowerment.  It 
would be crass to deny these are vital to mental well-being, but in the absence of the 
context provided by social structure, the possibility arises that the social and the 
interpersonal will be conflated. If this happens, it creates the danger people will look at 
reality as being subjective, feel empowered when no empowerment exists and be willing 
to assume responsibility for situations that are beyond their control. Tackling stigma, for 
example, could be reduced to a question of changing attitudes by framing the glass as 
being half full as opposed to half empty (Angermeyer and Schomerous 2012), rather than 
by addressing the social structures that create those attitudes (Scambler 2006; 2009). It 
would appear that for the SRN, recovery requires people with a history of mental illness 
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to internalize a way of thinking that identifies positive exercises of agency rather than the 
forces exerted by social structures as the factors that shape life’s outcomes, which is a 
trait Foucault (2008) has identified as a precondition for structuring society along the 
lines of a competitive market.  
2.6 Preparing for recovery: redefining disability.   
Earlier it was said that those people with a history of mental illness that saw the social 
model of disability as having no relevance for them were mistaken. The reason given for 
this was policymakers at an international level had adopted the language used by UPIAS 
to identify disability as something that is socially constructed to define it as something 
rooted in biological deviance and that the UK government had used work that had 
developed this theme to construct a set of welfare to work policies identified the 
outcomes of disability as something that is mediated by personal attitudes. This part of 
the discussion will now go into this in greater depth. In 1980 the World Health 
Organisation (WHO) published the International Classification of Impairment, Disability 
and Handicap (ICIDH) in 1980. On page 28 this document describes disability as,  
 
“Any restriction or lack (resulting from an impairment) of ability to perform an 
activity in the manner or within the range considered normal for a human being”. 
And on page 27, impairment is defined in the following terms,  
  
“Any loss or abnormality of psychological, physiological, or anatomical structure 
or function”.  
From the above, it can be seen that the WHO has followed the UPIAS by identifying 
impairment and disability as two different things. However, unlike the UPIAS, the WHO 
identifies deviations from biological norms rather than the barriers erected by social 
structures as the root of disability (Bickenbach et al. 1990). In the UK policymakers 
amended this schematic before it was incorporated into UK law with the passing of the 
Disability Discrimination Act 1995 (DDA). What these amendments are can be seen by 
looking at section 1 of that Act, which defines a disabled person as someone with,  
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a) A physical or mental impairment, which has,  
b)  A substantial and long-term adverse effect on their ability to carry out normal 
day-to-day activities.  
 
Here, the terms psychological, physiological or anatomical have been replaced by 
physical and mental, and a temporal component has been introduced to the definition of 
disability. Furthermore, the only guidance given by the DDA for defining the word 
impairment is in schedules one and two, where it says that it should have its normal 
meaning unless it is a mental one, in which case it must be caused by a clinically 
recognised illness. While the DDA has been superseded by the Equality Act 2010, the 
above definition is still relevant because it was incorporated in its entirety into section 6 
of the 2010 Act.   
 
At a superficial level, this could be seen as a partial victory for advocates of the social 
model of disability. However, believing this would be a mistake. Policymakers at an 
international and national level have identified normality as the ability to engage in 
existing social roles. By doing so, they are denying that social structures are disabling. In 
other words, participation by disabled people in day to day activities may require the 
provision of the support necessary to offset the limitations imposed by their impairments.     
2.7 Redefining recovery: paid employment as evidence of recovery in and recovery 
from mental illness.  
Since its creation in 1980, the failure ICIDH to acknowledge the role played by social 
structures has led to the discrediting of the ICIDH (Imrie 2004). The WHO sought to 
address this development in 2001 by publishing the International Classification of 
Functioning, Disability and Health (ICF). Pg 213 defines impairment as,  
   
“The loss or abnormality of body structure or physiological function (Including 
mental functions).”   
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On the same page, disability is not defined in terms of aetiology but limitations on 
activities, and participation restrictions.   
 
Activities are,    
 
“The execution of a task or action by an individual.” 
 
Limitations on activity resulting from impairments are,  
 
“Difficulties an individual may have in executing activities...in a manner or to the 
extent that is expected of people without the health condition.” 
 
While participation is,  
 
“A person's involvement in a life situation." 
 
And restrictions are defined as,  
 
“Problems an individual may experience in involvement in life situations", where, 
“The presence of a participation restriction is determined by comparing an 
individual's participation to that which is expected of an individual without 
disability in that culture or society." 
 
The ICF represents the adoption by policymakers at an international level of the 
biopsychosocial model of health and disability (Imrie 2004). In other words not only can 
impairments be disabling so can reactions to them. Like the model of recovery adopted in 
Scotland, the ICF does not deal with social structures but inter-personal relationships. 
When Engel (1977; 1980) created this model, he aimed to protect the hegemony of 
medicine over sickness and disability as he reconciled it with psychological and social 
understandings of those phenomena. He did this by allocating each of them a sphere of 
influence, where medical problems took precedence over psychological ones, and 
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psychological problems took precedence over social ones (Armstrong 1997). However, 
Engel looked upon well-being as a complex phenomenon (Engel 1977; 1980). Because 
the WHO does not have an executive function it did not have to consider the implications 
of seeing the world as being different from the sum of its parts when it created the ICF. 
Complexity means that using the ICF to create policy is problematic for national 
legislatures because it renders its outcomes uncertain. Waddell and Aylward (2006) 
solved this problem by identifying the results of interactions between the biological, 
psychological and social worlds as complicated, in other words well being is the sum of 
its biological, psychological and social components. 
  
By removing uncertainty from the biopsychosocial model, Waddell and Burton (2006a, 
b) were able to argue the role of medicine should be to identify the type of work disabled 
people can perform; the responsibility of the state should be to implement policies that 
will support them to overcome the physical, psychological and social barriers that prevent 
them from using agency to secure paid employment from the competitive labour market; 
and the duty of people with a history of mental illness should be to embrace this support, 
use it to identify realistic employment opportunities and then pursue them in an 
enthusiastic manner.  The UK government accepted this argument. By linking it to the 
dominant version of recovery they could use research showing most people in receipt of 
disability benefits because of their mental health wanted to be in paid employment 
(Boardman 2003; Boardman et al 2003; Bond 2004; Dunn Grasso and Saunders 2014; 
Rinaldi et al. 2008) and studies claiming they could realise this ambition when they are 
provided with appropriate support (Drake et al. 1996; Becker and Drake 2003; Bond 
2004) to argue paid employment obtained from the competitive Labour market is 
evidence of recovery from and recovery in mental illness (HM Government 2009).  
2.8 Facilitating recovery: introducing the UK government’s  
welfare to work policies  
The UK government is pursuing its vision of recovery by adopting and adapting the 
changes to the benefits system made by the last Labour government
4
. Despite concerns 
                                                             
4. The changes to the benefits system and their effect on the supply of labour will be discussed in chapter three. 
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raised by research using agency theory in Australia and the Netherlands about such an 
approach (Considine et al. 2014; Rees et al. 2014; Struyven and Steurs 2005), it is doing 
this by expanding the role of private sector firms. They are now being used to determine 
the nature of people’s impairments, the limitations they impose, eligibility for benefits 
and how to introduce them to the labour market to private and third sector contractors and 
assuming employers use human resource professionals and their beliefs about what 
constitutes recruitment best practice to hire staff (Keep and James 2010).   
2.8.1 The Work Capability Assessment.  
As a result of a rolling programme of ‘Work Capability Assessments’ (WCA) most, 
people who have received these benefits have now been moved on to ‘Support Group’ 
(SG) or ‘Work Related Activity Group’ (WRAG) ‘Employment Support Allowance’ 
(ESA) or ‘Job Seekers Allowance’ (JSA). People receiving SG ESA are to be supported 
to look for paid employment if this is something they want to do; people being provided 
with WRAG ESA will be compelled to do so after they have been provided with support 
to help offset the effect of their impairment; while those on JSA are expected to look for 
work immediately.   
The WCA allocates three distinct roles to medicine, the individual and the state along the 
lines outlined by Waddell and Aylward (2006) and Waddell and Burton (2006a, b). The 
role of medicine is to identify what individuals with a history of severe and enduring 
mental illnesses can and can't do; the role of the individual is to adopt a positive attitude 
about looking for work congruent with these assessments; and the role of the government 
is to develop policies that address the barriers that prevent people with impairments from 
selling what they can do in the labour market such as stigmatising beliefs; unfair 
discrimination; rigid workplace structures and practices; a lack of job searching skills and 
the additional costs associated with chronic and enduring conditions. What follows is a 
resume of the policies that have been introduced to enable these roles to be fulfilled.  
2.8.2 Equal opportunities legislation. 
In 2010, in the course of making EU equal treatment directives part of UK law, the 
Disability Discrimination Act along with the Equal Pay Act 1970, the Sex Discrimination 
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Act 1975, and the Race Relations Act 1976 were repealed and replaced by the Equality 
Act 2010. As far as employment is concerned, this Act treats public and private sector 
employers differently: it imposes a general equalities duty on public sector employers 
that only applies to private sector ones when they are doing work for the public sector. 
Furthermore, none of the obligations it imposes on the recruitment practices of private 
sector employers, with respect to disabled people, is strict liability.   
As was said earlier, section six of the Equality Act 2010 uses the same definitions of 
impairment and disability as section 1 of the DDA. Section 4 identifies people with 
disabilities as a protected group and schedules 1 and 6 define people who suffer from 
severe and enduring mental illnesses as being disabled. Section 13 imposes a statutory 
duty on employers not to directly discriminate against disabled people in their 
recruitment and employment practices. While section 60 allows an employer to ask 
questions about a job applicant's health only for the following purposes: to determine if 
they can do the job on offer; monitor diversity, facilitate positive action or if the job 
requires a disabled person to determine if the candidate has the disability required.  
However, X v EC Commission (1995) indicates that if an employee asks a disabled job 
candidate to undergo a medical and they refuse the request, then the employer does not 
need to consider them for employment. 
Section 20 and Schedule 8 of the Act imposes a duty on an employer to make reasonable 
adjustments to the workplace to accommodate prospective and actual employees if the 
conduct of the business, its structures, or the absence of auxiliary aids puts a disabled 
person at a disadvantage in relation to people that are not disabled. The use of the word 
reasonable tells us that irrespective of any awareness of a person’s disability, the duty to 
make adjustments to the workplace to accommodate disabled people is conditional. 
Something that is also the case with the duty imposed on them by the Act not to 
discriminate. Sections 15 and 19 allow employers to discriminate directly and indirectly 
against a disabled person when the discriminatory act is a proportionate means to of 
achieving a legitimate aim. It is not clear why proportionate and reasonable are being 
differentiated here. Edwards v National Coal Board (1949) indicates reasonable means 
asking the following questions: is there a goal, is the action necessary to achieve it, can it 
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achieve it, is it the least onerous way of doing so and does it balance the pursuit of the 
goal with competing interests, which is how the European directives on which the 
Equality Act is based define the term proportionate (Craig and de Burca 2011).   
An idea of what is meant by reasonable and proportionate in practice is again provided by 
case law. In Familoe v Lane group plc (2004), a case under the Health and Safety Act 
1974, it was found that compliance with equalities legislation is subordinate to 
compliance with other legislation when that legislation imposes an absolute duty. As well 
as having to take competing statutory duties into account, an employer can also refer to 
their operational needs (Chief Constable of Lincolnshire Police v Weaver 2008), the 
nature of the business, its size and the financial implications of taking on a disabled 
person (O’Hanlon v Commissioners for HM Revenue and Customs 2007). The code of 
practice that accompanies this legislation also shows cost to be a primary arbiter of 
reasonableness because it states the Equality Act places different demands on businesses 
of different sizes (EHCR 2011). It follows that it is likely that the number of employment 
opportunities available to people with impairments of any type will be considerably 
smaller than they are for non-disabled people and those that do exist will tend to be in 
larger organisations. 
Responsibility for policing private sector employers’ compliance with their duties under 
the Act falls on the shoulders of disabled people. What is involved in doing this is 
captured in Rugamer v Sony Music Entertainments UK Ltd (2002); College of Ripon and 
York St John V Hobbs (2002) and Walker v Sita Information Networking Computing Ltd 
(1997). The decisions made in these cases means the law requires a person claiming 
unfair discrimination on the grounds of disability to pass two tests to obtain the Act’s 
protection. They have to show they have a physical or mental impairment and then prove 
it is disabling, although they do not have to explain why it exists. Consequently, if a 
disabled person wants to call an employer to account for unfair discrimination, they must 
first be willing to become the object of a public investigation. Once this has been done, 
and they have established a prima facie case then the employer must prove they did not 
behave in such a manner.  However, even if this doesn’t happen, they can still use two 
defences to avoid sanction. The first exists when their business is located in a building 
 Page 38 of 292 
 
owned by someone else, and they have not been permitted by the owner to make any 
alterations. The second becomes available when they did not know or could not 
reasonably be expected to know that the person taking legal action against them had a 
disability.   
The latter defence is especially relevant to mental illnesses. To understand why one needs 
only to reflect on the nature of these conditions. Their presence tends to be signalled by 
deviations from social rather than physical norms. Furthermore, these deviations often 
occur intermittently over an extended period, which means each time they happen might 
be the last one. So even when one sets aside the influence of stigma, this suggests many 
people who have been diagnosed as mentally ill will be uncertain about whether they 
should reveal their health history to a prospective employer. As a result, it becomes 
reasonable to believe employers will be able to rely on this defence when facing a claim 
for unfair discrimination from someone who has been diagnosed as mentally ill more 
often than they would when confronted by a similar claim from someone with a physical 
impairment.   
From the above, it can be seen that while the Equality Act 2010 makes use of the social 
model of disability's parsing of disability and impairment, it is clear its authors do not 
accept the beliefs underpinning that model. It will be recalled this conceptualises 
disability as a form of oppression: the consequence of society structuring itself in a way 
that precludes the equal participation in it of people whose bodies and minds don't 
conform to a normative ideal (Finkelstein 1980). It is implicit in this that addressing 
disability requires proactive, anticipatory action, societal change and the conferring of 
unconditional rights that can be effectively policed and enforced (Oliver and Barnes 
2012). The long-standing alignment between the medical model of disability and 
capitalism contradicts this by presuming it is the individual impaired body or mind that is 
the disabling factor. The Equality Act explicitly shares this presumption. Consequently, it 
addresses disability in a way that requires employers to react and adjust to it on a case by 
case basis and disabled people to police these reactions and adjustments in a way that 
emphasises qualified duties, reasonableness and proportionality.  
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2.8.3 Anti-stigma campaigns. 
A compliment to the Equality Act 2010 is the anti-stigma campaign ‘See Me’ 5, which 
has been running in Scotland for the best part of a decade. Like all social marketing 
campaigns, it assumes attitudes and behaviour can be changed by increasing the public’s 
awareness and knowledge of a topic (National Audit Office 2011; Kotler and Zaltman 
1971). Its progress has been reviewed twice. The first one found the management of the 
campaign to be dominated by public and voluntary organisations (Myers et al. in 2009) 
and the second found there to be little private sector involvement in its development 
(Pilgrim and Corry 2013).    
Concerning employment, these reviews showed ‘See Me’ to have focused on workplace 
relations. Doing this is important, but the reviews indicated it had been done in a way that 
treats the shop floor as a generic social arena. Consequently, it has not taken into account 
the diversity of private sector workplaces. The literature on social marketing campaigns 
indicates success requires the targeting of specific sectors and using language that means 
something to the people residing in them (Kotler and Zaltman 1971; Dolan et al. 2010). It 
follows that there must be concern that the lack of private sector involvement in the ‘See 
Me' campaign might mean many employers will either be ignorant of it or view it as 
irrelevant. 
2.8.4 Vocational support.  
At the time this study was carried out, the UK government was funding three vocational 
support programmes: the ‘Work Programme’, ‘Work Choice’ and ‘Access to Work’. 
Except for ‘Access to Work’, all of these programmes are implemented by private 
contractors on a contractual basis where payment is made by results.    
Participation in the ‘Work Programme’ is compulsory for claimants in the ESA WRAG 
who are seen as being almost fit for employment and those on JSA who have previously 
received disability benefits. Failure to participate in the programme leaves a benefit 
claimant subject to sanctions, which can deny them access to some benefits for up to 
                                                             
5 Strictly speaking ‘See Me' is a Scottish government initiative however similar campaigns have been undertaken in 
England, Wales and Northern Ireland in the form of ‘Time to Change' and ‘Change your Mind'. All of these campaigns 
are ultimately funded by the UK government and by emphasising employment they all dovetail with its welfare to work 
policies. 
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three years. Getting individual ESA claimants into work is more lucrative than doing so 
with JSA claimants. In both cases payments are drawn down in three stages: when they 
engage with unemployed, when an unemployed person gets a job and at various points 
during their employment (Thurston 2013). 
 
‘Work Choice’ was introduced at the end of 2010 to replace the old ‘Workstep’ and 
‘Work Preparation’ programmes. Unlike in the ‘Work Programme’, participation by 
disabled people is voluntary. The focus here is on those individuals in the ESA SG who 
want to obtain paid employment and similarly minded people from the ESA WRAG who 
have been assessed as being furthest away from the labour market. It has a fixed budget 
and is only open to severely disabled people who need specialised help that cannot be 
provided by other welfare to work programmes. Payments are made on a 70% 
engagement and 30% outcome basis from a fixed budget, and they are again higher when 
the disabled person is deemed to face greater barriers to obtaining employment (Purvis et 
al. 2014). 
 
‘Access to Work’ is an initiative is run by the Department of Work and Pensions. Its 
purpose is to provide disabled people with the financial assistance necessary to pay for 
any additional costs they incur as a result of having an impairment and being in paid 
employment, such as those arising out of the purchase of specialised equipment, transport 
to work and the services of support workers. Like ‘Work Choice’, this programme has a 
fixed annual budget.  
 
The latter two programmes identify disabled peoples’ impairments as things that impose 
costs on them, which act as barriers to the market. They presume that, in the context of 
their companion policies, offsetting these costs will mean the market will be able to value 
their labour independently of their impairments. It could be argued that the structure of 
these programmes unfairly discriminates against people who are disabled by mental 
illness. To understand this, one only needs to reflect on the fact they have set budgets and 
the difference between physical and mental impairments. If a ramp is installed to provide 
access to a building for a person who uses a wheelchair, or an inductive loop is installed 
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to support people with hearing difficulties those facilities will improve access for 
everyone with similar impairments. The cost is a one-off and the benefits general. 
However, this is not the case with many mental health conditions, Schizophrenia, for 
example, can manifest itself in different ways at different times (Wehring and 
Carpenter2011), which means the benefits of any adjustments made to accommodate this 
condition will often be subjective and the costs cumulative.  
2.9 Conclusion. 
The discipline of psychiatry is a product of changes that took place as a result of the 
Enlightenment and the Industrial Revolution. Its initial presumption that mental distress 
is caused by a lesion and that treatment of this lesion requires compulsory confinement in 
asylums has been subject to constant criticism from a variety of directions including 
psychology, psychoanalysis, sociology and from within psychiatry for over two hundred 
years. Medicine’s response to these criticisms has led to an increase in the number of 
people diagnosed as mentally ill and a change in the locus and provision of their care. 
Instead of it being provided by psychiatrists in asylums it is now mainly provided by 
general practitioners in community settings.  
Frequently, this care involves providing people with a history of mental illness with 
disability benefits in lieu of their exclusion from the Labour market. The level of these 
benefits has meant many of them have found themselves living in communities with 
limited access to good quality education, housing and healthcare. The effect of this on 
their quality of life led many of them to reflect on their lives by drawing on thinking 
influenced by medicine; Marxism and symbolic interactionalism.  
These epistemes enabled people disabled by mental illness to develop a variety of 
positions on mental distress, mental illness and recovery. They concluded it could be an 
individual or collective experience; a medical goal, a social process, or compound of any 
or all of these. At a Scottish level, policymakers reacted to this development by 
identifying recovery as an individual journey: something that involved making 
appropriate choices: choosing to accept the reality of mental illness; choosing to live the 
life of a healthy person, choosing to identify realistic goals and choosing to pursue them 
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enthusiastically. In short, recovery involved a cure or mitigation of symptoms and a 
change in outlook if their attitude prevented them from regaining a valued social identity. 
Policymakers at an international and UK level also used work based on these epistemes 
to reframe disability. Both the WHO and the UK government identified it as a 
biopsychosocial phenomenon rooted in an individual deviance from biological norms. 
However, they disagreed about the nature of that phenomenon. While the WHO saw it as 
being a complex one the UK government decided to identified it as being a complicated 
matter. Treating disability as the sum of its parts enabled the UK government to use 
studies claiming that paid employment from the competitive labour market was good for 
mental health and that it was a realistic possibility for people disabled by their mental 
health as long as they were provided with appropriate support to argue paid employment 
is evidence of recovery in and recovery from mental illness. To pursue this vision of 
recovery it introduced a tranche of welfare to work policies that involved identifying the 
limitations imposed on people by their impairments; making changes to the benefit 
system that presumed most disabled people could work for a living if they were given 
appropriate support and funding a support programme that consisted of the passing of 
anti-discrimination legislation and the funding of anti-stigma campaigns and vocational 
support programmes. 
From the above, it is clear the UK government’s welfare to work policies are based on a 
belief that disabled people are denied access to the Labour market because of the 
additional costs generated by impairments and the unfair treatment catalysed by 
stigmatising attitudes. It is a belief that presumes once these costs are offset, and these 
attitudes are changed the competitive Labour market will value the labour of disabled 
people the same way as it does that provided by their non-disabled peers. The OECD 
(2014) has criticised this approach, with its emphasis on agency, for assuming that an 
employee-employer relationship is merely an exchange between individuals of labour for 
money, which is independent of social structures. In the light of evidence that people with 
a history of mental illness make up almost half of those on disability benefits (Institute of 
Fiscal Studies 2014), it is a criticism that makes it necessary to investigate the effect of 
the UK governments welfare to work policies on the demand from employers in Scotland 
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for labour from jobless people with a history of mental illness? But before investigating 
this question, it is necessary to critically examine the model of economic thinking that 
leads the UK government to believes its policies will be a success and what this means 
for the framing of the research question. It is this that will form the content of the next 
chapter.   
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Chapter Three:  
Welfare, theories of the labour market and welfare to work policies. 
3.1 Introduction. 
The previous chapter showed UK welfare policy is moving away from supporting jobless 
people disabled by mental illness live their lives towards facilitating the sale of their 
labour. A development that has been described by Jessop (1994; 2002) as a move from a 
'Keynesian Welfare State' to a 'Schumpeterian Workfare State'. Consequently, successive 
current UK government has implemented a tranche of welfare to work policies that 
involve passing of laws, the introduction of employment-focused services and the 
granting of market-related rights. In this chapter different understandings of the labour 
market will be drawn on to critically explore why the UK government at the time of 
writing believes its welfare to work policies will enable this group of people to find work.  
 
To set the scene, it will open with a brief history of how neoclassical economics came to 
dominate academia and policymaking. What will be touched on here is the fragmentation 
of political economy into economics and sociology, the splintering of economics into 
neoclassicism, the old institutionalism and Keynesianism, the emergence of the welfare 
state and the events that eventually led to its raison d'être moving away from providing 
the jobless with resources towards increasing the supply of labour to the market. Next, 
neoclassical theory will be looked at in more detail. What will be addressed here is the 
construction of the theoretical ideal of the perfectly competitive market, how it has 
influenced the thinking of most neoclassical economists about the role of policy and the 
unemployed and the relationship between its natural rate of unemployment hypothesis 
and the UK Government’s welfare to work policies.  
 
Then the focus of the discussion will move to neoclassicism’s economic antipode: the old 
institutional economics. Here it will be shown that this heterodox school of thought views 
the economy as a complex dynamic laminated social arena, which emerges out of the 
continual interplay between agency and structure. In the course of doing so, the 
identification by the old institutional economics of culture, habit, identity, money, power, 
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social location, and aggregate demand as pivotal influences on employability will be 
looked at as will their implications for the efficacy of the UK government’s welfare to 
work policies.    
 
Next, two schools of economic thought will be looked at that emerged in the seventies, 
which are heavily influenced by the neoclassical and old institutional traditions: the new 
institutional economics and stratification economics. This will show the new institutional 
economics has adapted neoclassical theory to develop an explanation for the existence of 
institutions that challenges the one offered by sociology, while stratification economics, 
uses the heterodox approach to economic analysis taken by the old institutional 
economics, to identify competition between groups as an influence on the structure of the 
labour market and the outcomes it produces. Then it will reflect on how sociology reacted 
to incursions by economics onto territory it has traditionally thought of as its own; 
specifically the emergence of the new economic sociology, its argument economic 
activity and the institutions that regulate it are shaped and shaped by social relationships 
and how Zelizer has built on this premise to develop her heterodox connected worlds and 
circuits of commerce approach to economic analysis.  
 
The chapter will then start to draw to a finish by looking at how the debates about the 
labour market within economics and between economics and sociology have influenced 
the literature on improving the employability of people with a history of mental illness. 
Finally, it will close by considering what the discussion in this chapter suggests will be 
the approach to the research question that will add most to the literature?  
  
3.2 The emergence of neoclassical economics as the dominant influence over UK 
economic policy.  
As a result of the marginalist revolution in the second half of the nineteenth century, 
political economy split into the disciplines of economics and sociology and economics 
(Milonakis and Fine 2009). Later, economics polarised around two camps, which can be 
broadly described as neoclassical and old institutional economics (Milonakis and Fine 
2009). Initially, the old institutional economics dominated policymaking (Rutherford 
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2001). However, this supremacy ended with the publication by Keynes in 1936 of the 
‘General Theory of Employment Interest and Money’. His book divided economics into 
macro and micro components, which led some people to look at them as being related but 
ontologically distinct (Hoover 2009; Quiggan 2010). With the ascendancy of 
Keynesianism, managing aggregate demand became the preferred approach to economic 
policy, one that prepared the ground for the emergence of the welfare state (Rutherford 
2001; Bambra 2009).  
 
Welfare states, such as the UK’s, came into being after World War 2 (Jessop 1999). They 
emerged in countries whose economies were characterised by continual growth, fixed 
exchange rates, mass production, relatively closed markets, organised labour, low 
unemployment, standardised inflexible methods of organisation and the ready availability 
of economies of scale (Jessop 1994). In academia, the Keynesian argument that inflation 
is caused by an excess of demand over supply and unemployment by an excess of supply 
over demand was formalised by the New Zealand economist A. W. Philips. Using UK 
government statistics, he derived the curve that takes his name. Many economists and 
policymakers interpreted Phillips’ work as formal proof of a stable relationship between 
inflation and unemployment (Quiggan 2010). This formalisation reinforced the then 
orthodoxy of managing the economy by increasing taxes and running budget surpluses 
when demand exceeded supply and vice versa (Quiggan 2010). As an approach to 
economic management, it appeared to guarantee full employment and stable inflation, or 
something close to them, for the best part of thirty years. The growth that was linked to 
the economies of welfare states justified their governments taking on increasing levels of 
responsibility for providing, policing, and regulating housing, health and open-ended 
jobless benefit services (Jessop 1994; Bambra 1999). Depending on your point of view, 
welfare states ensured every citizen enjoyed the fruits of economic growth (Torfing 
1999); used state power to ensure labour could be bought and sold without generating 
events that threatened the economic status quo (O’Conner 1973; Jessop 1994) or acted as 
a constraint on personal freedom (Hayek 2011). 
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The first signs of instability in the economies of welfare states emerged in the mid-
sixties. Increasingly, they were experiencing inflation and unemployment rates higher 
than those predicted by their ‘Philips Curves’ (Eatwell and Milgate 2011). Keynesian 
economists responded to this development by arguing the monopoly power of big 
business and trade unions was resulting in ‘cost push’ as opposed to ‘demand pull’ 
inflation (Quiggan 2010). Consequently, their governments did not respond by deflating 
the economy but by directly intervening in the setting of wages and prices by imposing 
price and wage freezes and negotiating incomes policies with business and unions 
(Quiggan 2010). However, this approach failed, and inflation and unemployment 
continued to grow (Eatwell and Milgate 2011). In the early seventies, two more 
developments further destabilised the welfare states: the end of fixed exchange rates and 
the slump caused by the oil price shock of the early seventies (Hemerijck 2013). Now 
when countries tried to reflate their economies by increasing public spending, they were 
hit with balance of payments crises, which demanded cuts rather than increases in public 
spending (Eatwell and Milgate 2011; Quiggan 2010). As a result, governments, including 
the UK’s, found themselves struggling unsuccessfully with problems of rising inflation, 
growing unemployment and currency instability (Quiggan 2010).  
 
The creation of new problems by the use of tried and trusted solutions to old ones brought 
an end to thirty years of growing production and consumption (Jessop 2010). Eventually, 
policymakers came to realise the pursuit of economies of scale by large companies had 
globalised production and the end of fixed exchange rates and new technologies was 
moving control of the global trading system out of the hands of nation-states into those of 
the financial markets (Jessop 1994; Quiggan 2010). Consequently, questions were raised 
about the welfare state’s scale, scope and purpose (Jessop 2010). These eventually led 
western governments to embrace neoclassicism (Jessop 1994; Rutherford 2001), a move 
that heralded what Jessop (1994; 2002) has called the transformation of the ‘Keynesian 
Welfare State’ into a ‘Schumpeterian Workfare State’.   
 
 Page 48 of 292 
 
3.3 Neoclassical understandings of the labour market.  
The timing of the welfare states’ difficulties was fortuitous for neoclassicism. Just as 
Keynesianism had replaced the old institutional economics as the dominant influence on 
policy, neoclassicism had done likewise in academia (Rutherford 2001; Hodgson 2009). 
By the late sixties neoclassical economics, as a result of work by, amongst others, Arrow 
and Debrue (1954) on market equilibrium, Samuelson (1965) and Fama (1970) on market 
efficiency, and Friedman (1968) and Phelps (1968) on inflation and unemployment, had 
developed a model of the economy that could challenge Keynesian orthodoxy. It 
explained the economic malaise that was enveloping the welfare states in terms that were 
compatible with the idea the outcomes produced by a market regulated by price 
competition are the sum of its micro component parts and that the point at which it 
reaches equilibrium between supply and demand represents the most efficient possible 
distribution of resources that an economy can aspire to (Boyer and Smith 2001).   
 
The foundations of the neoclassical model of the economy are work by 19
th
-century 
economists such as Jevons, Menger, Pareto and Walrus (Ekelund and Hebert 2002). Their 
endeavours were, in part, a response to concerns the labour theory of value used by Karl 
Marx and Adam Smith was failing to explain the prices of goods and services while 
generating findings about profits, rents and wages that were destabilising societies 
(Stigler 1972, Clarke 1982). From their efforts and that of their followers emerged the 
theoretical concept of the perfectly competitive market (McNulty 1967). This market was 
constructed using the following axioms: all resources, including labour from disabled 
people, are scarce, unevenly distributed and homogeneous; there are sufficient traders in 
the market to prevent any one of them from influencing market outcomes, and all of them 
have the freedom to enter and exit the market at will; know everything that is going on in 
it; and always act, subject to the constraints of price and income, as rational utility 
optimising agents with given and stable sets of preferences (Ehrenberg and Smith (2012).  
 
The neoclassical market is a static, marginalist, utilitarian and reductive ideal where 
outputs are the product of inputs, supply and demand always tend to towards equilibrium 
and fairness is never a consideration (Ehrenburg and Smith 2012). It is amenable to 
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mathematical modelling (Ehrenburg and Smith 2012), and it replaces “the individual 
economic agent as a sociological or historical datum” with “the utility-maximising 
individual" (Stigler 1969: p 225). Here trade in every type of good and service is 
conducted by barter in a single supply-constrained market, which never makes anyone 
better off at someone else’s expense, by people who only learn new ways of doing things 
when they calculate doing so will enable them to satisfy their existing desires at a lower 
cost (Ehrenburg and Smith 2012). It is an economic model that has led most neoclassical 
economists to argue state activity should be confined to ensuring resources are distributed 
through price competition, guaranteeing property rights and adjudicating on externalities 
such as who should pay for the effects of pollution (Ha 2014). For the rest of this thesis, it 
is their work that will be referred to when the terms neoclassical economics or 
neoclassicists are used. 
 
Neoclassicists presume people are hedonists who find work unpleasant (Ehrenburg and 
Smith 2012; Keen 2011). In other words, work is a means to an end rather than 
something with any intrinsic value. People work because the hardship (disutility) 
involved is outweighed by the pleasure (utility) gained from using the wealth it generates 
to enjoy their leisure time (Ha 2014). In other words, the supply of labour is deemed to be 
determined by a Benthamite work/ leisure trade-off, a perspective that encourages 
thinking along the lines of strivers versus skivers. The importance of this viewpoint for 
the creation and implementation of welfare to work policies is it implies people will 
choose to remain on benefits when they support a comfortable quality of life. It follows 
that such benefits waste resources and that cutting them and making them more difficult 
to obtain will incentivise the jobless to look for work. But will they find it? Before going 
on to discuss why neoclassical economists think they will, it is worthwhile looking at the 
criticisms that have been made of neoclassicism and how they have been rebuffed.      
Critics argue the assumptions underpinning neoclassical theory bear no relationship to a 
reality where unemployment always exists, information is generated in amounts beyond 
the ability of any individual or group of individuals to absorb, the unexpected often 
happens, employees are hired on long-term contracts after recommendations from 
friends, wages are fixed and paid in money rather than in kind, and markets are 
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dominated by large companies who continually try to balance the continually changing 
interests of powerful internal groups such as owners, managers and workers with the 
demands of the market (Keen 2011; Kaufman 2010).    
Neoclassicists agree with their critics that the purpose of theory is to strip away 
complexity and reveal fundamental tendencies (Friedman 1953). However, they do not 
accept models should be judged by the realism of the assumptions used to construct them. 
Instead, they believe the determinant of their quality should be the accuracy of the 
predictions they generate (Friedman 1953). In other words, if a theory predicts 
behavioural tendencies and empirical data supports the existence of these tendencies then 
that theory is valuable even when its assumptions are unrealistic. In making this 
argument, Friedman was acknowledging that predictions made by neoclassical theorists 
should be reconcilable with empirical evidence while ignoring the problems that could be 
created by different theories based on unrealistic assumptions reaching the same 
conclusions.  
Neoclassical economists treat firms as individual price takers who act to maximise their 
profits (Ehrenberg and Smith 2012). They are not concerned with their history, internal 
structures, politics, power struggles or culture unless they can see a way to reduce then to 
price competition between utility maximising individuals (Davies and Lee Lam 2001). 
For them, their sole role is to transform inputs into outputs (Ehrenberg and Smith 2012). 
When they see a firm spurning opportunities to make profits, they presume there must be 
unseen costs (Becker 1976). It is a perspective that leads them to identify a firm’s 
demand for labour as being derived from the demand for its goods and services 
(Ehrenberg and Smith 2012). All things being equal, a firm will have a demand for labour 
as long as the marginal revenue product of labour (MRPL) is greater than its marginal 
cost (MC) (Ehrenberg and Smith). What the MRPL represents is the increase in revenue a 
firm enjoys by employing one more unit of labour, which is something that is subject to 
the law of diminishing returns, while the MC of labour can be understood as the 
additional cost of purchasing that unit of labour (Ehrenburg and Smith 2012).  
Neoclassicism reconciles the reality of a money economy with their theoretical barter one 
by arguing that in the long term the money supply only affects nominal prices, not real 
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ones. In other words, money is a facilitator of exchange rather than a store of value, a 
statement of account, an indicator of social status or a source of power. Freidman (1969) 
captured the thinking here with the analogy of a helicopter drop. He described an 
economy with a fixed amount of money circulating in it. He then asked himself, what 
would happen if someone in a helicopter dropped enough money into it to double this 
supply and people thought this was a one-off event? He answered that initially, people 
would bid up the nominal value of goods and services but because the new money did not 
alter the productive capacity of the economy or the tastes of market actors the economy 
would eventually reach equilibrium with the same flow of real goods and services as 
before.    
Theoretically, perfect knowledge eliminates uncertainty. However, real subjective 
cognitive limitations mean people are ignorant to various degrees (Simon 1997). If reality 
is objective, ignorance means uncertainty. Consequently, economic traders cannot act 
rationally or maximise their utility. As a result, the market is unable to distribute 
resources efficiently (Simon 1997). Neoclassicists address this problem by adopting 
Bayesian probability. Here decisions are based on individual beliefs about an event 
happening rather than the actual odds of it occurring (Savage 1972). Identifying reality as 
a subjective concept removes ignorance as an influence on decision making, which 
makes it possible once more to argue people are rational, act to maximise their utility and 
market outcomes are economically efficient (Savage 1972).  
Important work by neoclassical economists looking at employment issues in the real 
world that have generated new insights or taken economics into territory historically 
occupied by other disciplines, such sociology, includes that by George Stigler (1962) on 
the role of information in searching for work in a world with large numbers and types of 
employer, Gary Becker (1971; 1991; 1993) on the effects of racial discrimination, the 
family, and education on labour market activity, and Lazear and Gibbs  (2009) on the 
influence of norms, teamwork, worker empowerment, and peer relationships on 
relationships between employers and workers. A common thread in many of these often 
mathematically advanced studies is that factors exogenous to the market: politics, social 
structures, out of work benefits, trades unions and new technologies can result in changes 
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to the market’s equilibrium point and the market reaching equilibrium with people still 
out of work. The coexistence of market equilibrium and unemployment will be discussed 
in the next section, which looks at what neoclassical economists call the natural rate of 
unemployment. 
3.4 The natural rate of unemployment. 
In 1968 the idea of the natural rate of unemployment
6
 (NRU) was developed 
independently by Milton Friedman and Edmund Phelps. Both argued policymakers are 
mistaken in accepting Phillips’ identification of long-term inflationary pressures as the 
result of changes in nominal wages. According to them, the real causes of such pressures 
are increases in real wages caused by external institutional forces such as employment 
protection legislation, trades unions, professional guilds, and out of work benefits 
(Friedman 1968; Phelps 1968).  
To understand their thinking, consider a workforce that fails to recognise an increase in 
the general rate of inflation. In such circumstances, both Phelps and Freidman accepted a 
wage increase would be interpreted as a rise in their standard of living. They also 
conceded the workforce’s demand for and the prices of goods and services would 
increase and that this will in turn increase businesses demand. However, they argued 
workers expectations about inflation will eventually catch up with reality and that when 
this happens, the workforce’s demand for goods, services and labour will fall to pre-wage 
rise levels. Furthermore, workers will factor in the rise in inflation caused by the initial 
wage rise into their future pay expectations. In other words, using monetary policy to 
increase demand in the long term will lead to an increase in inflation and the return of 
unemployment to the rate that is natural for that society’s institutional framework. It 
follows from the arguments of Friedman and Phelps that the role of monetary policy 
should be to stabilise the economy around the NRU by controlling inflation. It can be 
seen by reflecting on their arguments that what Friedman and Phelps are saying is short-
                                                             
6 Amongst some neoclassical economists there was some unhappiness with this term, which was coined by Friedman. 
In his work, Phelps referred to the equilibrium level of unemployment. Later Estrella and Mishkin (1998) argued 
policymakers are interested in the short term and that the NRU varies more here than it does in the long term. 
Consequently, they recommended using the less controversial more scientific sounding ‘Non Accelerating Rate of 
Inflation’ (NAIRU). Their recommendation will not be followed in this thesis because using NRU does not undermine 
the arguments it makes       
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term changes to labour market equilibrium can be made by monetary policy if economic 
actors fail to anticipate prices correctly, but permanent changes will require addressing 
the influence of institutions exogenous to the market on the outcomes it produces.  
Over time a large body of work looking at variations in the NRU has emerged, which 
broadly speaking, can be seen as having two foci. The first, such as work by Nickell, 
Nunziata and Ochel (2005), examines changes to labour market imperfections. The 
second looks at how economic shocks affect the distribution of unemployment, an 
example of this being work by Blanchard on hysteresis (2006), which suggests that after 
an economic shock unemployed workers find it difficult to find work because those in 
work can resist wage cuts. However, the different foci do not change the thinking 
underpinning the idea of a NRU, which is unemployment is best addressed by 
incentivising suppliers of labour to compete for work on the basis of price (Layard and 
Nickell 2003; Blanchard, Jaumotte and Loungani 2013).  
3.5 The natural rate of unemployment and welfare to work. 
In the aftermath of fixed exchange rates ending and the oil shock of the seventies, the 
thinking of Friedman and Phelps about economies having a NRU became highly 
influential in policy circles (Mankiv and Gregory 2002). By the mid-nineties, inflation 
and unemployment had both fallen, and neoclassicists were describing Keynesianism as a 
historical curiosity (Quiggan 2010).  However, a considerable part of this decline in 
unemployment was the result of increasing numbers of people moving out of the labour 
market and onto disability benefits (JRF 1998; Social Exclusion Unit 2004). Moreover, 
this shift from unemployment to disability benefits was tending to take place in areas of 
the country, such as Scotland, which were hit hardest by the loss of heavy and 
manufacturing industry jobs (Forster 2015; Beatty and Fothergill 2010; 2016).  
The view of the Conservative government that held power from the late seventies to the 
mid-nineties was large numbers of jobless people is a ‘Price worth paying’ (Hansard 
1991) as long as it kept inflation low. However, the Labour opposition argued such an 
approach to economic management not only wasted resources it was also a policy of 
social exclusion. Support for this position was provided by neoclassical economists who 
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argued the NRU in the UK did not have to be as high as it was. They pointed out it could 
be lowered by altering the UK’s institutional framework to incentivise the jobless to 
compete for work (Layard et al. 1991). Consequently, when the Labour government took 
power in 1997 welfare policy moved away from providing jobless, disabled people with 
open-ended benefits towards moving them into the labour market (DfEE, 2001). Since 
then, through boom of the early noughties and the recession following the financial crash 
of 2008 the welfare policy of subsequent governments has continued to move in this 
direction (Daguerre and Etherington 2014).   
 
These policies have four components: financial support to look for and stay in 
employment, making benefits more difficult to obtain, ensuring work pays more than 
benefits and granting people employment-related rights (Layard 2001). Critics of this 
approach have argued that because there are a limited number of jobs in an economy that 
deadweight, substitution and displacement effects will make it infective. Layard (2001) 
deals with this argument in two parts. He marginalises the deadweight, substitution and 
displacement effects by reflecting on two jobless people X and Y, where only X is 
eligible for support. If both apply for a job and X gets it because of the support on offer 
person Y will remain unemployed. However, this does not mean Y will stay unemployed 
because by definition they are employable. In other words, the support for X has 
increased the number of employable people competing for work and made it easier for 
employers to fill their vacancies. As a result, he claims it is possible for a higher level of 
employment to be sustained without creating inflationary pressures. Then he goes on to 
use British statistical records, which show that since 1850 the labour force and the 
number of jobs have both grown by 240%, to undermine the idea there is a fixed number 
of jobs in an economy an that this means there is a relationship between an increase in the 
workforce and an increase in unemployment. In essence, Layard is arguing that if a 
country’s unemployment rate is at its NRU then changing the institutional framework to 
increase the supply of labour will reduce inflationary pressures, increase the demand for 
labour, and lower the NRU.   
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Returning to the previous chapter, it will be remembered the goal of the ‘Access to Work’ 
and ‘Work Choice’ initiatives is to offset the additional costs disabled people face 
looking for and staying in work, the raison d'être of the ‘Equalities Act 2010' is to make 
unlawful some of the unfair discrimination they confront every day; and the ‘See Me' 
campaign seeks to reduce the stigma associated with mental illness. In the light of the 
discussion about NRU these initiatives can be seen as a package that presumes if disabled 
people are incentivised to supply their labour to the market and employers are 
encouraged to judge this labour rationally, then employers will hire them.   
Enthusiasts for identifying the labour market as an arena for promoting welfare have 
described welfare to work policies, such as those being implemented by the UK 
government as the creation of an enabling or activating welfare state (OECD 1990; 
Gilbert 2002). From this perspective, the competitive market is a facilitator of recovery 
and paid employment is evidence of being in recovery from and being in recovery in 
mental illness (HM Government 2009). However, as was noted above, critics have 
described identifying labour market engagement as the goal of welfare policy as a 
transformation of the post-war ‘Keynesian Welfare State’ (KWF) into a Schumpeterian 
Workfare State (SWS) (Jessop 1994; 2002). To understand this line of thought, it is 
worthwhile looking at neoclassicism’s longest standing critic: the old institutional 
economics.  
3.6 The old institutional economics.    
The old institutional economics emerged at the end of the nineteenth and the start of the 
twentieth century. Scholars like Veblen (1899) and Commons (1931) rebelled against the 
idea commercial activity in the real world can be understood by benchmarking it against 
a static theoretical model constructed using unrealistic assumptions (Hodgson 1998; 
2000; 2009; Rutherford 1997; 2000).  It draws on Darwin's thinking about evolution and 
fields such as history, law, management, psychology and sociology. It uses them to 
describe the economy as a stratified and evolving system. One whose outcomes are the 
result of continual interactions between individuals and networks of interdependent and 
value-laden cultural, social, political, technological and financial institutions whose 
purpose is to create order on an uncertain world (Myrdal 1978; Hodgson 1998; 2000; 
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2009; Rutherford 1997; 2000). For them, everything has a complex relationship with 
everything else. From their perspective, culture, with its generating of habits, identities 
and asymmetric distributions of power, is important; causal relationships are contingent; 
perpetual market equilibrium a chimera and the demarcation lines for economic analysis 
are relevant conditions rather than disciplinary boundaries (Myrdal 1978).  
Their heterodox view of the world has prevented the old institutionalist economics from 
developing an alternative all-encompassing general theory of trade with which to 
challenge the one on offer from neoclassicism (Hodgson 1998; 2000; 20009; Rutherford 
1989; 1997; 2000). Consequently, its detractors have accused it of being atheoretical 
(Hodgson 1998; 2000; 20009; Rutherford 1989; 1997; 2000). This charge is unfair. It 
would be more appropriate to describe it as believing theories should be rooted in reality 
and that they should be used to develop an understanding of the use and distribution of 
economic and political power in specific historical, geographical and social environments 
(Myrdal 1978; Rutherford 1989; Hodgson 1998). The above shows that the old 
institutional economics comes at the economy from the opposite direction to 
neoclassicism. Moving from general ideas about the interaction of agency and structure 
and how it evolves to the development of “specific ideas regarding economic institutions 
and types of economy” (Hodgson 1989 pg 169). It is consistent with the old institutional 
rejection of reductionism to believe there is more to employability than suppliers of 
labour striking a balance between the utility of leisure and the disutility of work. In other 
words, it can be influenced by impairments, the social location of people with 
impairments and the reactions of institutions towards them, and that because of this it can 
be right and proper for a country’s welfare system to do more than incentivise people to 
respond to labour market signals.  
The approach of the old school of institutionalism to economics is to expect that 
institutions will often outlast the people that created them and because of this habit, 
imitation, lock-in, cumulative causation and culture will over time produce patterns and 
regularities at the macro level, which will eventually inform how judgments are made at 
the micro one (Hodgson 1998; 2000; 2009). Endorsing the idea of an open system with 
feedback loops means chaos at the micro level can be independent of, and out of phase 
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with, conditions at the macro level and vice versa (Hodgson 1998; 2000; 2009). If one 
were trying to find a way to capture the difference between neoclassical and old 
institutional thinking, a good one would be to describe the former as looking upon the 
economy as a mechanism and the latter as seeing it as an organism.   
3.7 The old institutionalist economics and economic policy. 
For old institutional economists, institutions provide a cognitive framework that 
facilitates the habitual transformation of empirical data into knowledge, which is then 
used to develop an evolving understanding of the world. A good way of showing the 
implications of this is to consider the idea of money as a store of value, a source of 
power, a statement of account and a facilitator of exchange. In other words, it plays a part 
in creating, defining and locating relationships between various groups of people within 
and without the firm such as managers, labour, professions, trades, informal groups of 
workers, friends, family and wider society (Veblin 1899). Work by Piore (1978) and 
Minsky (1982; 1992) use this idea to show how institutions can influence labour market 
outcomes. Piore looked at changes to relative wages and Minsky access to credit. Piore 
argues social and economic relationships evolve, but that at any given moment of time 
the boundaries between them will be fixed. Amongst the situations he considers is when a 
court decision leads to increases in pay for a group of individuals. He then shows the 
threat this poses to the stability of these relationships leads others to demand pay rises to 
restore the differentials disrupted by the court decision, which then starts an inflationary 
cycle and an eventual increase in unemployment. In other words, factors such as custom 
and practice, power, and social location are integral to economic activity. Minsky drew 
on the work of Keynes and Schumpeter to look at what happens when pressure from 
financial institutions leads the state to deregulate the financial services industry (Mason 
2009; Knell 2015). He then  showed how rational behaviour at the micro level could 
result in instability at the macro one and how this could generated feedback loops that 
result in cycles of boom and bust of increasing frequency and a gradual polarisation of 
the labour market into relatively few stable well-paid jobs and relatively many unstable 
and poorly paid ones (Pollin 1997; Cassidy 2009; Mason 2009; Wolf 2014). In other 
words, policies encouraging rational economic behaviour at the micro level will produce 
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macroeconomic results that would be irrational for policymakers to identify as policy 
goals. By identifying inflation as something that can be triggered by the effect of 
institutional change and social relationships, Minsky and Piore are both saying the NRU 
thesis is simplistic because it ignores the symbiotic relationship between market and non-
market factors and its influence on economic activity. The manner in which they do this 
suggests the economy may need to be steered by an independent body or bodies with the 
authority to persuade, pressure, or even force economic actors from different geographic, 
industrial and social environments to accept changes that are detrimental to them in the 
short run but beneficial to everyone in the long term.  Abandoning the idea of money 
neutrality makes it clear that that the old institutional economics sees the economy as a 
laminated social arena. Moreover, the work of Minsky and Piore can be interpreted as 
identifying the macro and micro levels of an economy as being distinct ontological 
realms and the demand for labour as something existing in multiple markets regulated by 
different rules, and causal links that emerges from the conditions existing within the 
various strata of an economy (Hodgson 1998). Consequently, it is possible to draw a 
distinction between unemployment in the round and the labour market experiences of 
different demographic groups.  
The development of this laminated model of the economy with the possibility of distinct 
ontological realms enables the old institutional economics to build bridges with 
Keynesianism (Piore 1978). These bridges open the door to arguing policymakers should 
use fiscal and monetary policy to increase the aggregate demand for labour. However, the 
nature of the lamination suggests increasing aggregate demand will not be enough to 
improve the employability of people who have been disabled by mental illness for it 
implies there is still a need to address the influence of factors such as power, culture, 
social norms, vested interests, location, and skills shortages in a variety of industries and 
locations.    
Despite the neoclassical roots of the UK government’s welfare to work policies. It can be 
argued they go some way to meeting these needs. For example the Equality Act 2010 and 
the ‘See Me' anti-stigma campaign address social and cultural attitudes towards disabled 
people, which could prevent inflationary pressures arising out of non-disabled people 
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trying to maintain economic differentials, and the ‘Access to Work’ and ‘Work Choice’ 
seeks to mitigate the additional costs they incur when interacting with environments 
constructed with physical and mental norms in mind. However, these policies do not 
address the effects of deficits in aggregate demand, shortages of job-related technical 
skills, the influence of social networks on employability, or local variations in job 
vacancies. From an institutional perspective, such failures could mean the shock of 
introducing large numbers of disabled people to some of these labour markets might 
result in many local pools of unemployed people, which employers can use to threaten 
the pay and conditions of everyone on the bottom rung of the labour market(s). 
3.8 Developments in neoclassical economics: the new institutional economics.    
As noted earlier neoclassicism, the old school of institutionalism and sociology emerged 
from the fragmentation of political economy by the marginalist revolution. The old 
school of institutionalism reacted to this development by continuing with its heterodox 
approach to economic analysis. Neoclassicism and sociology went their separate ways 
(Clarke 1982). Parsons described these paths when he wrote sociology should confine 
itself to investigating the ultimate ends, or the value factors of social action and leave 
economics to focus on how the means to achieve these ends are generated (Parsons 1949; 
Beckert 2007). In other words, sociology and economics should be complements rather 
than partners or competitors. Given the nature of Parsons’ hostility to the old institutional 
economics (Parsons 1949; Beckert 2007), it is reasonable to believe he meant economics 
should leave the study of institutions to sociology.  
 
The division of labour described by Parsons held until the seventies when some 
neoclassical economists felt they could no longer ignore criticisms of their treatment of 
institutions as being exogenous to the economy or, in the case of firms, unproblematic 
black boxes (Hodgson 1998; 2000; Rutherford 1989; 1997; Ehrenberg and Smith 2012). 
Reactions to these criticisms led to the emergence of the new institutional economics. 
Like the old institutional economics, it sees institutions as endogenous to economic 
activity. Unlike them, it adopts and adapts neoclassical theory to explain their existence 
and treats the economy as the sum of its parts (Hodgson 1998; 2000; Rutherford 1989; 
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1997; Williamson 2000). Like neoclassical economics, the new institutional economics 
prefers private to public ordering, and it looks upon the old school of institutionalism as 
lacking analytical rigour and a theoretical framework (Hodgson 1998; 2000; Rutherford 
1989. It is a position that Coase (1984 pg 230) brutally captured when he described the 
work of the old institutional economics as being a “Mass of material waiting for a theory, 
or a fire.”  
According to Williamson (2000), the foundation stones of the new institutional 
economics are two papers by Coase, “The Nature of the Firm” (1937) and “The Problem 
of Social Cost” (1960). Here Coase identifies transactions as having costs and institutions 
as attempts to minimise them in an economically efficient manner. In the course of 
looking back at his work, and that of his successors, Coase (1998) claimed the new 
institutional economics had successfully used transaction costs to explain the existence of 
economic, legal, political and social institutions; the development of their internal and 
external relationships; and their establishment as a determinant of economic performance.   
 
A new institutional economist whose work is especially pertinent to employment is 
Oliver Williamson. Building on Coase’s work, he investigated what gives rise to firms, 
their structures, their activities, and how they perform them, including their use of labour 
(McMaster and White 2013). He did this by making four assumptions. The first is that “in 
the beginning there were markets” (Williamson 1975 pg 21), the second is these markets 
were initially made up of rational utility maximising individuals (Williamson 1975; 
1985); the third is that there are three dimensions to market transactions: uncertainty, 
frequency, and asset specificity (Williamson 1981; 1996; 1998), and the fourth is that 
social influences on a labour market are subordinate to the economic need to minimize 
transactional costs (Williamson 1993; 1997; 2000).  
 
Williamson fleshes out Coase’s argument about the purpose of institutions by drawing on 
the work of Herbert Simon (1997) on bounded rationality. Simon stated that gathering 
information about assets takes time, incurs costs and there is no way to determine when 
the optimal amount of information has been secured. He went on to argue that subjective 
constraints on time, resources and cognitive ability mean market actors have no choice 
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but to exploit their knowledge of history, their environment and the regularities they 
signal to find satisfactory solutions to problems rather than optimal ones: to be satisficers 
rather than satisfiers (Simon 1997). In other words, variations and limitations in people’s 
capacity to use information to formulate and solve problems will not prevent them from 
trying to act rationally.  
Bounded rationality means there are always asymmetric distributions of information 
(Simon 1997), which means contracts for assets can never be complete (Williamson 
1975; 1980; 1993; 2000). Consequently, Williamson identified asset specificity as the 
most important dimension of a market transaction because it leaves room for people to 
incur transaction costs as a result of mistakes and opportunistic behaviour (McMaster and 
White 2013). With respect to labour, these costs are determined by human asset 
specificity and the ability to link specific outputs to individual workers (Williamson 
1985).  
According to the new institutional economics, one to one contracts between agents and 
principals are the preferred medium of economic activity but that they can become 
problematic when they involve frequent contact, the purchase of expensive assets, or a 
high degree of uncertainty. The reason given for this is that in such circumstances there 
more room for cognitive idiosyncrasies, asset specificity and opportunistic behaviour to 
generate significant transaction costs (Williamson 1975; 1981 1993; 2000). From a new 
institutional perspective firms efficiently manage transaction costs by internalising them. 
They do this by creating a bureaucracy to delegate and supervise tasks. As the firm 
grows, it hires more workers and creates more bureaucratic layers, and it becomes 
increasingly difficult to link workers to specific outcomes (Williamson 1975; 1981 1993; 
2000).  
The solution to this agent principal problem is aligning the interests of its employees with 
its desire for profit (Williamson 1975; 1985). The new institutional economics approach 
to such problems is to focus on cost minimisation and utility maximisation rather than 
parameters such as habit, identity, power, trust and other such manifestations of a firm’s 
culture (Williamson 1975; 1985; 2000). Here the firm’s workforce is seen as consisting 
of two types of team: primitive and relational, where primitive teams are made up of 
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workers with transferable skills while relationship teams are made of those with firm 
specific ones (Williamson 1985). The ending of an employer-employee relationship 
between a firm and a member of a primitive team is not seen as anything to be concerned 
about because the market will provide alternative employers and employees (Williamson 
1985). However, the ending of such a relationship between workers from a relational 
group and the firm poses a threat to the firm because they are costly to replace. Firms 
protect themselves by providing these workers with on the job training, clear career 
paths, promotion from within and a degree of security (Williamson 1975; 1980; 1985). 
By acting this way, the firm limits the ability of these workers to move elsewhere because 
it makes it more difficult for them to find jobs offering similar rewards elsewhere 
(Williamson 1985). Now both parties are in effect in a bilateral monopoly situation. It 
follows from this line of thought that many vacancies will never reach the market and 
that many of those that do will either be for entry-level posts or ones requiring workers 
for specific tasks on an as and when required basis, where the employer can end their 
relationship with an employee with relatively little fuss.  
The new institutional economics has been criticised for being biased towards employers, 
possessing theoretical inconsistencies and having a simplistic understanding of the role of 
workforce teams (McMaster and White 2013). With respect to siding with employers, 
Dow (1987) points out Williamson’s work concentrates on the opportunistic traits of 
workers and ignores those of employers. One consequence of this is that the effect of 
agency principal problems between firms does not appear to have been considered (An 
important lacuna from the point of this study, given one of the things it is looking at is the 
use by the UK government of contracts with private firms to move people with a history 
of mental illness into employment with third parties). Accusations of theoretical 
inconsistency arise for three reasons. First, Williamson arbitrarily identifies markets 
without institutions as the starting point for his analysis. By doing so, he ignores the 
chicken and egg relationship between agency and structure. For example, markets require 
the existence of the institution of language if a transaction is to be negotiated, but 
language requires the existence of individuals and so on until reductio ad absurdum 
(Hodgson 2009; Rutherford 2001). Second, he explicitly identifies his model of 
employer-employee relationships as being a static one (Williamson 2000), yet he writes 
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about the influence of on the job learning on the employer-employee relationship 
(Williamson 1985), which suggests the need for a dynamic model (McMaster and White 
2013). Learning on the job is the source of another gap in Williamson’s thinking. 
McMaster and White (2013) point out the transactional costs model implies asset 
specificity is determined outside of the firm, however firm specific skills suggest asset 
specificity is endogenous. As for workforce teams, Williamson does not consider their 
intrinsic value. As a result, he ignores how they generate behavioural norms, informal 
lines of communication, feelings of belonging, senses of identity, and feelings of us and 
them with their implied threat of ostracisation for deviants (Granovetter 1985). He also 
ignores the reality that employees’ social networks are likely to be made up of members 
of multiple teams both inside of and outside of the workplace such as professional bodies 
(McMaster 2008) and social clubs (Puttnam 2000). In other words, he does not take into 
account the possibility that skills might be industry instead of firm specific (Jacoby 
1990), or that employability might be determined as much by culture, identity, social 
location, and social networks as it is by cost (Granovetter 1985).  
These criticisms apart, there is some overlap between thinking of the new institutional 
economics and the old institutional economics in as much as it identifies public and 
professional discourses as something that will obstruct the employment of people 
disabled by mental illness. Ironically the reliance of the new institutional economics on 
transaction costs as an explanation for the existence of these barriers make it possible to 
argue it is surprising the UK government's welfare to work policies are trying to 
dismantle some of them. Nevertheless, there are barriers consistent with this line of 
thinking that these policies do not address, specifically market segmentation, internal and 
external job markets and the need for job-specific skills. These are barriers that suggest 
the number of vacancies people with mental health problems, who are entering the labour 
market after several years in receipt of disability benefits, will have a realistic chance of 
filling will be relatively small and that many of them will be for unskilled entry-level 
posts governed by challenging terms and conditions.   
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3.9 Developments in the old school of institutional economics: stratification 
economics. 
Stratification economics recently emerged from the USA. Like the old institutional 
economics, it takes a heterodox approach to economic analysis and identifies groups with 
their ability to generate identities and asymmetric distributions of power as crucial 
influences on the outcomes of economic activity (Darity, Mason and Stewart 2010). The 
origins of stratification economics lie in investigations into the economic disparity 
between races in the US (Darity, Mason and Stewart 2010). Recently, it has started to 
research economic inequality rooted in caste, gender, and religion (Darity Hamilton and 
Stewart 2015), which suggests its thinking is relevant to disability. However, before 
continuing, it is important to say I am not conflating racism and disablism. Hopefully, it 
is self-evident ethnicity does not determine someone’s ability to perform a task (Phyllis 
Jones 2002) and that impairments might (Thomas 2004). However, the reason I do not 
think this difference matters here is that stratification economics does not deal with 
capacity but the unfair denial of capacity. 
 
As with the old institutional economics, stratification economists look upon the economy 
as a dynamic evolving system. Its focus is the historical interplay, competitive and 
collaborative, between groups, which are animated by the collective self-interest of their 
members (Darity 2005; 2009a; 2009b; Darity, Mason and Stewart 2006; 2010). Conflict 
and cooperation are seen as endogenous characteristics of society rather than exogenous 
forces disrupting market efficiency (Darity, Mason and Stewart 2006; 2010). One 
consequence of conflict is that members of winning groups often seek to dehumanise and 
oppress members of losing groups, who then go on to internalise the negative narratives 
created by the winners (Darity, Hamilton and Stewart 2014). In other words, prejudice 
and stigma are rational responses by society’s dominant groups, whose purpose is the 
protection of privilege. Within this framework, cultural patterns are understood as being 
responses to context and maladaptive behaviour is interpreted as signalling the presence 
of defects and injustices in society rather the existence of dysfunctional groups (Darity 
2009a).  
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Three things follow from the above about the views of stratification economists towards 
inequality. First, they see the existence of stereotypical beliefs about particular groups, 
such as the work shyness of the jobless, the positive work ethic of protestants, and the 
glorification of entrepreneurs as a product of the establishment and maintenance of group 
hierarchies (Darity, Hamilton and Stewart 2015)
7
; second, they reject explanations for 
unemployment and poverty that prioritize biological or cultural differences (Darity 2005); 
and finally, time series work and cross-sectional investigations have led them to conclude 
economic inequality is institutionalised by processes that transfer wealth across 
generations in ways that keep it under the control of specific social groups (Darity, 
Hamilton and Stewart 2015). Consequently, they believe policies that encourage 
engagement with the competitive labour market will not change the behaviour of 
members of disadvantaged groups unless they also strive to ensure investments made by 
members of these groups will generate the same returns as similar ones made by 
members of privileged groups (Darity 2009a). As a result, one of the foci of this school of 
thought is how this can be made to happen.  
 
They have identified two courses of action here. First, agree with disadvantaged groups 
on how to end and compensate them for the historical social and economic injustices they 
have suffered (Darity 2009a); and second, in an echo of Keynesian thought, they believe 
the state should implement an ongoing programme of investment in the country’s human 
and physical infrastructure that will guarantee members of disadvantaged groups who can 
work a job and provide them with specific job-related skills (Darity 2010). Darity (2010) 
argues this latter initiative will provide an assurance of good quality employment for 
members of stigmatized groups, reduce the adverse health outcomes, both mental and 
physical, associated with exposure to prolonged unemployment, and eliminate in work 
poverty because it will place a floor under the wage rates on offer from the private sector. 
In anticipation of concerns about cost, he provides figures from the US government 
                                                             
7  The focus on identity in stratification economics resonates strongly with the discussions in the previous chapter of 
sociological studies by Becker (1963) and Lemert (1951; 1967) on deviance; and Goffman (1990); Scheff (1984) and 
Link and Phelan (2013) on stigma.     
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showing that implementing such policy would cost around half what the US government 
spent on bailing out the financial sector (Darity 2010).  
 
Although some of the UK governments welfare to work policies such as anti-stigma 
campaigns, ‘Work Choice' and ‘Access to Work', are compatible with Darity’s ideas in 
principle, the striver skiver framework used to reduce and restrict access to out of work 
benefits is not. Furthermore, the identification by stratification economics of groups as 
the analytical starting point leaves it open to the same accusation levied at neoclassicism 
and the new institutional economics, which is arbitrarily breaking the chicken and egg 
relationship between agency and structure. But from a disability studies perspective what 
is really interesting about the thinking of Darity and his colleagues, is it provides an 
economic justification for disabled people of every hue to argue for services that provide 
training in valued job-specific skills, a work history, a circle of contacts that include 
people who make hiring decisions, the prospect of being judged for who they are rather 
than who they might be and sufficient ongoing support to guarantee them a decent quality 
of life when they are unable to work.   
3.10 A response to the new institutional economics: the new economic sociology.  
Sociology, in the tradition of Parson’s, did not reply to work such as that by Becker, 
Lazear and Gibbs, and Stigler on the role of discrimination, the family, norms, and flows 
of information on employability that was touched on earlier even though they could be 
thought of as incursions onto its territory (Kalleberg and Sorensen 1979), perhaps 
because their work focused on individuals, utility maximisation and price competition. 
Nor, at the time of writing, does it appear to have replied to the work of the stratification 
economists. There could be three reasons for this, silo thinking, the newness of their work 
and their desire to draw on sociological thought rather than replace it. The use by Oliver 
Williamson of transaction costs to provide an alternative explanation to sociology’s for 
the existence of institutions resulted in a backlash from sociology (Granovetter 1985; 
1995). This backlash resulted in the emergence of the new economic sociology 
(Granovetter 1985; 1995), a school of thought whose aim is to redraw the boundaries 
separating economics and sociology in sociology’s favour (Granovetter and Swedberg 
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1992). Amongst the work carried out under its banner are studies by Abolafia (1996) 
looking at the influence of social norms on financial trading; Zelizer (1978; 2011) 
investigating the role of social taboos and intimacy in shaping economic activity and 
most famously, Granovetter (1985; 1995a) who has written on the embeddedness
8
 of 
economic activity in society and the role of social networks on employability.  
 
The resonance of Granovetter’s work with the heterodox approach to economic analysis 
of the old institutional economics has led some scholars to describe their work as being 
effectively new wine in old bottles (Ingham, 1996, p. 245). Granovetter concedes 
sociology’s concept of people as beings whose freedom of action is constrained by the 
internalisation of consensually developed systems of norms and values is an overly 
socialised one (Granovetter 1985). After closing of a common line of criticism of 
sociological thought, he goes on to attack the thinking of the new institutional economics. 
The foundation of this attack is that using neoclassical theory, bounded rationality and 
transaction costs to explain the existence of institutions is an example of economics 
overplaying its hand because it under estimates the role of habit, identity, trust, social 
networks and culture in dealing with uncertainty and over estimating the influence of 
incentives, regulation and calculation in managing risk (Granovetter 1973; 1985; 1995a).   
 
Granovetter argued there was a need to chart a new route through the territory mapped 
out by economic thought (Granovetter (1985; 1995a). In doing so he accepted reality is 
independent of our knowledge of it; that humans had cognitive limitations, and that 
institutions create multiple markets because they regulate exchange by marking the 
boundaries between the known and the unknown, risk and uncertainty and order and 
chaos (Granovetter (1985; 1995a).  His mapping of this territory led him to conclude 
institutions are power structures whose existence is catalysed by established social 
networks. Consequently, variations in the development of the relationships that give rise 
to these networks will determine if, when and in what form institutions will emerge. For 
example, when exchanges are conducted between parties who lack overlapping networks 
                                                             
8 Granovetter’s work should not be confused with Polyani’s. Although Granovetter referenced Polyani, Polyani’s work 
is more hostile to capitalism than Granovetter’s. For more on this see Beckert, J (2007). The great transformation of 
embeddedness: Karl Polyani and the new economic sociology. MPIfG Discussion Paper, No. 07/1. 
http://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/19938/1/dp07-1.pdf  Downloaded on the 21/10/14. 
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or are members of ones that are conducive to dishonesty and disorder it will create 
pressure for the creation of institutions. Alternatively, when networks are ones that 
induce order and honesty, then the demands for the creation of these institutions will be 
absent, making them less likely to form.  
 
It follows from Granovetter’s view of the world that labour is traded in multiple markets 
separated by barriers that can be difficult to cross. Here, however, the foundation of these 
obstacles is not transactional costs but trust, habit, social networks and culture and a 
desire for protection against the hazards that reside in the unknown. It is a perspective 
that suggests the trade in labour will, by its very nature, deny employment to many 
people. It is also one that points to the UK government’s welfare to work policies being 
ineffectual in improving the employability of people with a history of mental illness even 
if they possess in demand skills because although they address the issue of stigma they do 
not address the other factors that shape employability such as knowing people who make 
hiring decisions or those who have access to them.    
 
In making his arguments, Granovetter was well aware of the dangers of functionalism 
with its tendency to explain things in terms of effect rather than cause, its denial of 
contradiction and disorder and its marginalisation of the malign influence of factors such 
as disablism, racism and sexism (Rex 2010). He accepted that because social networks 
establish close, longstanding relationships they not only foster trust, they provide 
opportunities for malfeasance, not just in terms of breaches of trust but also in terms of 
the abuse of power that comes with the formation of groups (Granovetter 1985). 
However, he did not go into detail about why some group relationships foster honesty 
and support while others resulted in dishonesty and unfair discrimination beyond saying 
the outcome would be determined by the details of how the group was structured. Instead, 
he pointed out the need for economic sociology to study the role of interpersonal 
relationships in economic activity, which is a challenge that (2011) has taken up with her 
‘connected worlds’ and ‘circuits of commerce’ approach to transactions.  
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3.11 Developments in the new economic sociology: connected worlds and circuits of 
commerce. 
 
Zelizer’s (2011) thinking about connected worlds and circuits of commerce builds on her 
earlier (2007) work on the role of intimacy in economic activity. She starts by arguing 
decisions made in the economic world are viewed as rational because they are motivated 
by financial self-interest, while those in the social world are seen as irrational and 
altruistic because they are influenced by feelings of emotion, intimacy, identity and 
mutual obligation and that allowing decision-making processes in one world to intrude in 
those of the other is dangerous. If the rules regulating economic action impose 
themselves upon the social world, it creates the danger that everything will be reduced to 
a commodity (Marx 1844; Weber 2009). In other words, qualities are reduced to 
quantities, and the world's problems are treated as a question of arithmetic (Simmell 
1950). As a result, the most important question about a problem is never what should be 
done but much will it cost? Similarly, allowing the rules that regulate social activity to 
intrude upon the economic world creates the danger that economic actors will be directed 
away from economic imperatives towards servicing personal relationships. As a result, 
irrational and unfair discriminatory practices are introduced into the workplace and 
profits are reduced (Zelizer 2011).   
From here she goes on to describe the economic and social arenas as examples of circuits 
of commerce, where commerce includes but is not limited to exchange for money 
(Zelizer 2011). Each of these circuits has well-defined borders where movement across 
them is policed and monitored. Within each circuit, a distinctive set of transfers is 
facilitated by specific media and ties whose meaning is shared by members of the circuit. 
At this point, it would be reasonable to ask, how does this differ from the network 
analysis that forms the foundation of the ideas of Granovetter about embeddedness (1985; 
1995a)? For the most part network analysis is functionalist in its approach: it focuses on 
relatively stable patterns of social ordering and tends to ignore the variable content of 
transactions and their meanings or their fluid continually changing nature (Zelizer 2011). 
Circuits of commerce address this lacuna by accommodating questions about meaning 
and relational and emotional labour. 
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Circuits of commerce can do this because their members inhabit multiple circuits. 
Consequently, they are not a collection of closed worlds with their own cultures. Zelizer 
argues economic actors use these circuits to create an institutional structure, which makes 
an uncertain world more predictable and less threatening by utilising the mode of 
exchange and level of trustworthiness appropriate to specific circuits. One example of a 
circuit of commerce is shared membership of a group such as family, friends or 
professional guilds. Here, biological imperatives, custom and practice, feelings of mutual 
obligation and the existence of penalties for breaking with established norms may result 
in information about jobs only being circulated as a gift to members of that group.  
Another circuit is where the specialist nature or scale of an employer’s demand for 
labour, leads them to believe managing the costs of satisfying their demand for labour is 
best served by paying a fee to a specialist third party. From Zelizer’s perspective, an open 
market regulated by price competition can be seen as a circuit of commerce employers 
engage with when intimacy, social relationships and the institutions that have emerged to 
manage transaction costs have failed to identify suitable sources of labour.   
3.12 Reflections on theories of the labour market. 
Neoclassicism and the new institutional economics idealise humans as beings whose only 
motivation is securing rewards from others (Ghoshal and Moran 1996; Osterloh and Frey 
2000; Ehrenburg and Smith 2012). The former offers a generalised theory of trade that 
identifies institutions as an exogenous disrupter of efficient market functioning 
(Ehrenburg and Smith 2012). The ambition of the latter is to offer an alternative general 
theory of trade, which identifies institutions and their creation of multiple markets that 
can be difficult to move between as rational responses to the existence of transactional 
costs (Williamson 1975; 1985; 2000)
9
. Both perspectives offer explanations for the 
emergence and transformation of capitalist markets and the movement of job seekers 
across continents. In doing so, they reject the idea that the economy could be laminated 
into distinct ontological realms. Furthermore, they have difficulty accommodating the 
                                                             
9
 Nobel Prize winner Douglass North is an important new institutionalist economist who appears to have turned away 
from trying to explain the existence of institutions in terms of transaction costs. His later work is more in line with the 
thinking of the old institutional economics (Hodgson 2009). Even Williamson (2000) appears to acknowledge that his 
position that in the beginning there were markets is problematic, given his positive comments about Granovetter’s ideas 
on embeddedness.   
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reality that recruitment decisions are not the product of competition but the relationships 
created by group membership and their fostering of identity, intimacy and habitual 
cooperation. One example of this is word of mouth, which is frequently used by 
employers to identify sources of labour (Granovetter 1995a) another is the frequent hiring 
of family members and friends by owners of firms (Zelizer 2007; 2011).   
 
The argument of the new economic sociology that trade is embedded in and regulated by 
social relationships provides signposts for explaining how families, friends acquaintances 
and word of mouth influence employability. However, these markers do not offer a 
general theory of trade, nor can they account for the emergence and transformation of 
capitalist market(s) (Beckert 2007). Unlike neoclassicism or the new institutional 
economics, it struggles with the idea of a market where technology makes it attractive for 
a small business to move abruptly from a situation where they employ local people with 
whom it has a longstanding relationship, to one where they subcontract work to a firm on 
the other side of the world where no such relationship exists. It is scenarios like this that 
have led Granovetter (1985) to accept that the foundation stone of the new economic 
sociology, his concept of embeddedness, is vulnerable to the criticism made of the old 
institutional economics, which is that unlike neoclassicism or the new institutional 
economics, it does not offer an all-encompassing model of trade.  
 
Other new economic sociologists reacted differently to Granovetter to this criticism. They 
modified the term embeddedness in the same manner as neoclassicists have the term 
capital. Where neoclassicists frequently speak of social, cultural, human and political 
capital; these sociologists often talk of cultural, cognitive, political and structural 
embeddedness (Zukin and Di Maggio 1990). However, this fails to address the accusation 
that the new economic sociology has no unifying theory. Consequently, critics of the new 
economic sociology have been able to accuse it of the offence it had accused others of 
committing, which was overplaying its hand. A good example of this is a study by Blair 
(2012), who reviewed two papers by Uzzi (1996; 1997) that are influenced by 
Granovetter’s work, which looked at the US garment industry. She pointed out that 
Uzzi’s evidence showed that the relationships are often created by pre-existing economic 
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institutions and that once the influence of these institutions disappears then so do the 
relationships that they created. With hindsight perhaps these new economic sociologists 
would have been better able to defend themselves by reviewing the work of the old 
institutional economics.  
 
If they did, they would have found that a lack of a general theory can be defended. The 
heterodox approach of the old institutional economics is open to the idea that an economy 
is a place where the interaction of agency and structure may produce transcendent results. 
Consequently, it can accommodate the idea micro level transactions are embedded in, 
shape and are shaped by a myriad of historical and socially located identities and 
relationships. This characteristic has influenced the emergence of stratification economics 
and its argument that the outcomes of competition between groups in pursuit of their 
member’s interests will require state intervention in the economy if it is to be prevented 
from evolving in ways that distribute wealth unfairly. Furthermore, the possibility of 
transcendence enables macro and microeconomics to be treated as related but 
ontologically distinct realms, which validates the use of Keynesianism by policymakers 
as a tool of economic management. All of which offers an explanation for why influential 
new economic sociologists such as Granovetter have mourned the decline in influence of 
the old institutional economics (Velthuis 1999) and why Zelizer (2011) has taken a 
heterodox approach to economic analysis by using the concepts of connected worlds and 
circuits of commerce to unpack the social and economic influences on economic activity.  
3.13 The engagement of the disability literature with labour market theories.     
Like the discussion in the previous chapter, the one here revolves around the influence of 
agency and structure on life's outcomes. Given this, one would have thought the disability 
literature would have engaged with the economic and sociological debates about the 
labour market. There has been theoretical work, such as that by Oliver (1990) and Barnes 
(2012), which identifies this market as disablist. However, this has not been followed up 
with empirical research seeking to identify whether they are right. Instead, the 
presumption underpinning empirical work on employability is the high unemployment 
experienced by disabled people is the result of institutions that obstruct access to the 
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labour market, (Burns et al. 2007; Bond et al. 2014). Examples of this being research into 
the influence of stigma on employability such as that by Manning and White (1995) and 
Brohan and Thornicroft (2010).  
One result of the failure of disability studies to engage with the disputes within 
economics and between economics and sociology about the labour market is it has never 
concerned itself with how the labour market works or its demand for labour at any point 
in time. Another is that it has never gathered evidence from employers about their beliefs 
about the employability of people disabled by mental illness other than to ask them about 
their reactions to imaginary people in hypothetical situations (Riddel et al. 2005; Clark et 
al. 2010; Hayward and Bright 1997; Sharac et al. 2010). In the light of the discussion in 
this chapter and evidence showing that employers hire significant numbers of people with 
a history of mental illness, including some with severe and enduring conditions 
(Mechanic et al. 2002; Lelliot 2008; Henderson et al. 2013), it is clear an assessment of 
the efficacy of the UK government’s welfare to work policies will have to address these 
lacunae. Consequently, this study will gather and assess data about the overall health of 
the labour market and collect and reflect upon evidence from employers about their 
beliefs about mental illness, what they think is involved in trading for labour and how 
they go about identifying and recruiting new employees. Given the influence of 
neoclassicism on the UK government’s economic policy indicates they prefer private to 
public ordering the focus of these investigations will be the private sector.     
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Chapter Four:  
A macro-level exploration of the Scottish labour market at the time the UK 
government was implementing its welfare to work policies. 
4.1 Introduction. 
This chapter will discuss the overall health of the labour market in Scotland between 
March 2008 and March 2013 by drawing on the economic and sociological literature. It 
will start by looking at the financial crisis of 2008, the consequent recession and whether 
the evidence indicates these events were the result of an endogenous or exogenous shock 
to the market. From here, it will move on to consider the response of successive 
governments to these events. In particular, how the Conservative / Lib Dem coalition 
used them to justify amplifying its Labour predecessor’s supply-side welfare to work 
policies and what this means for jobless people disabled by mental illness. After this, 
there will be a reflection on the state of the Scottish labour market. Next, Scottish 
employment-related statistics will be considered in the light of insights provided by 
neoclassicism, both schools of institutionalism, stratification economics and the new 
economic sociology. The ground covered here will be the effects of the recession on 
employment, how changes to the benefits system have changed the supply of labour to 
the Scottish labour market and the potential for them to change it further. Finally, the 
chapter will close by considering the ability of the Scottish labour market to absorb these 
changes and what this tells us about the ability of the UK government’s welfare to work 
policies to improve the employability of jobless people who have been disabled by 
mental illness.          
4.2 The relevance of the global financial crisis of 2008 and the consequent recession 
to those people with a history of mental illness being moved into the labour market.    
In the UK, the collapse of Lehman Brothers and Northern Rock heralded the arrival of 
the financial crisis of 2008. Shortly afterwards, the UK and many other western 
economies entered the deepest recession since the 1930's (Hay 2010; Stiglitz 2010). The 
catalyst for these events was something that, at first glance, appears unrelated to the 
employment prospects of jobless people in Scotland who have been disabled by mental 
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illness: the collapse of the US housing market bubble of the late nineties and mid-
noughties (Krugman 2008; Stiglitz 2010; Wolf 2014). This bubble followed the 
deregulation of their financial systems by the world’s advanced economies, a subsequent 
increase in the availability of cheap money and the desire of the government of the US to 
increase home ownership at a time when large parts of that country’s productive capacity 
was lying dormant (Cassidy 2009; Stiglitz 2010; US Financial Inquiry Commission 2011; 
Wolf 2014).  
The economic environment encouraged financial institutions to invest in the US housing 
market by offering mortgages to people who were once ineligible for them (US Financial 
Inquiry Commission 2011; Wolf 2014). These ‘sub-prime’ loans were structured so that 
the interest paid by the debtor increased significantly during their lifetime (Stiglitz 2010; 
Mian and Sufi 2014). Often, the risks involved in such loans were not fully explained to 
borrowers. When they voiced concerns about servicing their debts, they were told that 
because house prices would continue to rise, they could keep monthly repayments low by 
repeatedly remortgaging (Stiglitz 2010; Mian and Sufi 2014). The faith in ever rising 
house prices also led financial companies to encourage homeowners to use the value of 
their homes to borrow money to buy goods and services. By 2008, three-quarters of the 
USA’s GDP was housing related (Stiglitz 2010).  
The threat posed by their expanding portfolio of loans led lenders to repackage them into 
financial products called derivatives10. These contained a mixture of good and poor 
quality loans and were structured in a way where people could buy tranches of them. The 
attraction of selling them was it enabled loan portfolios to be removed from balance 
sheets. The appeal of buying them was the belief they minimised risk (Greenberger 2010; 
Mian and Sufi 2014; Stiglitz 2010; US Financial Inquiry Commission 2011; Wolf 2010). 
Now, poor quality loans were viewed as unproblematic sources of profits (Wolf 2010; 
Stiglitz 2010).   
                                                             
10 According to the US Comptroller of Currency, a derivative is a contract that derives its value from the performance 
of an underlying entity, which can be an asset, index, or interest rate, and is often called the "underlying". An example 
of a derivative is collecting mortgages carrying various levels of risk and repackaging them as a single product to be 
sold on to investors. 
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Consequently, financial institutions around the world were buying, creating, 
deconstructing, repackaging and selling derivatives. Later, manufacturing companies 
were finding their finance departments were their most important source of profits (Wolf 
2010; Stiglitz 2010). Soon, a global market for financial products, with a nominal value 
of trillions of dollars, which nobody understood, was created (Greenberger 2010; Mian 
and Sufi 2014). Before long, these companies started to use leveraged finance11  to 
purchase derivatives (Blair 2008; Stiglitz 2010; US Financial Inquiry Commission 2011). 
The uncertainty created by these developments was obscured by a consensus private debt 
didn’t matter because one person’s debt is another person’s credit, money is a neutral 
facilitator of exchange and banks are only intermediaries who linked creditors to debtors 
(Wolf 2014; Keen 2011). As a result, credit rating agencies were able to award ‘Triple-A’ 
ratings to firms that had unknowingly lost control of their balance sheets (Stiglitz 2010; 
Mian and Sufi 2014).    
As long as house prices continued to rise, which they did for more than a decade, few 
people saw any problems on the horizon that could not be dealt with by raising interest 
rates (Keen 2011; Stiglitz 2010). Indeed the increase in global economic activity 
generated by house price inflation led some neoclassical economists, including Robert 
Lucas (2003), to declare, with no little degree of hubris, the economic cycle of boom and 
bust had been mastered. In economies such as the UK’s, commercial activity was so 
robust they started to experience shortages of labour (Frogner et al. 2002). As a result, 
employers imported foreign workers (Dustmann et al. 2002) and policymakers used 
studies such as ‘Transforming Disability into Ability' (OECD 2003) to reintroduce an old 
response to tight labour markets, one criticised by Stone (1984) for being unfair to 
disabled people, which is identifying them as a reserve source of labour.  
 
                                                             
11
 Leverage, often referred to as gearing in the UK, is any technique that can multiply gains or losses. Brigham, E. F 
and Houston, J. (2011). Fundamentals of Financial Management. Concise Edition. Boston: Cengage. An example of 
leverage is purchasing a £10 product by putting down a deposit of £1 and borrowing £9 with the promise to pay it back 
in a year's time, which is leverage of 10 to 1. If after a year they sell the product for £11 they have made a return of 
100% on their money. If they had paid cash, their return would only have been 10%. The opposite is true if the value of 
the product had fallen by £1. A small amount of money is being used to control a larger amount than would typically be 
possible by a direct cash purchase.    
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In 2005-2006 the US housing market collapsed. Increasingly, homeowners were unable 
to remortgage to avoid contractual interest rate rises. But because they held non-recursive 
mortgages, they could walk away from their debt. Creditors had no choice but to write off 
these loans and take control of assets whose value was shrinking (Stiglitz 2010; US 
Financial Inquiry Commission 2011). Before the deregulation and globalisation of the 
financial sector, the difficulties arising from these events would have primarily been a 
concern for US policymakers. Now, the continuous worldwide buying, selling, 
repackaging and reselling of derivatives meant nobody knew who had responsibility for 
the debts linked to worthless assets (Stiglitz 2010; US Financial Inquiry Commission 
2011). All that was known was it was spread throughout the world's financial system. As 
a result, financial institutions stopped lending to each other (Stiglitz 2010).  
 
It is here, the relevance of events in the US housing market to the employment prospects 
of people in Scotland with a history of mental illness emerges. When the flows of money 
between financial institutions dried up, huge holes appeared in their balance sheets. To 
protect themselves they made fewer loans to new customers, pressurised existing ones to 
concentrate on repaying their debts rather than investing in the production of goods and 
services and took over healthy businesses experiencing cash flow problems, closed them 
down and liquidated their assets (Adair et al. 2009; Stiglitz 2010; Fraser 2014). Suddenly, 
economies across the world, including those in Westminster and Holyrood, were facing 
the deepest recession since the 1930's (Hay 2010; Stiglitz 2010).  
 
Despite the scale of the recession, unemployment in the UK did not approach the levels 
experienced during the great depression (Tatton 2009; Coulter 2015). Automatic 
stabilisers: structural buffers that exert their influence without government action, such as 
the tax and benefits system and public sector employment, which were much smaller in 
scale in the 1930’s, absorbed around a third of the economic shock caused by the 
financial crisis (Doll et al 2009; Veld et al 2012). Nevertheless, as we will see, the 
relatively small rise in unemployment disguised a sharp rise in underemployment. 
Consequently, those people disabled by mental illness who are moving into the labour 
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market will be face competition for jobs from a large numbers of workers with better 
work and health records and more up to date job-relevant skills.  
 
Within economics, some neoclassicists sought to absolve the market from blame. 
Ignoring the reality that private banks create money in pursuit of profits, they argued 
events were caused by an exogenous shock: an inappropriate use of monetary policy by 
the US government (Russell 2010). Others economists took a different tack and blamed 
activity in the market (US Financial Inquiry Commission 2011; Wolf 2014). Accepting 
the neoclassicists’ argument is problematic for two reasons. First, most neoclassical 
economists dismissed concerns about the possibility of a crash right up until it happened 
(Stiglitz 2010; 2014; Wolf 2010; 2014). More importantly, Hyman Minsky, a self-
identified old institutional economist, whose work was introduced in the previous 
chapter, had presciently used the work of Keynes and Schumpeter (Mason 2009; Knell 
2015) to develop a theory of financial instability that predicted the events of 2008 would 
play out.    
Before 2008, Minsky’s maverick status meant his work was largely ignored (Cassidy 
2009; Mason 2009; Keen 2011; Wolf 2014). Given events, it is important to revisit his 
thinking here. Unlike neoclassicists, Minsky thought the role of money as a store of value 
and a statement of account could be as important as its function of facilitating exchange 
(Knell 2015). In another departure from orthodoxy, he viewed financial institutions as 
profit-seeking entrepreneurial businesses that linked debtors and creditors and created 
money so that they could pursue profits (Knell 2015). Minsky observed companies grow 
by purchasing existing assets and creating new ones and that this growth is not always 
created by investing retained profits but by borrowing money from financial institutions, 
which they create in response to a promise of future profits. When everything goes to 
plan, the capital goods purchased with this money will, along with the labour that uses 
them, generate enough profits to provide the lender with a steady stream of payments 
over the lifetime of the loan. However, the future is unpredictable, and the banks have no 
cast-iron guarantee that these payments will always be made. Consequently, the 
expansion of the economy depends on whether financial institutions feel it is safe to 
speculate on future income (Minsky 1982; 1992). Price stability provides such security, 
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and it increases their willingness to lend money. With credit easier to come by, 
businesses invest more, and paper profits rise. As a result, financial institutions become 
more willing to provide credit businesses become more relaxed about going into debt 
(Minsky 1982; 1992). Consequently, stability leads to an increase in debt financing, 
which will be weak at first because of memories of previous bad times.  
But as these memories recede, financial institutions will be able to persuade the state 
continued growth depends on them being free to innovate in the pursuit of profits and that 
this requires deregulation. Initially, they use their new found freedom to lend to 
businesses and private individuals that can pay the principal and the interest (Hedge 
finance). Later, they lend to those that can only pay the interest (Speculative finance). 
Finally, they identify rising asset values (paper profits) as security for their loans, which 
justifies them lending to those who cannot pay the principal or the interest (Ponzi 
finance). Gradually consumption and profits become more dependant on using debt to 
trade in existing assets than they are on wages from employment or the creation of new 
assets.  
At the Ponzi stage, the financial institutions become unable to service the demand for 
credit from their assets. As a result, they borrow from each other, create products such as 
derivatives and buy and sell different parts of them. By trading in this way, they move 
debt off their balance sheets and increase their paper profits, thereby creating an illusion 
of reduced risk that encourages businesses to use leveraged finance to purchase more 
derivatives so that they can increase their paper profits by lending more. Eventually, even 
the financial institutions become Ponzi borrowers who can only continue in business if 
they can attract enough new investors to pay their existing creditors (Minsky 1982; 
1992).  
Minsky then went on to point out credit booms always end when worries about inflation 
lead to upward pressure on interest rates. With money becoming harder to borrow, 
debtors, including healthy businesses, start to experience cash flow problems. Because 
they can no longer rely on rising paper profits for protection against their debts, they start 
to sell off their assets. As a result, asset values fall; paper profits turn into actual losses; 
demand for goods and services fall; businesses go bust; investment declines and 
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unemployment rises. Consequently, asset values fall further and a downward spiral 
develops, which continues until the effects of the bubble are purged by the running down 
of stocks, the wearing out of capital assets, the reduction of debt and laying off workers. 
Minsky portrays rational behaviour in financial markets as something that causes the 
broader economy to lurch between boom and bust (Minsky 1982; 1992). From his 
perspective, financialisation produces an inefficient distribution of resources. Instead of 
an economy having a natural rate of unemployment, its demand for labour will tend to be 
sinusiodal, with peaks and troughs of growing frequency and scale, which gradually 
polarises around relatively few stable well paid jobs and relatively many unstable poorly 
paid ones (Pollin 1997; Cassidy 2009; Keen 2011; Wolf 2014; Knell 2015). 
4.3 The response of the UK government to the financial, crisis the subsequent 
recession, and how it affected people with a history of mental illness.  
At the start of the financial crisis, price inflation was still seen as the key strategic 
concern (Stiglitz 2010; Wolf 2014). Demand and unemployment were problems that 
policymakers felt could be dealt with by manipulating monetary policy (Stiglitz 2010; 
Wolf 2014). Cutting interest rates would encourage people to spend resources rather than 
save them. In turn, demand would increase, and employers would hire more people, 
which would create more demand and a virtuous cycle would ensue. However, as the 
scale of the crisis became apparent, it became clear this approach was problematic. Many 
of the world's largest financial institutions, including two headquartered in Scotland, RBS 
and HBOS, were in serious trouble. Cutting interest rates would reduce their deposits and 
increase their vulnerability, and if they went down, they threatened to take the global 
financial system with them (Acharya et al. 2009; Crouch 2010; Stiglitz 2010; Wolf 
2014).  
In the course of tackling the crisis, the government suspended its fiscal rules about deficit 
management until the crisis was over because the situation had rendered them perverse 
(Darling 2008). Following this change, borrowing rose from 2.3% of GDP in 2007-2008 
to 11.3% in 2008-2009 (Hodson and Mabbett 2009). Subsequently, some commentators 
accused the government of adopting a discredited Keynesian approach to economic 
management (Lee 2009), an accusation that was endorsed by the Conservative opposition 
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(Osborne, 2008). Setting aside any opinions on the efficacy of Keynesianism, how 
accurate were these allegations? According to the OECD (2009), discretionary spending 
in the UK amounted to around 1.4% of GDP as opposed to 3% in Germany and almost 
6% in the USA. Some of this was used to fund the automatic stabilisers, such as increased 
unemployment benefits, but in relative terms the sums involved were tiny (Hodson and 
Mabbett 2009). A far more significant proportion of the money available to the 
government, around a £1000 billion (National Audit Office 2010), was set aside to 
stabilise the banks and improve their liquidity (Stiglitz 2010; Wolf 2014; National Audit 
office 2010). It follows that any stimulus this gave to the economy would have to work 
its way through the financial system. In other words, the bail out to the banks was 
designed to improve access to credit. In the light of the above, and evidence showing the 
one fiscal stimulant the UK government gave to the economy during the crisis was the 
novel one of a temporary cut in VAT (Crossley et al. 2014), it is perverse to accuse the 
last Labour government of acting as Keynesian demand managers. 
Perverse or not, it appears the public was persuaded it was not private sector recklessness 
or market failures that were at the root of the country’s economic problems but public 
sector profligacy, for after the 2010 election a coalition between the Conservatives and 
the Liberal Democrats formed a new government (Crouch 2010; Wolf 2014). In power, 
they did not try to cut public spending. Instead, the Labour policy of taking money away 
from the direct provision of services and using it to create a market where private sector 
service providers could compete for government contracts was pursued with greater 
vigour (Kersbergen and Hemerijck 2014). To justify this the coalition argued that 
continuing to support the financial sector would keep interest rates low, encourage 
private wealth to be invested in productive sectors of the economy rather than being left 
lying on deposit or being used to purchase government bonds and increase tax receipts, 
which in turn could be used to reduce the deficit (Wolf 2014). In effect, the coalition was 
claiming that if the public sector were prevented from crowding out the private sector 
demand would be increased (Alisina and Ardagna 2009).  
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For people with a history of mental illness, many who have received disability benefits 
for more than two years (DWP 2015A)12, the consequences of the coalition government’s 
approach to economic management were threefold. First, it allowed them to yoke their 
argument about the need to cut the public debt to the one made by Waddell and Burton 
(2006 a, b) that paid employment is good for mental health in order to justify increasing 
the impetus behind the policy, started by the last Labour government during the boom 
years, of moving them into the labour market. To this end, they spent £2.4 Billion 
between 2011 and 2014 on the Work Programme, Access to Work and Work Choice 
initiatives (DWP 2014a; DWP 2014b). Second, the government expanded the policy of 
contracting out its functions (Crouch 2010), which meant the services provided to them 
were increasingly determined by targets set for private businesses by government 
contracts.  
The challenge facing these policies can be seen by reflecting on evidence a 
disproportionately large number of people with a history of mental illness in receipt of 
disability benefits live in post-industrial areas of the UK such as Scotland (Forster 2015; 
Beatty and Fothergill 2010; 2016). These areas are heavily reliant on the public sector for 
work (McVicar 2013; Hecks et al. 2005). In Scotland, the move away from the direct 
provision of services has contributed to a loss of 30,000 public sector jobs (Scottish 
Government 2014b). The indications from the government are that these losses will 
increase significantly (HM Treasury 2016). It follows, that when people in Scotland 
move off disability benefits and into the labour market, the focus of their job search 
activities will have to be the private sector. Now, the discussion will continue with a look 
at the challenges they face when they do this and what they tell us about the efficacy of 
UK welfare to work policies. To begin with, it will look at the recession's effect on 
private sector jobs in Scotland.  
                                                             
12
 Two years does not capture how long many of these people have been absent from the labour market because the 
rolling programme of moving people off the old disability benefits and on to ESA resets the period of claim clock to 
zero.    
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4.4 The effects of the 2008 recession on private sector employment in Scotland and 
what this means for the employment prospects of people with a history of mental 
illness.   
Despite its depth, the recession did not produce levels of unemployment anything like 
those of the great depression of the 1930’s. They had more in common with those of the 
less severe recessions of the 1980’s and 1990’s. In the UK the downturn of the 1980's 
produced a rise in unemployment of 2.4%. The figure for the one in the 1990’s was 3.4%. 
The figures for the the recession that followed the financial crash was 2% in the UK 
(Lambert 2010) and 4% in Scotland (Scottish Government 2011). Even if one allows for 
the effect of automatic stabilisers these figures are surprising.    
The figures in Table 1 below contain figures for March 2008 and March 2013 for the 
number of small medium and large businesses that were in operation in Scotland and the 
numbers of people they employed.  
Table 1: Businesses operating in the private sector in Scotland 
 in March 2008 and March 2013
13
. 
 March 2008 March 2013 
Size of 
business 
Number 
of 
employees 
Number of 
businesses14 
No of people 
employed by 
sector 
Number of 
businesses 
Number of 
people employed 
by sector 
  2008 % 2008 % 2013 % 2013 % 
Small  1-49 92,045 94 595,640 33.6 94,810 94 589,110 33.4 
Medium 50-249 3,575 3.7 252,810 14.4 3,705 3.7 252, 030 14.4 
Large >250  2,285 2.3 920, 260 52.0 2,270 2.3 921,110 52.2 
Total  N/A 97,665 100 1,768,710 100 100,785 100 1,762, 250 100 
 
These show the relatively small rise in unemployment was not the only surprise, for they 
indicate that the numbers of private sector businesses operating in Scotland had increased 
by 3%, while the number of people in employment had decreased by less than 1%. These 
figures appear relatively benign. However, the massive support for the financial services 
                                                             
13 Scottish Government (2014) Businesses in Scotland tables. 
http://www.scotland.gov.uk/Topics/Statistics/Browse/Business/Corporate/Tables/TimeSeries Downloaded on the 
25/8/14. 
14 The Scottish Government (2015) Increase the number of businesses. 
www.gov.scot/About/Performance/scot/Performs/indicator/businesses Downloaded on the 25/8/14. 
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industry was not repeated elsewhere. Consequently, they disguise significant variations in 
the effects of the recession on different sectors of the economy. Manufacturing and 
construction, which historically had substantial numbers of manual and unskilled jobs, 
experienced job losses of 10% as opposed to the 2% fall in the services sector (Gregg and 
Wadsworth 2010; Martin 2012). Evidently, the last recession accelerated the decline in 
demand for manual and unskilled labour that had previously been identified by Bell and 
Smith (2004), which suggests unemployed people with a history of mental illness, will 
have to look for work in the service sector.   
Closer scrutiny of the above figures shows the surprisingly small drop in employment 
occurred at a time when the number of small firms increased and the average number of 
people they employed decreased. An explanation for this is that some people who lost 
their jobs during the recession preferred to enter self-employment rather than register for 
unemployment benefit (Bell and Blanchflower 2011). The figures in Table 2 below 
provide some support for this argument. They show between March 2008 and March 
2013 the number of self-employed people increased by 24,000. However, the rest of the 
figures show that at the same time employment fell by 45,000, JSA recipients increased 
by 68,000, the number of economically inactive people rose by 73,000, and the total 
number of jobs declined by 167,000. Evidently, this argument, on its own, cannot explain 
the relatively small increase in unemployment.  
These figures also show that in March 2008 there were over 200,000 jobs unfilled and 
75,000 people on JSA, while in March 2013 the respective figures were 90,000 and 
140,000, which suggests that unemployment in Scotland has changed from being 
predominantly a supply-side problem to being mainly a demand-side one. Given the 
amount of liquidity sucked out of the economy as a result of the financial crisis, this is 
unsurprising. However, even with this change, there were still over 90,000 jobs left 
unfilled. 
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Table 2: Changes in the Scottish labour market 
between March 2008 and March 2013. 
 
  March 2008  March 2013 Change 
1 JSA Claimants
15
*       75,300     143,570   +68,230 
2 Economically active aged 16 to 64
16
** 2,680,000 2,753,000   +73,000 
3 Total jobs
17
 2,758,000 2,591,000 -167,000 
4 Demand> Supply       78,000   -162,000 -240,,000 
     
5 Self-employed jobs
18
    271,000    295,000  + 24.000 
6 Employee jobs
19
 2,468,000 2,280,000 -188,000 
7 Other jobs
20
      19,000      16,000 -3,000 
     
8 Public sector employment
21
    701,300    655,300   -46,000 
9 Third sector employment
22
      73,900      81,700    + 7,800 
10 Private sector employment
23
 1,768,710 1,762,250   -6,460 
11 Total employment  2,543,910 2,499,250 -44,660 
     
12 No of jobs > no of people in employment. 
(Row 8 minus row 12) 
    214, 090 91,750 -121,340 
13 No of people in employment> no of employee 
jobs 
(Row 12- Row 6) 
      75,910   219,250 +143,340 
14 No of economically active people> No of 
employee jobs. (Row 2 –row 6) 
   212,000     311,000     99,000 
 *I have used the figures for JSA rather than those for the unemployed because the former figures are an actual 
number whereas the latter is an estimate made as a result of a statistical sampling exercise. 
** This underestimates the number of economically active people: in 2013 there were 996,000 people over the 
age of 65 in work. It appears this figure is increasing because in Feb 2015 the figure was 1,114,000 (ONS 2015).   
 
                                                             
15 DWP (2015) Jobseekers claimants http://tabulation-
tool.dwp.gov.uk/100pc/jsa/ccdate/ccgor/a_carate_r_ccdate_c_ccgor.html. These figures are for February 2008 and 
2013. The figures for jobs and the economically inactive relate to March 2008 and 2013. This data is published on 
different cycles, so I have been unable to obtain an exact calendar match. Given the small time difference, I have taken 
the liberty of treating them as being for the same period for these calculations. The evidence is that the percentage 
difference between the actual totals for March and February will be too small to undermine the arguments I will be 
making in this chapter.  
16 Nomis (2015) Scottish labour force.  
https://www.nomisweb.co.uk/reports/lmp/gor/2013265931/report.aspx#tabrespop  
17 Source: Nomis, https://momisweb.co.uk/reports/lmp/gov/201326593/report.aspx?town=Scotland. Downloaded on 
the 7/1/14   
Source: Nomis, https://momisweb.co.uk/reports/lmp/gov/201326593/report.aspx?town=Scotland. Downloaded on the 
7/1/14.   
18 Ibid 
19 Ibid 
20 Ibid 
21 The Scottish Government (2014) Local authority tables: Table 1.20a level and proportion of employees by sector 
(private, public and third) Scotland 2004-2013.  http://www.gov.scot/Topics/Statistics/Browse/Labour-Market/Local-
Authority-Tables Downloaded on the 9/4/15. 
22 Ibid 
23 The Scottish Government (2014) Businesses in Scotland tables 
https://www.scotland.gov.uk/Topics/Statistics/Browse/Business/Corporate/Tables/TimeSeries Downloaded on the 
25/8/14. 
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The figures above indicate the Scottish labour market, irrespective of the condition of the 
economy, has distinct supply and demand problems. Consequently, two more questions 
emerge that are both relevant to the efficacy of the UK government's welfare to work 
policies in addition to the one about the small rise in unemployment. Why are so many 
jobs left unfilled when there are large numbers of unemployed people looking for a job; 
and what does this mean for the employability of those individuals with a history of 
mental illness affected by these policies? The next section will now address the above 
three questions.   
4.5 Explaining the small rise in unemployment during the recession.    
The first question can be answered by considering the difference between being in 
employment and a job. Labour market statistical returns, including those made by the 
Office of National Statistics, report jobs on a full-time equivalent basis (ONS 2014). 
They do not take account of the fact that more than one worker can fill a post, which 
suggests the decline in the number of jobs, the increase in the size of the labour force and 
the rise in the numbers in paid employment could be reconciled if there has been an 
increase in part-time working. Figures from the Scottish Parliament (2014) for time-
related underemployment confirm this has happened, for they show that in August 2013, 
243,000 employees said they would work extra hours if they were available. A rise in 
underemployment of around a quarter since 2008 (Scottish Government 2016). If one 
adds this figure to that for the unemployed it can be argued there are almost 400,000 
people, around 15% of working age people in Scotland, looking for work at the same 
time as there are 90,000 vacancies. This situation changes the question of why has there 
been such a small increase in unemployment as a result of the recession to why 
unemployment and underemployment exist when there are so many unfilled vacancies. 
The next two sections will look at this question, first from the perspective of 
neoclassicism, the new institutional economics and then the old institutional economics, 
its close relation stratification economics and the new economic sociology.  
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4.5.1 Neoclassical and new institutionalist understandings of the increase in 
unemployment and underemployment when there are large numbers of vacancies.  
From a neoclassical perspective, the reason firms with part-time workers or unfilled 
vacancies are not employing full-time workers or hiring new employees is quite simple. 
All things being equal, workers can strike a balance between the disutility of work and 
the utility of leisure that makes it unprofitable for firms to hire them (Ehrenburg and 
Smith 2012). Changing this situation requires asking why workers can strike the balance 
they do. If the catalyst for this decision is private wealth or resources obtained from the 
market as a result of price competition, then there is nothing more to be said (Ehrenburg 
and Smith 2012). If they have acquired them as a result of the state, directly or indirectly, 
redistributing wealth in their favour, then the unemployment and underemployment are 
voluntary, economically inefficient and something that needs to be addressed (Ehrenburg 
and Smith 2012). In  other words the state needs to turn away from redistributing 
resources and providing workers with rights towards incentivising people to compete for 
them by increasing the pain of being unemployed and making existing workers easier to 
dismiss and less costly to hire (Ehrenburg and Smith 2014) by, for example, weakening 
trade unions (Nickell 1997), making workers responsible for pensions arrangements and 
reducing the value of out of work benefits, making them less generous, more difficult to 
obtain and more focused on the labour market (Lazear 1990; Lazear, Shaw and Stanton 
2016; Ehrenburg and Smith 2012; Waddell and Burton 2006a). Neoclassicists argue 
actions such as these will make it more likely the unemployed and underemployed will 
respond to market signals by developing the skills (Human Capital) employers want 
(Becker 1993), search for work until they find it (Stiglitz 1962) and, if there is no work 
available, move to places where it is more readily available (Becker 1971).  
The assumptions of neoclassical economics about the utility of leisure and the disutility 
of work, its preference for private ordering, and its desire to promote economic efficiency 
are also attributes of the new institutional economics (Williamson 1975, 1980; 1985; 
2007). So the new institutionalists are not averse to policies incentivising people to 
respond to market signals about price. However, their position on transaction costs 
enables them to offer labour contracts rendered inefficient by asset specificity, bounded 
rationality and cognitive idiosyncasies to provided an additional explanation for the co-
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existence of unemployment, underemployment and numerous vacancies. In other words 
agent-principal problems.   
 
The existence of unemployment when there are vacancies can be understood by reflecting 
on the idea that agent-principal problems require buyers of labour to protect themselves 
from harm. Doing this involves striking a balance between the costs incurred in using the 
market on a one to one and as and when required basis against those involved in creating 
a hierarchal organisation (Williamson 1975; 1980, 1985). After a decision has been made 
to create such an organisation and vacancies are created that are not project focused time-
bound ones, it can be presumed the firm is looking for people to become members of 
what Williamson (1975; 1985) calls relationship teams. When trying to fill such 
vacancies, opportunism on the part of job seekers could lead the firm to make recruitment 
mistakes (Williamson 1975; 1985). Here, the conditions of employment of relationship 
team members, the difficulties involved in changing them and the lack of asset specificity 
of recruits could unsettle teams, disrupt production, and reduce profitability. 
Occasionally, fear of such problems may lead a firm to decide that it is more efficient to 
leave such vacancies unfilled, perhaps filling them later by using specialist recruitment 
agencies, internal promotion or even reorganising them out of existence.  
 
As for the existence of underemployment, if one assumes the labour provided by 
members of relationship teams is firm-specific, then the firm will know these workers 
will be difficult to replace (Williamson 1975; 1985). Fear of losing these workers means 
a firm is likely to be reluctant to reduce their hours during a downturn unless it has no 
other option. Similarly, these workers will be aware they will struggle to find the same 
work, rewards and security elsewhere (Williamson 1975; 1985). Consequently, 
employers and employees will often prefer to maintain their existing relationships and 
wait for an upturn even when there are cheaper sources of labour and full-time 
employment opportunities available elsewhere.    
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4.5.2 Sociological, old institutional economics and stratification economics 
understandings of the increase in unemployment and underemployment when there 
are large numbers of vacancies.   
It will be recalled from the literature review that adherents of the old institutional 
economics, the new economic sociology and stratification economics have been critical 
of the use of neoclassical theory to explain economic activity. They argue its approach 
ignores the reality that commercial activity is embedded in, regulated by and a regulator 
of personal relationships, social structures and group membership (Commons 1931; 
Zelizer 2007; Granovetter 1973; 1985; 1995a; Darity 2005; 2009a). In other words, they 
obfuscate the influence of identity and power on economic relationships.  
Identity can be used to explain the increase in part-time working and the existence of 
unemployment when there are vacancies. Identities can foster shared beliefs, interests 
values and close physical proximity (Handy 1993; Darity 2005; 2009a; Johnson et al. 
1999). By doing so, they can make risks and uncertainties appear more manageable and 
provide protection when things go wrong (Commons 1931; Zelizer 2007; Granovetter 
1973; 1985; 1995a). It follows that the decisions of economic actors will be influenced by 
safety and status considerations, perhaps as much as or even more so than a desire for 
increased profits or higher wages. Because of this, employers may prefer to reduce 
people’s hours rather than wield the axe when times are bad for fear it will undermine 
their ability to hold on to valued employees and recruit new ones when times are good 
(Ehrenburg and Smith 2012). Workers may decide to accept shorter hours because being 
in work carries more prestige than being unemployed and the possibility of more 
financially lucrative work elsewhere could be outweighed by the prospect of losing 
benefits such as security and the chance for promotion in the future (Ehrenburg and 
Smith 2012; Handy 1993). A desire for safety can also be used to explain the existence of 
vacancies when there is a surplus of labour. It suggests employers will be more inclined 
to employ people when personal experience or that of someone they trust indicates a job seeker 
is a fit with existing workplace actors. If this is the case, then it implies the trade in labour is 
two-tiered. On one level, as Zelizer (2007) argues, it is regulated by intimacy. On another 
one, it could be conducted in discrete markets where access and the nature of competition 
are influenced by factors such as class, identity, location and shared histories 
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(Granovetter 1985; 1995a; Darity 2005; 2009a). In both cases, reporting the existence of 
a vacancy to the authorities does not mean every appropriately qualified person will be 
able to compete for it. From this perspective, a job seeker’s ability to find work cannot be 
reduced to questions of skills, flexibility and price. 
Power can be used to explain the existence of underemployment and unemployment 
when there are a large number of vacancies. Skilled workers have greater freedom of 
movement and can be hard to replace. The power this gives them means they are more 
likely to have their requests to work part-time work accepted (Sweet et al. 2016). 
Possession of such power partly reconciles the co-existence of large numbers of 
unemployed and underemployed with significant numbers of full-time vacancies, but 
what about unskilled relatively powerless workers? To answer this question, it is worth 
revisiting the arguments of Jessop (1994; 1999; 2002) about the transformation of the 
Keynesian welfare state (KWF) into a Schumpeterian welfare state (SWS) by economic, 
political and social pressures. Unlike the KWF, which decommodify’s labour and 
redistributes wealth, the SWS recommodifies labour by making new territories subject to 
market discipline through the promotion of competition, flexibility, innovation, and self-
reliance (Jessop 1999; 2002). Facilitating this paradigm shift is the removal or weakening 
of employee protection rights, the marginalisation of trade unions and the implementation 
of policies that promote employability by cutting out of work benefits, making access to 
them more difficult to obtain, and subjecting rights to a willingness to work test (Jessop 
1994; 1999; 2002). The SWS increases the supply of unskilled labour to the market and 
reduces the ability of unskilled workers to resist change (Bambra 2009).  
The thinking behind this move from the KWS to the SWS is it will encourage 
entrepreneurs to build profitable businesses because it gives them more room to respond 
to market signals by cutting wages, reducing hours, making workers unemployed or 
hiring them on a gig basis (Bambra 2009; Di Stefano 2016). Neoclassicists can counter 
this by arguing that the ability of businesses to act in this way is limited because their 
workers (and their unemployed peers for that matter) can choose to develop the skills 
required to compete for the vacant full-time posts. It is an argument that only stands up 
from the perspective of the utility disutility model of leisure and work. Departing from it 
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allows the move from the KWS to the SWS to be seen as an attempt to prioritise the 
needs of employers by lowering benefits and making them more difficult to obtain so as 
to make it potentially catastrophic for workers to take risks (Hagfors and Kajanoja 2007). 
Consequently, they are more likely to stay where they are, because being, mistreated in 
work will often be better than being out of work.   
4.5.3 The implications of the alternative economic and sociological explanations for 
the unemployment and underemployment produced by the recession.  
The increase in underemployment as a result of the recession suggests the challenge 
facing people with a history of mental health illness in finding a job will change as the 
economy picks up. At the moment they will have to persuade employers to purchase their 
labour rather than buy it from existing employees. People who are known quantities that 
may be willing to be flexible about the terms and conditions of their employment if it 
means they can stay in a job24.  When things start to pick up, they will have to convince 
employers to hire them rather than offer the extra work to the same group of people. 
Furthermore when things improve to the point where the existing number of employees 
cannot meet the demand for the goods and services they produce they will have to 
persuade them that they are a better source of labour than unemployed people with a 
better health record a more recent work history and more up to date skills. 
A disproportionate number of people with a history of severe and enduring mental illness 
live in the former industrial areas of the country. These areas have high numbers of 
people in long-term unemployment and rely heavily on a shrinking public sector for jobs 
(Forster 2015; Beatty and Fothergill 2010; 2016). Neoclassicists argue increasing the 
supply of labour and removing protection from those in work will increase competition, 
reduce inflationary pressures and make it profitable for employers to hire more workers 
(Layard 2001). In this light, the passing of the Equality Act 2010, and the implementation 
of the ‘Access to Work’, ‘Work Choice’, ‘See Me’ initiatives can be seen as an attempt to 
ensure that the labour from people disabled by mental illness will be judged solely on the 
basis of price competition. Both schools of institutionalism, reluctantly in the case of the 
                                                             
24
 This has led the Conservative MP for Shipley Philip Davies to argue that disabled people should be paid less than the 
minimum wage. See http://www.bbc.co.uk/blogs/ouch/2011/06/minimum_wage_a_barrier_to_empl.html 
Downloaded on the 12/1/11.   
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new institutional economics, and the new economic sociology accept non-economic 
institutions
25
, influence economic outcomes. They accept uncertainty means institutions 
and multiple markets are a precondition for trade, which means that labour can never be 
judged on merit alone. At a macro level, there is merit in both positions given that during 
the boom there were more vacancies than there were suppliers of labour and there were 
still people out of work while in the aftermath of the bust employers appeared to eschew 
cheaper suppliers of labour in favour of existing ones. As we have seen, the UK 
government adopted the neoclassical position. The next section will discuss the changes 
this has led them to make to the benefits system, the actual and potential effects of this 
change on the supply of labour to the economy and the economy’s ability to absorb them.    
4.6 The changes to the benefits system and their effect on the labour supply.  
The changes to the benefits system aim to reduce the on flows and increase the off flows 
from disability benefits. ‘Employment Support Allowance’ (ESA) was introduced in 
2008 on a rolling basis to replace ‘Incapacity Benefit’ (IB), ‘Income Support with 
Disability Premium’ (IS+DP) and ‘Severe Disability Allowance’ (SDA). All new 
applicants for disability benefits will have their eligibility for ESA assessed while the 
eligibility of existing benefit claimants will be evaluated over time. It will be recalled 
from ‘Chapter One’ that the on and off flows to ESA are regulated by Work Capability 
Assessments (WCA), which are carried out by private sector contractors. It will also be 
remembered this assessment splits applicants for ESA into three groups: the Support 
Group (SG), who will not be compelled to look for employment; the Work Related 
Activity Group (WRAG), who will be expected to engage in work-related activity under 
threat of sanction; and JSA who would be scheduled to look for work immediately. 
Making a comparison between March 2008 and March 2013 is problematic. The WCA’s 
collating of disability benefit claimants into SG, WRAG and JSA did not happen in 
March 2008. Table 3 below, prepares the ground for assessing what would have 
happened if they did. For the sake of simplicity, the figures for IB, IS+DP and SDA will 
                                                             
25 Williamson argues that in the long term competition will erode the influence of non-economic institutions on 
economic activity. See Williamson, O.E (2000). The new institutional economics: taking stock looking ahead. Journal 
of economic literature 38, 595-613.  
 Page 93 of 292 
 
be gathered under the heading ‘Old Incapacity Benefits’ and claimants for ESA will be 
collected under the row ‘ESA claimants'. 
Table 3: Changes in the numbers of people in receipt of incapacity  
benefit by age mental health and the length of their claims between  
February 2008 and February 2013
26
*. 
  Incapacity related benefits  
claims (IB) 
Incapacity related benefits claims 
(Mental Health) 
Feb 2008* Old Incapacity Benefits  300,000 135,100 
Feb 2013 Old Incapacity Benefits 95,450 42,470 
ESA 177,650 85,930 
Total 273,100 128,400 
Change in claims for all incapacity 
benefits 
-26,900 -6,700 
*Unlike employment statistics, which are issued in March, benefit claimant statistics  are issued in February 
 
Given the role of the WCA in separating applicants for ESA into support group ESA, 
Work related ESA and JSA, it is reasonable to look upon people that have been moved on 
to WRAG or JSA after their WCA as ‘hidden unemployed’, people whose joblessness is 
not recorded by the unemployment figures27. In the past, disabled people were identified 
as a hidden reservoir of labour when demand outstripped supply. Now it is taking place 
when supply exceeds demand. The total ‘hidden unemployment' for February 2013 
emerges from the figures in Table 4 below.  
Table 4: Numbers of people in each category of an ESA claim in 
February 2013
28
. 
 The total numbers of people in each phase of phase of ESA by Feb 2013 
 Total Assessed 
and under 
assessment 
Currently 
under 
Assessment 
Total 
assessment 
completed 
Work Related 
Activity Group 
Support 
Group 
Move to 
JSA 
All incapacities 177, 650 50,600 127,100 59,500 59,810 7,740 
Mental health 85,930 24,920 61,010 31,000 26,990 3,020 
 
                                                             
26
 Source: DWP (2014) http://tabulationtool.dwep.gov.uk/100pc/tabtool/html. Downloaded on the 5/7/2014 
27 That the UK government takes this view is reinforced by the announcement by the Chancellor of the Exchequer that 
from April 2017 WRAG ESA will be paid at the same rate as JSA. http://www.disabilitynewsservice.com/budget-
osborne-scraps-wrag-as-part-of-13-billion-a-year-benefit-cuts/ Downloaded on the 17/9/15.  
28 Nomis (2014). https://www.nomisweb.co.uk/query/construct/submit.asp?forward=yes&menuopt=201&subcomp=. 
Downloaded on the 7/1/2015.  
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The figures in Table 4 contain the results of every WCA carried out during the existence 
of ESA. From them, we can identify ratios for the WRAG, SG and JSA groups, which are 
0.47, 0.47 and 0.06 for all incapacities and 0.51, 0.44 and 0.05 for ones related to mental 
health.  By applying these ratios to the numbers receiving the old incapacity benefits 
awaiting a WCA and those currently being assessed from tables 3 and 4 we can establish 
the total of ‘hidden unemployment’ for February 2013. Now we have reasonable 
estimates for the total numbers of existing claimants who will eventually be collated into 
the SG, WRAG and JSA groups. If we add the estimates for WRAG and JSA to the 
equivalent figures in Table 4, we have a plausible figure for the total ‘hidden 
unemployment'. If it is assumed these ratios are constant, and we apply them to the 
figures for February 2008 for all claimants of the old incapacity benefits and those 
claiming them for mental health reasons then a reasonable estimate can be made of how 
many claimants of incapacity benefits would have been collated into WRAG and JSA by 
the WCA if it and ESA had existed then. If it is assumed the differences in figures for 
February and March in 2008 and 2013 are marginal, then a comparison can be made 
between the figures for 2008 and 2013 for recorded and ‘actual’ disabled unemployment 
for all disabled people and those disabled by mental health problems. This comparison is 
made in Table 5 below. 
The apparent fall in the numbers of ‘hidden unemployment' can be explained by the rise 
in JSA claimants JSA and people moving out of the system altogether. What is 
interesting about this fall is that over 80% of it is accounted for by people with mental 
health problems. It suggests people claiming disability benefits because of mental health 
difficulties are being targeted by ESA administrators for a move into the labour market. 
Support for this suggestion is provided by research from Mind and the Independent 
newspaper (2015)29 and a freedom of information request made by the website ‘Benefits 
and Work’ in 201330. The former found that ESA sanctions affecting them rose by 668% 
over four years, while the latter revealed that they account for 60% of all ESA sanctions. 
                                                             
29 http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/benefit-sanctions-against-people-with-mental-health-problems-up-
by-600-per-cent-a6731971.html  Downloaded on the 3/2/ 16.   
30 http://www.benefitsandwork.co.uk/news/2717-dwp-target-mental-health-claimants-for-esa-sanctions Downloaded on 
the 3/2/16. 
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It would appear that there are a disproportionately high number of people with a history 
of mental health problems moving off benefits and into the labour market.        
Table 5: Unemployment figures including  
the 'Hidden Disabled Unemployed for  
March 2008 and March 2013
31
. 
  March 2008 March 2013 Change 
to U/E 
between 
2008 and 
2013 
1 Benefit 
Category 
JSA WRAG 
(Est.) 
Moved 
to JSA 
(Est.) 
Hidden 
disabled 
U/E* 
(Est.) 
‘Total 
U/E’** 
(Est.) 
JSA*** WRAG Moved 
to JSA 
Hidden 
disabled 
U/E 
Total 
U/E  
2 Recorded 
U/E 
75,300 141,000 18,000 159,000 234,300 143,600 133,900 9,900 143,800 277,500 +43,000 
3 Hidden 
U/E 
 141,000 18,000 159,000 159,000  133,900 9,900 143,800 143,800 -15,200 
4 Hidden 
U/E 
(Mental 
Health ) 
 68,900 6,800 75,700 75,700  56,600 6,400 63,000 63,000 -12,700 
*U/E is an abbreviation for unemployment 
**’Moved to JSA’ total is added to figures for March 2008 but not to March 2013 as JSA figures for 2013 already include Moved to JSA figures. 
***JSA figures for 2013 will include the 3,020 people that have already had their WCA 
 
4.7 The changes to the Scottish labour market created by the recession and the 
WCA. 
The changes to the Scottish labour market caused by the recession and changes to the 
benefits system are revealed in Table 6 below, which was created by adding the figures 
from Table 5 and Table 2. They indicate that if the changes to the benefits system had 
been in place at the height of the last economic boom the supply of labour would have 
outstripped the number of employee jobs by 212,000 but if one includes the figures for 
the ‘hidden unemployed’ of 159,000 at that time this figure increases to 371,000. Even if 
we confine ourselves to the hidden unemployed who have a history of mental illness, the 
supply of labour would have outstripped the number of available jobs by 288,000. These 
figures overestimate the excess supply of labour as some people would have become self-
employed, but probably not by much. There are two reasons for saying this: first, many 
people on disability benefits for a considerable period are unlikely to have the up to date 
skills or contacts necessary to make this type of work a realistic option and second, the 
                                                             
31 In making these calculations no allowance has been made for the possibility that the ‘hidden unemployed' may 
decide to become self-employed. 
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increase in the number of self-employment between 2008 and 2013 was only 24,000. 
Disturbingly, these figures indicate that if ESA had been in place at the height of the 
boom, it could have increased the supply of labour beyond what the economy could then 
have absorbed.   
Table 6: The Scottish labour market between March 2008 and March 2013
32
 
  March 2008 March 2013 Change to 
U/E 
between 
2008 and 
2013 
1 Benefit Category JSA WRAG 
(Est.) 
Moved 
to 
JSA** 
(Est.) 
Total 
U/E** 
(Est.) 
JSA*** WRAG Moved 
to JSA 
Total U/E  
2 Recorded U/E* 75,300 141,000 18,000 234,300 143,600 133,900 9,900 277,500 +43,000 
3 Hidden U/E  141,000 18,000 159,000  133,900 9,900 143,800 -15,200 
4 Hidden U/E (Mental 
Health ) 
 68,900 6,800 75,700  56,600 6,400 63,000 -12,700 
5 Jobs    2,758,000    2,591,000 -167,000 
6 Employee jobs    2,468,000    2,280,000 -188,000 
7 Self-employed jobs    271,000    295,000 24,000 
8 Private sector 
employment  
   1,768,700    1,762,300 -6,400 
9 Economically active    2,680,000    2,753,000 +73,000 
10 Total supply of  
labour > demand  
(row 9-row 5) 
   -78,000    162,000 +240,000 
11 Total supply of  
labour >employee  
jobs (row 9-row 6) 
   212,000    473,000 +261,000 
12 Total supply labour 
plus hidden U/E > 
availability of 
employees (row 
11+row 3)>(row 6) 
   371,000    616,800 +245,000 
*U/E is an abbreviation for unemployment 
**’Moved to JSA’ total is added to figures for March 2008 but not to March 2013 as JSA figures for 2013 already include Moved to JSA figures. 
***JSA figures for 2013 will include the 3,020 people that have already had their WCA. 
 
Unsurprisingly, the fallout from the financial crisis of 2008 means the challenge facing 
the UK government’s welfare to work policies is greater in March 2013 than it would 
have been if they had been in place in March 2008. The figures in table 6 show the extent 
of the challenge. In March 2013 the supply of labour outstripped the number of employee 
jobs by 473,000. However, once the 143,800 ‘hidden unemployed' are added, the figure 
for the supply of labour increases to 616,000. To absorb them, the number of jobs in the 
                                                             
32 Figures for benefits issued in February have been added to figures for employment issued in March for illustrative 
purposes. The evidence indicates that the variations in figures will not invalidate them being used for this purpose.  
 
 Page 97 of 292 
 
Scottish economy would have to grow by a quarter. But if this burden is to be borne by 
the private sector alone, then the number of jobs will have to increase by a third even if it 
is assumed that public sector employment remains constant. 
If we presume either scenario is unlikely, then the indications are that employers will be 
able to increase production without increasing the number of employees they have; and 
that when this source of labour is exhausted they will have access to up to a quarter of a 
million workers with a recent work history before they need to consider hiring any of the 
hidden unemployed the government is moving into the labour market. Given the evidence 
shows people disabled by mental illness suffer higher rates of unemployment than other 
disabled groups (Social Exclusion Unit 2004) the indications are many of them will be at 
the back of the queue. 
4.8 Conclusion.  
From the above, it is clear policymakers, and their economic advisers failed to foresee the 
financial crash of 2008. Neoclassical beliefs about deregulation, globalisation, money, 
private credit and debt and the nature of banks blinded them to the fact that the economic 
boom of the late nineties and early to mid-noughties was the product of a debt-fuelled 
bubble. 
When this bubble burst, western governments were faced with the deepest recession since 
the nineteen thirties. In the UK, unemployment rose less than might have been expected. 
However this disguised a considerable drop in demand for labour. In Scotland 
underemployment rose sharply and there was a large fall in the number of vacancies. The 
nature of these changes can be gauged from government statistics showing that in 
Scotland the demand for labour in 2013 was still less than it was in 2008. Within 
economics, the recession fuelled debates between adherents and critics of neoclassicism 
about its cause. The former, ignoring their failure to predict the crash, the role of private 
individuals in setting interest rates and the power of banks to create money in the pursuit 
of profit, blamed an inappropriate use of monetary policy by the US government for 
giving a shock to the global economic system. While many in the latter camp pointed to 
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Minsky’s work on financial deregulation, which charted the course of events decades 
before they happened, to justify blaming the market for the debacle.  
The last Labour government responded to thse debates by continuing with its supply-side 
policies. Using borrowing and ‘Quantitative Easing’ it prevented the financial services 
industry from collapsing and helped the banks to continue lending, albeit less freely than 
before. When the Coalition took power after the general election of 2010, it argued that a 
sustainable recovery required the deficit, much of which was created by the support given 
to the banks, to be reduced, the freedom of the private sector to be increased and public 
spending to move further away from the provision of services towards supporting the 
competitive market to distribute resources.    
Taking this tack allowed the coalition government to continue with its predecessor’s 
support for the financial sector as it cut public services and privatised the provision of 
many of the remaining ones. As part of this process, it implemented market orientated 
policies aimed at increasing the pressure on people disabled by their mental health to 
move off benefits and into the labour market, which was first exerted when there was a 
shortage of labour. Given the decline in importance of manufacturing to the UK economy 
of manufacturing and the coalition government's approach to economic management, the 
indications are that those people who succumb to this pressure will have to focus their job 
search activities on private businesses operating in the service sector. 
The challenge facing the welfare to work policies of the UK government can be seen by 
reflecting on the environment where they are being implemented. The evidence shows 
disproportionate numbers of people disabled by mental illness live in post-industrial areas 
of the country, like Scotland, which are heavily reliant on the public sector for jobs and 
have higher than normal rates of unemployment. However, the government is reducing 
public sector employment. Furthermore, high unemployment has made people in work 
more willing to accept being underemployed. It is a scenario that suggests private sector 
employers will have access to unemployed and underemployed workers with better work 
histories, more up to date job-specific skills and better health records than most of the 
people who have a history of mental illness that will be moving off disability benefits.   
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It can be argued a growing economy will eventually solve this problem, but this raises the 
supplementary questions, how far will it have to grow to do so and is such growth likely? 
One way of answering this is to look at the effects of changes to the benefits system to 
the supply of labour. These changes are designed to reduce on flows and increase off 
flows from disability benefits without appearing to cause much of an increase in the 
unemployment figures. Furthermore, they seem to be being implemented in a way that 
targets people with a history of mental illness. It seems that if the private sector is to 
absorb the numbers of disabled people who will be moving into the labour market, it will 
have to grow by a third before it mops up those job seekers that have been disabled by 
their mental health. As to the likelihood of such growth, the evidence suggests that if 
these benefit changes had been in place at the height of the last boom, they would have 
moved the economy from a situation where it had a shortage of labour to one where it 
had a considerable surplus.   
Nevertheless, private sector employers have hired significant numbers of people with a 
history of mental illness, including many with severe and enduring conditions, before, 
during and after the last recession (Mechanic et al. 2002; Lelliot 2008; Henderson et al. 
2013). Given the alternative suppliers of labour, they have access to it is unclear why are 
they behaving in this way? One explanation is that some job seekers with a history of 
mental illness have been able to respond to market signals; another is that they have been 
fortunate enough to benefit from the way multiple identities, personal relationships, 
social networks and economic institutions regulate the trade in labour. If it is the former 
then the UK governments, welfare to work policies, which are aimed at increasing 
competition in the labour market, could improve, at least in relative terms, the ability of 
jobless people with a history of mental illness to find work. If it is the latter, then these 
policies are less likely to be effective. Identifying which of the above scenarios best 
represents what is happening in the Scottish labour market is essential if the effect of 
these policies on the employability of jobless people disabled by mental illness is to be 
determined. To do this most of the rest of this thesis will discuss evidence from 
employers about their understanding of mental illness their attitudes towards people who 
have been disabled by mental illness and the labour market. The next chapter will prepare 
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the ground for this by outlining the methodological approach that will be used to gather 
and analyse this evidence. 
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Chapter Five:  
Researching the attitudes of employers to hiring people with a history of mental 
illness. 
5.1 Introduction. 
‘Chapter One’ described how the move from the asylum to the community eventually led 
the UK government to identify paid employment as evidence of recovery in and recovery 
from mental illness. It also introduced the policies the UK government is using to pursue 
this vision of recovery. Following this, ‘Chapter two’ considered some of the debates 
between neoclassicism, both schools of institutionalism, stratification economics and the 
new economic sociology about the influence of agency and structure on employment 
opportunities. Then ‘Chapter Three’ used these lines of economic thought to reflect upon 
the economic environment where the UK Governments welfare to work policies are 
being implemented. In the course of these discussions, it became evident that belief 
systems and values inform how problems are understood and addressed.  
One result of this is the efficacy of the UK government’s welfare to work policies is open 
to question. Another is when social researchers investigate disputed areas, they need to be 
transparent about their approach to the subject, what generated their interest; and why 
they investigated it in the manner they did. This chapter will provide this clarity in eleven 
stages. It will introduce and justify the methodological approach used in this 
investigation; define the research subjects; look at the challenges involved in researching 
employers; reflect on my position regarding them and people with a history of mental 
illness before moving on to discuss the issues of research design; sampling strategy; 
recruitment process; research ethics; research quality; data collection and data analysis.  
5.2 The methodological approach to the research question. 
In ‘Chapter Two’, it was shown that at the extremes there are two beliefs about mental 
illness. At one, it is seen as a biological phenomenon: a body’s reaction to a pathogen or 
physical trauma. At the other, it is seen as a social construction. Criticisms of psychiatry 
made by social constructionists identify many of its diagnostic categories as myths whose 
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existence is unsupported by physical evidence (Szass 1987). Biological determinists 
argue improvements in analytical techniques and technology will enable investigations 
into mental illness to provide continually improving descriptions of reality (Rogers and 
Pilgrim 2012). Social constructionists argue mental illnesses are by-products of the 
activities of mental health professionals. In other words, psychiatric labels bring into play 
social pressures that cause labelled people to manifest the behaviour associated with 
those labels (Scheff 1984). Because this line of thinking renders the concept of mental 
illness problematic, social constructionists focus their efforts on investigating the social 
construction of mental illness in a particular time and place (Rogers and Pilgrim 2012).  
The discussion in ‘Chapter Two’ resonates with that in ‘Chapter One’, for it showed 
understandings of economic activity to have two antipodes. Gathered round one are 
neoclassicists, who see the economy as a closed system: a static mechanical structure 
amenable to mathematical modelling, where the outcomes of price competition for scarce 
resources are the product of inputs made by rational utility maximising individuals 
(Ehrenburg and Smith 2012). As we move from one pole to the other, we meet the new 
institutional economics. It leans heavily on neoclassical theory to argue institutions are an 
economically efficient response to the existence of transaction costs (Williamson 1975; 
2000; 2005). Finally, at the other antipode we find the new economic sociologists, who 
take a discursive approach to analysis. They contend economic activity is embedded in a 
network of social relationships and that the institutions that regulate such activity are the 
product of those relationships with their myriad of identities, group memberships and 
imbalances of power (Granovetter 1985; 1995a).  
The review in ‘Chapter Three’ of the financial crash of 2008 and its aftermath showed 
four things. The First is that as well as being a facilitator of exchange money is also a 
store of value, a means of account and a source of power. The second is that in a 
financialised economy rational utility maximising behaviour by private individuals at the 
micro level can destabilise an economy at the macro level. The third is that feedback 
loops between the macro and macro levels of an economy can result in the flow of money 
seizing up, economic activity falling abruptly and unemployment rising sharply. Finally, 
it showed that an economist called Hyman Minsky, whose ideas were unfashionable 
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when he was alive, had decades earlier written that the multifaceted nature of money 
meant increasing the financialisation of the economy would make such events inevitable 
and more frequent.   
One can adopt a medical or social constructionist position on mental illness. Similarly, it 
is possible to do likewise with the economy with respect to neoclassicism, the new 
institutionalism, or the new economic sociology. But taking a monotheistic approach to 
either topic is problematic. Medicine, neoclassicism and the new institutional economics 
offer static under socialised understandings of mental distress and economic activity 
(Rogers and Pilgrim 2012; Granovetter 1985; 2005). Similarly, social constructionism 
offers an evolutionary over socialised idealisation of mental illness (Rogers and Pilgrim 
2012) as does the new economic sociology with respect to the economy (Blair 2012). 
However, individually, they all capture various aspects of reality. In the case of mental 
illness, medicine has shown infections such as syphilis and the plaque on the brain that is 
evidence of Alzheimer’s can cause peoples’ behaviour to depart from social norms 
(Rogers and Pilgrim 2012), while sociology has demonstrated that by labelling someone 
mentally ill a medical practitioner can induce in the person being labelled the behaviour 
associated with the label (Scott 1969; Scheff 1984) and lead to normal reactions to new 
environments being seen as evidence of mental illness (Rosenham 1973; Rogers and 
Pilgrim 2012). As for the economy, on some occasions businesses behave in ways that 
are consistent with neoclassical and new institutional thinking for, as Blair (2012) has 
shown, competitive pressures can lead them to terminate longstanding social 
relationships with workers and communities by moving production to more economically 
benign locations. However, on other occasions employers hire people they have become 
intimate with (Zelizer 2007) and people who have become part of the social circles they, 
their friends and their workers inhabit (Granovetter 1985; 1995a) even when the market 
signals more profitable sources of labour are available.  
If this study were to take an orthodox approach to mental illness and the economy, it 
would mean abandoning the insights into these topics offered by sociology. Similarly 
using sociology as my sole approach would mean doing likewise with those offered by 
medicine, neoclassicism and the new institutional economics. And this is before any 
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attempt is made to take account of the relevance of Minsky’s thinking about rational 
behaviour producing outcomes it would be irrational to desire to the financial crash of 
2008 and its aftermath. Taken together these bodies of work indicate there are times 
when economic outcomes can be reduced to cause and effect and times when they 
cannot. The heterodox approach of the old institutionalism, its close relation stratification 
economics and Zelizer’s later work enables a researcher to draw on the insights into 
economic activity offered by neoclassicism, the new institutionalism and sociology 
because they allow reality to be viewed as laminated and the relationships between strata 
as unsynchronised and transcendental. Such a view of reality also opens the door to 
utilising the insights into mental distress offered by medicine and sociology. For this 
reason, I decided to tackle the research question by taking a heterodox approach to 
mental illness and economic activity. Yoking together the different biological, economic 
and sociological perspectives on mental illness and the economy means the conduct of 
this research will have to prioritise reality over theory, accept reality can be multifaceted, 
avoid making presumptions about specific discourses or the values and practices they 
produce and accept the possibility that evolutionary change can generate what appear to 
be causal relationships and transcendent outcomes.  
These demands led me to embrace critical realism. An approach to research that 
differentiates between ontology, epistemology and axiology in a way that prioritises 
ontology over epistemology and epistemology over axiology. Here, ontology is realist, 
structured stratified and transcendental, epistemology is eclectic and interpretive, and 
axiology can emancipate or enslave (Bhaskar 1989; 2008; Easton 2010). Its fundamental 
tenets are: reality is independent of our knowledge of it and knowledge is socially 
constructed. Critical realists view the world is a place where things tend to take courses 
that are vulnerable to change as a result of external influences, which can be physical or 
social. As a result, they believe investigations into any phenomenon require critical 
evaluations of their cause and meanings (Sayer 2000). In essence, critical realism views 
our understanding of reality as a social construction that can influence and be influenced 
by an objective continually evolving external reality (Easton 2010). 
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Critical realists view the world as an open system with three transcendent levels: the 
empirical, what is being observed; the actual, what is happening; and the real, which is 
the cause of what is happening (Bhaskar 1989; 2008). Here, the empirical emerges from 
the actual and the actual from the real, where each emergent phenomenon represents a 
transformation of what appears as causal factors into something that cannot be reduced to 
the sum of its parts. For example, combinations of atoms form a variety of elements; 
these elements can be arranged in ways that give rise to compounds that have 
characteristics different from their components, and these compounds can combine in 
ways that give rise to sentience, acts of agency, the creation of social structures, 
engagement in economic activity and the creation of different stories about how this 
happens, which in turn can result in events that change the factors that created them 
(Bhaskar 2008; Collier 1994).   
 
They also look upon reality as a place where unknown or unexpected influences can 
cancel each other out or cause the real, the actual and the empirical to move out of phase 
with each other (Collier 1994). As a result, they believe the variables used to describe a 
phenomenon will often be able to register changes without being able to explain them 
definitively (Sayer 2000). Consequently, they look upon the relationship between cause 
and effect in terms of tendency: contingent rather than inevitable. It is a view of the world 
that means causation is easily disputed. For critical realists, such disputes cannot be 
resolved unless there is a reason to believe studying a phenomenon will show it has the 
power to catalyse events or display what they call demi-regularities33. Adopting a critical 
realist approach to the research question makes two demands. The first is that the 
wording of the question needs to locate the research topic in a time and place in a way 
that recognises the danger of logical fallacies such as after therefore because. So instead 
of asking ‘Will the UK government’s welfare to work policies increase the demand from 
private sector employers in Scotland for jobless labour from jobless people with a history 
of mental illness’; it will be worded ‘After the financial crash of 2008, how will the UK’s 
welfare to work policies affect the attitude of Scottish private sector employers towards 
                                                             
33
 Critical realists often use the phrase demi-regularities to describe what others call causal relationships in a 
simultaneous attempt to reject the ideas of universal laws and patternless chaos. It was first use in Lawson, T. (1997). 
Economics and reality. London: Routledge.   
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hiring jobless people who have been disabled by mental illness?’ The second is that there 
is a need to identify and define the entities being researched, which is what will be done 
in the next section. 
5.3 Defining the research subjects. 
For this study, five things need to be defined: employer, employee, job seeker; the 
employer-employee relationship, a person with a history of mental illness and a person 
disabled by mental illness. The interrelated nature of the first four variables means they 
will be described in the course of defining an employer. Making the employer the focus 
of the study makes it relatively straightforward to define a person with a history of mental 
illness and a person disabled by mental illness. The reason for this is that the debates in 
the disability literature about the validity and reliability of the concept of illness or 
whether disabilities are a social construct or personal tragedy no longer occupy centre 
stage. Instead, they become reference points with which to compare and contrast how 
government policies influence employers’ attitudes towards people who have been 
diagnosed as mentally ill. Consequently, this study will define a person with a history of 
mental illness as someone who has, at some point in time, been diagnosed with a mental 
illness. It follows someone disabled by mental illness is a person whose diagnosis has 
made them eligible for disability benefits.    
The literature on employability and mental illness provides no help in defining an 
employer. All the Equality Act 2010 and the statutory code of practice accompanying this 
legislation have to offer is that the Act imposes duties on people such as partners in a 
business or agencies supplying labour to a third party (EHCR 2011, paragraph 1.23 page 
26) who are not legally employers. Surprisingly, other employment-related statutes and 
their supporting documents do not provide much help here either. The Employee Rights 
Act 1996 (ERA); The Trade Unions and Labour Relations (Consolidation) Act 1992 
(TULRA(C); the Working Time Regulations 1998 (WTR); The National Minimum Wage 
Act 1998 (NMWA); and the Social Security (Contributions) (Amendment No 5) 
Regulations 2002 (SS(C) (A) R) all provide multiple definitions of the term employer. 
The ERA section 230(4) and NMWA section 54(4), states an ‘employer, in relation to an 
employee or worker is defined as the person by whom the employee or worker is (or 
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when the employment has ceased, was) employed’. TULRA(C) (1992) provides two 
different definitions. Section 295 states an employer is ‘the person by whom the 
employee is (or where the employment has ceased was) employed’, while section 296 
defines the employer as ‘a person for whom one or more workers works, or have worked 
or normally work or seek to work’. Furthermore, the working time regulations state an 
‘employer is, in relation to a worker, the person by whom the employee or worker is (or 
where the employment has ceased, was) employed’.  
Some clarity is provided by turning to the common law
34
, specifically Stevenson, Jordan 
and Harrison v MacDonald and Evans (1952) 1 TLR 101; O’Kelly V Trusthouse Forte 
plc (1983) ICR 728; Ready Mixed Concrete v Minister of Pensions and National 
Insurance (1967) 2QB 497; Market Investigations v Minister of Social Security (1969) 
2QB 173 and Carmichael v National Power plc (1999) UKHL 47. These cases describe 
an employer-employee relationship as a contractual one, which creates, what the law 
archaically calls a ‘master-servant’ relationship between a buyer of labour, who when 
terms are agreed becomes the master and the seller of labour who then becomes the 
servant. It follows that the definition of the phrase job seeker is someone who wishes to 
enter into a master-servant relationship and that the definition of employer hinges on the 
question, what is a servant?   
The answer to this question depends on whether the contract of employment is a contract 
of service or a contract for services. Legally, unless a statute specifically says otherwise, 
for someone to be another person's employer, there must be a contract of service. Such a 
contract only exists if the answer is yes to all of the following questions: is there a one to 
one contract, explicit or implied, between a purchaser and supplier of labour; does it 
oblige the purchaser to provide the supplier with work or absorb the costs of not doing so; 
is there an obligation for the supplier of labour to do the work themselves and does it 
demand that the purchaser of labour supervise how the seller of labour performs their 
work (Gov.UK 2015). 
                                                             
34 Many of these cases are English. However the House of Lords is the last civil court of appeal in Scots law, so these 
cases are highly influential.   
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However, the diversity amongst employers means that, for practical purposes, there is a 
need to finesse further the description of an employer as someone who enters into a 
contract of service with an employee. The first part of this process is aided by referring to 
the Companies Act 2006. Sections 382 and 465 define companies as small and medium 
employers as follows: a small sized employer is one who has less than 50 employees; a 
medium-sized employer is one with more than fifty but less than 250 employees. The Act 
does not explicitly define a large employer, but it can be taken to be a business with more 
than 250 employees
35
. These boundaries give us a framework for contextualising and 
judging the recruitment practices of companies with access to vastly different resources 
and levels of expertise. The refining process continues by distinguishing between a 
company and the person who makes the hiring decision on its behalf. The above figures 
make this necessary because they show that even in small businesses the authority to 
make a hiring decision will be delegated to employees. It is at this point that the 
definition of an employer that will be used in this study emerges: it is someone who has 
the authority, or who has been delegated the authority, to agree on a contract of service 
between a business and a job seeker.   
The voluntary ceding of authority to employees to agree on contracts of employment with 
job seekers begs the question, how do they use this delegated power? Unpacking this 
question requires reflection on those factors that shape a firm’s culture, such as size, 
internal structure, the beliefs of senior decision makers, the geographic spread of its 
operations, whether its focus is on services or manufacturing, and the influence of 
precedent on the ability of managers to control the balance subordinates strike between 
the use of formal policies, procedures and lines of communication and custom and 
practice (Schein 1992; 1996; 1999; Handy 1993). A firms culture will shape the freedom 
of managers in different firms or even different parts of the same firm to determine the 
why’s, when’s, how’s and who’s of recruitment. The owner of a family businesses might 
create a vacancy for a child independent of commercial pressures, the owners of small 
businesses may prefer to use their or their employees social and professional networks to 
                                                             
35
 These boundaries have recently been confirmed by the European Commission. See European Commission (2015). 
What is an SME? http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/policies/sme/facts-figures-analysis/sme-definition/index_en.htm 
downloaded on the 13/5/2015. 
 Page 109 of 292 
 
fill a vacancy instead of advertising it, firms needing someone with hard to locate skills 
or large number of workers at short notice could lead to direct engagement with the 
labour market or via recruitment agencies, larger firms operating in different geographic 
locations might delegate to their managers the authority to align hiring practices with 
local laws and customs. All of which takes us back to critical realism, because it can now 
be seen that biology, institutions, mutual obligations, power and precedent are factors 
operating at the deep stratum of reality, which influence not just the making of 
recruitment decisions in the real world but how they are seen (Fleetwood 2014).   
5.4 Researching employers. 
The literature on the employability of people with a history of severe and enduring 
mental illness has concentrated on trying to identify and understand the experiences of 
job seekers (Hayward and Bright 1997; Clark et al. 2010; Riddell et al. 2005; Sharac et 
al. 2010). As a result, it is not much help in identifying and meeting the distinctive 
challenges posed by researching the beliefs, attitudes and experiences of employers. For 
this, it is necessary to turn to the literature on researching elites. At first, glance relying 
on this body of work is vulnerable to the attack that while it is reasonable to identify the 
director of a multinational company as a member of an elite group doing so with the 
owner of a small business employing one or two people is not. As we shall see the 
literature on elites and its perspective on power makes it easy to rebuff such criticism.   
 
In this body of work, elites are described as people with ‘proximity to power' (Lilleker 
2003 pg 207) or research subjects who have more power than the researcher (Burnham et 
al. 2004 pg 205). It views the possession of power as being more than the possession of a 
title because people can gain and lose these all the time and still wield power (Plesner 
2011). Instead, it is seen as the ability to exert influence, by using personal knowledge, 
position, and social networks to create barriers that divide people into different groups 
(Harvey 2011). Individuals with this capacity are clustered within every stratum of 
society (Shenton and Hayter 2004; Welch et al. 2002 Woods 1998). Employers use it to 
decide which outsider becomes an insider: which jobless person will become an 
employee, and which researcher will be granted access to the information they use to 
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make this decision. With this in mind, it would be fair to describe people working in 
businesses of every size who have the power to hire staff as being members of elite 
groups. 
 
Although sociology regards understanding power as the key to unpacking social 
processes, it has spent relatively little time researching the powerful (Williams 1989; 
Neal 1995; Gilding 2010). Over forty years ago, sociology was scathingly described as 
the study of ‘nuts, sluts and perverts’ (Liazos 1972 pg 103). In the same year, Nader 
argued there was a need for social scientists to study up as well as study down because 
people need to be aware of the motives of those who shape attitudes and control 
institutional structures. More than twenty years later there was still very little research 
into these groups (Neal 1995). By 2010 Gilding had found that although this situation had 
improved slightly, the work that had been done was over-reliant on secondary sources, 
which were created for purposes other than research, such as corporate records, the 
business press and government inquiries.  
Sociologists offer four explanations for their failure to heed Nader’s call: funding, 
motivation, defeatism and fear. There are those who have pointed out that most research 
is paid for by the powerful and is conducted in ways that pursue their interests by 
identifying the powerless as a problem (Goldberg 1992). Some feel the role of sociology 
should be to side with the oppressed and that this requires concentrating on their 
experience and understanding of oppression (Oliver 1992; Barnes 1996). Others find fault 
with their colleagues, accusing them of being defeatist (Mungham and Thomas (1981). 
Lastly, there some who believe their peers fear the reversal of the power relationship that 
usually exists between themselves and the people they research (Hunter 1995); in effect 
they fear engaging with research subjects with the ability to influence the direction of a 
study, bring it to a halt, make life difficult for the researcher (Williams 1989), or create 
feelings of indebtedness in them (Herod 1999). No matter the explanation, two questions 
need to be answered: how do you get access to them and how do you behave once access 
is gained?  
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The barriers erected by powerful people give them a degree of control over the 
information circulated about them (Mikecz 2012). If they are to participate in research, 
they need to be persuaded to surrender some of this. For this to happen, the researcher has 
to convince them that doing so will be worthwhile, enjoyable or at the very least a 
harmless distraction (Walford 2011). There appear to be three approaches to doing this: 
pay more attention than usual to issues of organisation, preparation, protocol and 
presentation (Gilding 2010); exploit pre-existing social networks (Walford 2011); or if all 
else fails, get your foot in the door by being be economical with the truth (Ostrander1995; 
Welch et al 2002).  
The idea the ethical approach of some researchers depends on who they are researching is 
reinforced by evidence about how research into elite groups has been conducted. Some 
continue to focus on the issues of preparation, protocol and presentation highlighted by 
Gilding. Others appear to be more cynical. Their starting point is that the powerful will 
only participate in research in pursuit of a goal and they will lie if this helps them achieve 
it (Morris 2009). For them, this appears to justify researchers being disrespectful to their 
research subjects if it gains them access to data that might otherwise remain uncovered. 
Examples of such behaviour are making false claims about neutrality and empathy 
(Welch et al. 2002), stretching the rules of etiquette (Ostrander 1995) and only gradually 
revealing how much they know to encourage indiscretions (Pollit et al. 1990). It does not 
appear to have concerned the researchers who confessed to behaving in these ways, such 
as Kogan (1994), that their actions could limit access to elites by other researchers in the 
future or that they could lead readers of their work to mistrust any findings they have 
made. However, important as these concerns are, they are not the only reasons that have 
led this researcher to reject the idea of being disrespectful to employers to gain access to 
information. Another is my experience of being an employer who has participated in 
research, which is something that will be discussed in the next section on positionality.  
5.5 Positionality. 
In the past, I have worked in several organisations at operational and strategic levels. 
From time to time, I have had requests to participate in research. On those rare occasions 
where I reacted positively, I did so for one of the following reasons: the question was 
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interesting, directly related to the work I was doing or, there was a social connection 
between myself and the person conducting the study. Once I had agreed to participate, I 
always tried to be cooperative, treat the researcher with respect and answer their 
questions honestly. Smart and Higley (1977) and Kogan (1994) found, to their surprise, 
that the senior people in private and public sector organisations they interviewed for their 
research behaved similarly.  It follows from this that sociologists using a perceived 
imbalance of power to justify disrespectful behaviour are essentialising and exploiting 
employers in a way they would rightly condemn if it were ‘nuts, sluts and perverts' under 
investigation. Furthermore, it conveniently sidelines the fact that when researchers 
conduct research, they possess considerable power: they can control the direction of 
interviews; the meaning that is taken from them, the dissemination of results and their 
presentation (Bryman 2008; David & Sutton 2004; Ritchie & Lewis 2003).  
 
It is not unreasonable to believe that when publication of research shows that subterfuge 
was used to obtain data that the people who participated in the study will feel betrayed. I 
never had such an experience, but I know how I would have reacted if I did. Unless the 
researcher could convince me I was mistaken, I would refuse any future cooperation with 
them or the institution they came from and encourage people I knew who occupied 
similar positions in my own and other organisations to do likewise. Self -presentation is 
central to the establishment of credibility and rapport (McDowell 1998). Dishonesty is, in 
the long run, self-defeating and using it as in investigatory tool can only be justified if a 
research subject is believed to be breaking the law. It could be argued I have the luxury of 
taking this position because my work history makes me an insider: someone who has 
access to employers. While this argument has some force, it is mitigated considerably by 
the fact that retirement has made me, to a significant extent, an outsider. As a result, I am 
no longer able to direct or materially influence the decisions of any employer. All I have 
to offer anyone who takes part in this research is my gratitude.     
 
The question whether I am an insider or outsider concerning my relationship with people 
who have a history of mental health problems is also relevant to the conduct of this 
research. I have only suffered from the emotional ups and downs that are an inevitable 
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part of life. Challenging as these can be, they are not the same as having to deal with an 
ongoing sensory or emotional disconnection from my surroundings. As a result, I have 
never received a diagnosis of mental illness, been hospitalised, or had to submit to the 
authority of mental health professionals. This lack of a previous diagnosis can define me 
as an outsider. But, as I said in the introduction, I have provided support for someone 
who has had all these experiences and helped them get back to work. Obviously, 
supporting someone who has received a diagnosis of mental illness is different from the 
experience of being diagnosed as mentally ill. However, it has given me an awareness of 
the difference in social impact between being diagnosed with physical and mental 
illnesses.     
 
My experience as a manager has led me to believe that in the private sector the continued 
existence of a firm almost always depends on its ability to compete successfully against 
other businesses. In pursuit of this goal, its managers will be provided with resources, 
including staff, to meet set targets. Furthermore, they will be held accountable for failing 
to do so. In this environment, recruitment failure constitutes a threat. Personally, I have 
reacted to this type of situation by rejecting applications from people with a poor work 
record without inviting them for an interview. On the other hand, my experience of 
supporting someone with a history of mental illness and what I have observed about the 
nature of mental illness and how people react to it has led me to firmly believe the 
exclusion of people with a history of mental illness from the social circles open to the rest 
of us, including the workplace, constitutes a social injustice.    
 
My concern about this injustice does not mean I am going into this research with the aim 
of mounting an attack on employers for the recruitment decisions they make. Personal 
experience has shown me how the influence of personal values on recruitment decisions 
can be undermined by competitive and social pressures. Nor should it be forgotten that at 
a time when high unemployment means there is easy access to alternative sources of 
labour some employers employ significant numbers of people with a history of mental 
illness, including some who have suffered from severe and enduring conditions (Lelliot 
2008; Independent Mental Health Task Force 2016; Henderson et al. 2013). Instead, I 
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intend to use my experience of being an employer to build a rapport with my research 
subjects to obtain the information necessary to make a judgement about the likely 
efficacy of the UK government’s welfare to work policies with respect to jobless people 
who have been disabled by mental illness. For me, the purpose of doing this is not so 
much about generating theory, though that is very important, as it is about helping people 
who have a history of mental illness to engage better with the debate about the UK’s 
approach to welfare to work. The next section will now set out how I intend to go about 
obtaining this information.  
5.6 The research design. 
The research tool used to get information had to be able to take account of the influence 
on employers of social structures, power relationships and their experience of mental 
illness on recruitment decisions. At first, consideration was given to conducting a case 
study. The attraction of this approach is it is appropriate for investigating a bounded 
system in a real-life contemporary setting (Creswell 2009). In this case, a system that 
regulates how people in a variety of businesses, who have the authority to hire staff, react 
to the UK government welfare to work policies. It is also an approach that lends itself to 
the use of multiple sources and types of information (Yip 2009 cited in Creswell 2013 pg 
97). However, the scale and variety of activity in the labour market and the failure of 
social researchers to engage with employers led me to reject this approach because I did 
not feel there was enough evidence to justify taking it.  
Given the lack of evidence, it was unsurprising to find the literature showed using 
qualitative methods to obtain the information necessary to address the research question 
would be difficult. Not only would I need to gain access to employers there was also the 
issue of the nature of that access. Evidence suggesting gaining access to them might be 
challenging is provided by Winkler (1987); the US Equal Opportunities Commission 
(USEOC) (2003); the Observatory (2003) and Wood et al. (2009). These researchers 
struggled to get employers to participate in their research. In the case of Winkler, it took 
him a year to negotiate access and Wood had limited success in securing their 
participation. The USEOC and the Observatory blamed events like these on the 
reluctance of employers to participate in social research. However, the research of Wood 
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et al. suggests this explanation is possibly self-serving because he was looking into a 
subject that is of acute interest to employers: pension reform. Because of this, he 
concluded that gaining access to employers required the identification and opening of 
appropriate lines of communication. As for the nature of that access, Mikecz (2012) 
found it was likely to be on a one-off basis and on terms set by the employer, which 
suggests many of the tools normally available to qualitative researchers, such as focus 
groups and multiple interviews, will be unusable.   
I was in a situation where I needed an approach that would capture subjective experiences 
of a contentious subject from members of a group largely absent from the disability 
literature. One that could persuade potential research subjects the research is relevant to 
them; show them the researcher is both credible and competent; convince them the 
information they provided will shape the study and enable me to build the rapport 
necessary to generate large amounts of data in a short period. I decided that I would be 
most likely to achieve these aims if I interviewed employers; transcribed their contents 
and submitted the transcripts to the relevant research subjects for comment. Making this 
decision meant I would have to take cognisance of the social nature of interviews and the 
threat of interview bias (Bryman 2008).To guard against this, I would look to 
demonstrate an awareness of influences such as age, appearance, behaviour, ethnicity, 
sex and status (Bryman 2008; David and Sutton 2004; Ritchie and Lewis 2003).  
The next step was deciding on the type of interview. Using structured ones presumes 
knowledge and understanding of the employer's world (Bryant 2008). While I have 
personal experience of this, the absence of employers from the disability literature led me 
to conclude it would not be appropriate to do this here. Consideration was given to the 
opposite tack: conducting unstructured interviews. These could obtain subjective 
experience. However, this approach was also rejected because it would be harder to keep 
the study on track and demonstrate credibility (Bryman 2008). As a compromise, I 
decided to use a semi-structured questionnaire, mixing closed and open questions. As 
with any compromise, there are drawbacks: my worldview will play a role in directing 
the interviews (Bryant 2008). But they compensate for this in two ways. They make it 
easier to demonstrate knowledge, purpose and credibility and they provide an opportunity 
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to create a structure loose enough to allow research subjects to see they are influencing 
the direction of the research and the meaning and understanding gained from it (Bryman 
2008; Cresswell 2013; Ritchie and Lewis 2003; Robson 2002).  
Two methods of conducting an interview were considered: face to face and telephone. 
Telephone interviews save time and reduce the cost associated with gaining access to 
subjects spread over a large geographical area (Chapple 1999; Sturges & Hanrahan 2004; 
Sweet, 2002; Tausig & Freeman, 1988); make fewer demands on space (Sweet 2002) and 
increase interviewer safety (Carr & Worth, 2001; Sturges & Hanrahan 2004). Some 
studies into attitudes towards hiring people with a history of mental illness report such an 
approach has led to the recruitment of large numbers of managers and the securing of 
high response rates (Shaw Trust 2006; 2012; Little et al. 2011). However, these studies 
were conducted by using a database of companies, which indicates there was a pre-
existing relationship between the researcher and the research subjects.  
 
The absence of such a database was not the only barrier to using telephone interviews. 
They require the researcher follows guidelines for completing interview questionnaires, 
which limit the use of open questions, question complexity and the number of response 
categories (Bryman 2008; David and Sutton 2004). There is also concern that a fear 
business would be lost because of engaged telephone lines would deter participation by 
small and medium-sized business (Bryman 2008). Furthermore, face to face interviews 
are better for in-depth discussions; investigating sensitive subjects; reacting to unforeseen 
answers; preventing research samples from being dominated by large organisations and 
using non-verbal cues to determine the honesty of the interviewee (Creswell 2009; 
Groves 1990; Mann and Stewart 2003; Robson 2002; Shuy 2002). The research topic and 
the lack of a database of pre-existing contacts; together with the gender and age of the 
researcher; their access to private transport; the geographic area being covered and the 
flexibility these offered about the time and place of any interview led to a decision to try 
to obtain face to face interviews.   
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5.7 Sampling strategy. 
The first question addressed here was, would I draw a representative sample from the 
population of employers? Drawing such a sample requires the researcher to be able to 
isolate the beliefs and attitudes of the research subjects, understand the relationships 
between these and actions and know how they are distributed (Bryman 2008; David and 
Sutton 2004). I have been unable to find any study that convincingly argues these 
parameters, the food and drink of qualitative research can be described mathematically, 
which makes it reasonable to believe obtaining a representative sample is currently 
impossible. For this reason, I eschewed representativeness.  
 
The next question I had to address was what size of the sample would enable the conduct 
of the research and the results it generated to be seen as credible. It has been argued a 
small number of interviews can demonstrate a phenomenon is more complex than was 
hitherto thought and that the test of sample size is how many interviews will convince a 
sceptic (Becker 1998). Warren (2002) suggests this test would be satisfied if a qualitative 
study is based on between twenty and thirty interviews. However, Gerson and Horowitz 
(2002) have argued that this number is too small and that the number of interviews 
should be near sixty. I reflected on these positions in the light of the variety of employers' 
and their operating environments. I concluded that I needed a sample size that would 
allow participants to be broadly based in terms of their status in an organisation; the size 
of the organisation they worked for and the organisations business sector. Balancing this 
need with the evidence from the literature about the difficulty in persuading employers to 
participate in social research led me to aim for thirty recruits.   
 
The last question I asked myself here was where would I draw the sample from? Because 
I was a sole researcher living in Scotland, I decided to focus on the Scottish labour 
market. Given three-quarters of its population lives in a relatively small area called the 
central belt (Scottish Government 2014a), I decided to draw my sample from there. 
Because the literature has indicated that recruiting employers to take part in this study 
will be challenging, I decided it would be impractical to try and obtain a sample that 
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offered the prospect of identifying collective differences in attitude towards hiring people 
with a history of mental illness by age, ethnicity and gender. 
5.8 The recruitment process. 
Recruitment took place between September 2012 and September 2013. Initially, I 
intended to recruit research subjects with whom I had no connection. The reason for this 
was deliberate selection and association with chosen cases could severely compromise 
the study (Bryman 2008; Aldridge and Levine 2001). I created a sampling frame from the 
online services of Scotbis, local telephone and business directories and Scotweb. As I 
was identifying potential participants, I split them into the sectors used by BiS (2012 
table 2.1 pg 10) of manufacturing, knowledge and services. I then used information 
provided online by Scotbis, company websites, Companies House and Google Earth to 
divide these businesses into small, medium and large using the definitions given in the 
Companies Act as outlined in paragraph 5.3 above.  
 
Evidence employers are difficult to recruit for social research led me to investigate what 
kind of response rate I would obtain if I continued with this approach. I used my 
sampling frame to identify 100 small, medium and large businesses covering the three 
sectors of the economy defined by Scotbis and sent them an introductory letter (Appendix 
one). The letter outlined who I was, the topic I was researching and the purpose of the 
research. Attached were a plain language sheet (Appendix two) and a consent form 
(Appendix three). All three pieces of information followed the University of Glasgow 
ethics guidelines. Testing the water proved prescient. My mail shot obtained one 
response, from a bank, declining the opportunity to take part. I followed up this 
unwelcome result by calling twenty of the businesses to ask if they had received my letter 
and if so why they had decided not to take part in the study. With the larger companies, I 
rarely got past reception, as for the smaller ones, the person I wrote to was often 
unavailable. When I did manage to make contact with them, often after several telephone 
calls, they gave me a variety of reasons for their attitude including policy, an inability to 
make a worthwhile contribution, and most frequently a lack of time. 
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Consequently, I abandoned this approach to obtaining a sample and adopted a more 
opportunistic tack, which involved using my knowledge and connections to create an 
availability sample. In doing this, I was influenced by the argument that the difficulties 
involved in researching elites justify the use of personal contacts to gain access to them 
(Walford 2011) and then snowballing from there (Bryman 2008). However, I still wanted 
to limit the influence exerted by deliberate selection and association with chosen cases. 
Consequently, I decided not to ask people I had a personal relationship with to participate 
in the study but to request they use their networks to identify research subjects. By doing 
this, I was able to recruit employers because of the efforts of a deputy chief executive of a 
chamber of commerce; the ability of an ex-professional footballer I am friendly with to 
get me invites to fundraising dinners attended by business people; and employers from a 
variety of firms I had dealings with in the past and snowballing from there. These 
approaches were successful in obtaining the participation of employers working in the 
manufacturing, knowledge and service sectors, but they tended to be people working for 
large and medium-sized businesses. I increased the involvement of small employers in 
the study by picking two areas in the north and south of Glasgow that have several 
commercial thoroughfares and industrial estates with large numbers of small businesses, 
putting on a suit, a collar and tie and going door to door trying to sell myself and my 
research project. Predictably I received a significant number of rejections, but I 
occasionally got my foot in the door. Eventually, I secured the sample size and mix I 
wanted. The research subjects’ pseudonyms, the manner I recruited them, the size of their 
business according to the criteria in the Companies Act, the sector they operate in, and 
the part of the central belt of Scotland where their head office is based in are listed in 
Table 7 on the next page. 
An interesting result of the recruitment process was that it identified the importance of 
personal networks. Mine's were crucial to obtaining access to larger and medium-sized 
employers, but my willingness to cold call and chap doors sometimes gave me access to 
the networks possessed by smaller employers, sometimes even before I asked for it. An 
illustration of this is the experience I had after approaching a business trading on the 
south side of Glasgow. After talking with the owner for about fifteen minutes, he not only 
agreed to take part in the study, he unprompted made several telephone calls to several 
 Page 120 of 292 
 
other businesses who all eventually decided to participate. In practice, this meant 
snowballing, and personal recommendation amounted to the same thing.   
 
Table 7: List of employers who took part in the study
36
 
 Pseudonym Manner of recruitment Size of 
business 
Type  Business Sector Company 
Position.  
Area based 
1 David Personal 
recommendation 
<50 Small Services Owner Lanarkshire 
2 Billy Snowballing <50 Small Services Owner Renfrewshire 
3 Robert Personal 
recommendation 
<50 Small Services Owner Glasgow 
4 Niall Door to door  <50 Small Services Owner Glasgow 
5 George Door to Door <50 Small Manufacturing Manager Glasgow 
6 Vincent Snowballing <50 Small Services Owner Glasgow 
7 Margaret Snowballing <50 Small Services Manager Glasgow 
8 Sean Snowballing <50 Small Services Owner Glasgow 
9 Andy Personal 
recommendation  
50-250 Medium Manufacturing Director Renfrewshire 
10 Clare Snowballing 50-250 Medium Services Director Renfrewshire 
11 Michael Door to door <50 Small Services Owner Glasgow 
12 Ross Football dinner >250 Large Knowledge Director Edinburgh 
13 Craig Personal 
recommendation 
>250 Large Services Manager Ayrshire 
14 Ian Personal 
recommendation 
<50 Small Manufacturing Owner Edinburgh 
15 Susan Snowballing <50 Small Manufacturing  Manager Glasgow 
16 Naveed Snowballing <50 Small Manufacturing Owner Glasgow 
17 Steven Snowballing <50 Small Services Director Dundee 
18 Gavin Snowballing <50 Small Manufacturing Director Lanarkshire 
19 Mike Personal 
recommendation 
50-250 Medium Services Director Renfrewshire 
20 Richard Personal 
recommendation 
50-250 Medium Manufacturing Director Stirlingshire 
21 Gerry Personal 
recommendation  
50-250 Medium Services Director Glasgow 
22 Kevin Personal 
recommendation 
<50 Small Knowledge Owner Glasgow 
23 Frank Snowballing 50-250 Medium Knowledge Director Glasgow 
24 Julian Snowballing 50-250 Medium Manufacturing Director Ayrshire 
25 Gus Snowballing <50 Small Manufacturing Owner Dunbartonshire 
26 Anna Snowballing 50-250 Medium Knowledge Director Stirlingshire 
27 Brendan Football dinner >250 Large Knowledge Director Dunbartonshire 
28 Thomas Snowballing 50-250 Medium Services Director Dundee 
29 Karl Personal 
recommendation 
>250 Large Services Manager Edinburgh 
30 Glen Personal 
recommendation 
<50 Small Services Director Glasgow 
 
In most cases, access to these networks only got me the employers’ attention. I still had to 
sell them myself and the study. In effect, I had to subject myself to what was in effect an 
                                                             
36 The interviews revealed more than half of the employers who took part in this study had knowingly hired someone 
with a history of mental illness.  
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interview. Sometimes this took place face to face, on other occasions, it was over the 
telephone. In both cases I was asked about my background, how did I know our mutual 
contact, where did I work, did I have any experience of being an employer, what were 
these experiences, what did I think about them, why was I researching this area, what was 
the purpose of the study and where would the information they provided be kept and for 
how long. I was left with the impression that my experience as an employer was highly 
influential in obtaining participants.  
Echoing the experience of Mickecz (2012) every interview took place at a time and venue 
of the employer's choosing. The locations of the meetings were workplaces; pubs; 
restaurants; cafes and their homes. On only two occasions were the interviews cancelled 
but both of these were rearranged. My experience of recruiting research subjects led me 
to believe that, time allowing, I could have recruited considerably more participants. In 
the end, none of the employers I was introduced to overtly declined to take part, but I was 
unable to obtain interviews with three of them ostensibly because of the pressures exerted 
by their business. It was an experience that led me to conclude that Wood et al. (2009) is 
correct in seeing the main difficulty in recruiting employers for social research is 
identifying and opening appropriate lines of communication with them rather than 
overcoming their reluctance to take part in social research.  
One question that arises from my approach to the research question is whether other 
researchers will have the ability, which is highly prized in academic research (Bryman 
2008), to replicate this study. To some degree, this will depend on whether they have 
access to a similar social network; have a comparable work history and the ability to sell 
themselves and their project. However, obtaining such access should be possible if people 
who are or have been employers are involved in the conduct of future research. 
Recruiting such people should not be beyond the bounds of possibility given the amount 
of management training that takes place in higher education. Another question to emerge 
from how I conducted this research is whether my contacts approached employers they 
knew to have experience of or an interest in mental illness. If this is the case, it could 
narrow the range of attitudes about the topic within the research sample. I tried to get 
around this by making it clear to the contacts I used that the crucial attribute I was 
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looking for was an ability to hire staff. Nevertheless, the evidence I obtained leads me to 
believe I was not entirely successful in this endeavour.     
5.9 Research Ethics. 
Before I started this study, I completed the University of Glasgow, College of Social 
Sciences Ethics form and submitted it in December 2012. I received approval from the 
College's research ethics committee in a letter dated the 4/2/13, ethics reference number 
CS20120254 (Appendix Four). In line with the advice from this body, I followed their 
guidelines about creating a framework that demonstrated participants had given informed 
consent to participate in the study, that their participation had been recorded accurately 
and that they had access to the material they had provided.  This framework consisted of 
the aforementioned introductory letter (Appendix One), plain language sheet (Appendix 
two) and consent form (Appendix Three ) there was also a transcript accuracy form 
(Appendix Five).  
As was stated earlier, my initial recruitment approach was to send out an unsolicited 
introductory letter along with a plain English statement and a consent form. When events 
led me to abandon this in favour of using personal contacts, door stepping and 
snowballing, I considered providing my contacts with the ethics paperwork for 
distribution but decided against it because I could not guarantee its circulation and I was 
not comfortable with surrendering more control over the lines of communication than I 
had to. Consequently, the first time a prospective research subject was given in-depth 
information about the study was in the discussions that took place after we had been 
introduced. I decided I would provide the potential research subject with the ethics 
paperwork at the end of our first meeting on the grounds that starting it by handing over 
the paperwork and saying that tells you everything you need to know, which is essentially 
what an unsolicited letter does, would have undermined any attempt to build trust and 
develop a rapport. However, I always asked them to read the material before making a 
final decision to take part.  
In general, I found the ethics procedures were unfit for the purpose of engaging with 
employers. There were two reasons for this: first, it became obvious that the preliminary 
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interview determined whether an agreement to take part would be reached and second, 
the paperwork it generated proved to be more of a hindrance than a help. Nobody 
changed their mind after they read it. Indeed some of them were amused by the idea that 
the study could harm them. But it made others revisit whether they wanted to take part 
and not for the reasons anticipated by the university. On these occasions, I was asked, 
sometimes in the most robust terms, what was the point of this, was there something that 
I wasn’t telling them, who is this meant to protect, them or the university; and didn’t I 
think it showed a lack of trust or that bureaucracy was running wild? I tried to address 
this development by telling them the purpose of this set of documents was to provide 
them with checkable proof that the study was conducted in the manner they were told it 
would be. In the end, I had to plead with some employers to sign the consent form by 
telling them I wouldn’t be allowed to interview them unless they did. Eventually, they all 
signed the paperwork. It was an experience that led me to believe they would not have 
done so if we did not share experiences and social networks. In 2007, Coggan was 
confronted by a similar reluctance by research subjects to sign ethics paperwork. His 
conclusion, which is one I agree with, is that such irritation is reasonable given that it is 
normal for people to regularly give personal information, whose dissemination may affect 
them, for other purposes, market research for example, without having to sign a consent 
form.  
Underpinning this type of problem is the assumption that the power relationship between 
the researcher and the research subject will favour the researcher. Given most social 
research focuses on marginalised groups this is a reasonable one. It is therefore 
understandable that addressing ethical concerns will be proceduralised in ways that try to 
address dangers such as exploitation. However, when a researcher is investigating elite 
groups, the reasons for participating in research and the distribution of power is likely to 
be different or even reversed. If the ethics procedures fail to recognise this, it could 
threaten the ability to carry out much-needed research. It follows that there is a need to 
look again at the idea of a one size fits all approach to ethics procedures.   
Once I had secured an agreement to be interviewed, I asked them if it would be 
acceptable to record the interview when it took place. Nobody had a problem with this. 
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To help me cover the same ground in all the interviews, I used the same topic guide in all 
of them (Appendix six). As soon as possible after the interview, the recordings were 
transcribed in a way that protected the anonymity of the research participant. Once this 
was done, a copy was sent to them for comment on the understanding that when there 
was a disagreement about what was said I would not necessarily alter the transcript but if 
I didn’t I would include both recollections of what had been said. On two occasions I was 
asked to change the transcript. I agreed to this both times because the requested 
alterations were minor: ambiguities I had missed were resolved and some spelling 
mistakes corrected.   
On occasion, when the interviews took place in a pub, restaurant or café I paid for some 
of the food and drink that was consumed. On no occasion did I pay for it all, nor did I 
offer to do so when negotiating access to any research subject. Other than this there is no 
way that they could be seen as financially benefiting from participating in this study.   
5.10 Research Quality. 
Qualitative research cannot have the clarity of quantitative studies. The individuality of 
the researcher; their biases; values and the influence they bring to bear in a volatile 
research environment make this an unattainable goal (Bryman 2008; David & Sutton 
2004; Ritchie & Lewis 2003). As a result, this type of study is always harder to replicate, 
and their results are harder to reproduce. Consequently, reliability and validity, with their 
emphasis on measurement become inappropriate arbiters of quality (Winter 2000). It 
follows there is a need to identify alternative ones.    
A way to do this is signalled by Kuhn (1970). He identifies quantitative and qualitative 
research as approaches arising out of two different conceptual frameworks. Winter (2000) 
builds on this insight by arguing that in qualitative research validity is no longer a single 
concept but one whose characteristics are determined by the processes, intentions and 
methodologies of the study. Consequently, it possible to argue that construct validity and 
trustworthiness should be the measures of research quality. Construct being the initial 
question; validity the appropriateness of the assumptions behind the inquiry including 
where, when, how and from whom the data is gathered (Wainer and Braun (1998); and 
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trustworthiness the consistency, credibility, neutrality, transparency and transferability of 
the study (Hoepfl 1997; Lincoln and Guba 1985; Seale 1999). The questions that were 
asked when constructing this thesis were: is the design an appropriate one for 
investigating the research question, is it contributing to empirical and theoretical 
knowledge, does it do so in a systematic and transparent manner and does it, in the light 
of the available evidence, make arguments and claims that are credible (Spencer et al 
2003). To answer these questions I took the following steps: I followed the 
recommendation to keep a reflexive diary Rolfe (2006); made extensive use of 
anonymised quotes, which highlighted convergence and divergence with earlier research 
and the assumptions underpinning policy (Bryman 2008) and used this evidence to reflect 
on how to build on agreements and resolve conflicts (Bryman 2008; David & Sutton 
2004; Ritchie & Lewis 2003). 
5.11 Data Collection. 
As was said earlier, the data from each research subject was obtained from a single semi-
structured interview. These interviews took place between February 2013 and January 
2014. Once the employer agreed to participate, I asked them to sign an interview consent 
form (Appendix three) either there and then or to do so later and post it to me. The next 
step was to decide when and where to conduct the interview. On ten occasions the 
meeting took place immediately after the employer agreed to participate. The remainder 
of the time an agreement was reached about meeting later. On only three occasions were 
these appointments rearranged, two of them on multiple occasions. The interview with 
one of the employers, who had cancelled on several occasions, was finally conducted 
after I received a call saying that he would be available if I could get to his current 
location in the next hour. These hiccups apart, once an employer agreed to participate in 
the study every one of them honoured that agreement.  
The interviews themselves took place in a variety of locations. Five occurred at the 
employer's home, twelve took place in pubs or restaurants, and the remainder were held 
at their workplace. Every interviewee agreed to the interview being recorded. I told them 
the recording would be transcribed to facilitate analysis and that they would be provided 
with a copy of it together with a transcript accuracy form (Appendix five), which they 
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could return to me with comments once they had read the transcript. To help me 
concentrate on the discussion, I did not take notes during the interview but wrote some up 
soon shortly after it ended. 
The topic guide (Appendix six) was prepared by referring to my experience as an 
employer and my theoretical knowledge of and interest in the following subjects: 
sociology, mental health and economics. The topic guide was written in the form of 
specific questions, but they were used as a reminder of the areas I wanted to investigate. 
The anticipated difficulty in recruiting participants led me to decide on a set of questions 
and to stick to them rather than to check their relevance with a pilot study. With 
hindsight, my ability to recruit employers suggests that I could have done this. The aim of 
these questions was to identify what makes them decide to hire staff; how they did so; 
why they chose that approach; their experience of mental health matters; how aware they 
are of government welfare to work policies and how these policies influenced their 
recruitment practices.  
I opened each interview by restating its purpose. Given the success of the interviews 
depended on the amount of data they uncovered, it was necessary to get them to talk 
openly and freely (Bryman 2008; Creswell 2008). To encourage this, I started by asking 
them about their business then I inquired about their understanding of the labour market 
before moving on to the topic of mental health. The reason I structured the interview in 
this manner was to make the employer as comfortable as quickly as possible and to make 
it easier to build a rapport with them before moving on to areas that were more likely to 
be unfamiliar to them.  
On every occasion, the interview went well. Like Smart and Higley (1977) and Kogan 
(1994), I found the research participants to be open and friendly. I had no difficulty 
getting them to talk. In negotiating access, I asked for 45 minutes of their time. During 
the interview, to demonstrate my integrity, I made sure they knew I was aware of how 
time was progressing and that I intended to conclude the meeting within the allocated 
time. When the interview took place in the workplace, it was occasionally interrupted by 
work-related matters. To reinforce my commitment to confidentiality, I responded to 
these interruptions by automatically switching the recorder off. Only six employers held 
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me to the requested 45 minutes. None of them included the time lost as a result of 
interruptions. The rest made it clear, as the interview progressed that they were willing to 
give me more time than I had asked for. Sometimes, the interviews lasted as long as an 
hour and three-quarters. This extra time allowed emergent themes to be explored in more 
detail and allowed a greater rapport to be developed. The feedback from employers 
indicated this approach made the topic at hand more interesting and the interview more 
enjoyable. 
5.12 Data analysis. 
Following the suggestion made by Loftland et al. (2004), I listened to the recordings of 
the interview as quickly as possible after they had taken place. I then wrote up my 
impressions of what had happened organising it into a series of initial headings. These 
actions started an inductive process whose aim was to develop a narrative of what was 
going on. This process needed to be an open one as it involved identifying ideas that 
could be looked at in later interviews and discovering emergent themes. Because of my 
promise to respect confidentiality, I decided to transcribe the interviews myself. 
Consequently, I had to listen to the interviews on several occasions to ensure each 
transcription was an accurate reflection of what had been said.  A benefit of doing this 
was it gave me a greater understanding of the material. From time to time, the product of 
my work was submitted to my supervisors for comment and discussion.    
As I was transcribing the interviews, I was importing them into ‘Nvivo Ten’. Using the 
initial headings I had derived from listening to the transcriptions, I created nodes and sub-
nodes, as more and more interviews were transcribed, feedback loops were set up that 
submitted these nodes to a process of amendment, division, integration and removal. This 
process allowed me to deepen my immersion into the data, but as the analysis developed, 
I became aware the ability of Nvivo to create nodes and sub-nodes created the danger that 
employers’ comments could become disconnected pieces of information devoid of 
context. To avoid this, I made sure my subdividing of the data took place within the 
context of broader headings, which were informed by biographical data such as the 
number of employees, market sector and geographic location. This increased the 
influence on the analytical process of the employers’ subjective experience. However, it 
 Page 128 of 292 
 
created the danger I would miss the relevance of data that didn’t fit comfortably into the 
categories my analysis had identified. To address this, I revisited this material to 
reappraise its importance and its relationship with the established themes. At the end of 
this process, much of the data in each interview had been collated into nodes structured in 
terms of importance and how they related to each other. At this point, I read through the 
restructured material to crystallise my understanding of the relationship between what 
employers had said and the narrative structure that had emerged.     
The next three chapters will discuss the three most important themes that emerged from 
the analysis of the data. ‘Chapter Six’ looks at their experience of mental illness; 
‘Chapter Seven’ examines their experience and understanding of the labour market; 
‘Chapter Eight’ examines the influence of the UK government’s welfare to work policies 
on how they trade for labour and ‘Chapter Nine’ will juxtapose the evidence from these 
chapters with the literature review in ‘Chapter One’ and ‘Chapter Two’ and the evidence 
from ‘Chapter Three’ to discuss my conclusions about how the UK government’s welfare 
to work policies have affected the demand from Scottish private sector employers for 
labour from jobless people who have been disabled by mental illness.  
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Chapter Six:  
Employers and their beliefs about, experiences of and reactions to people with a 
history of mental illness. 
6.1 Introduction. 
Work-related mental illnesses cost employers in the UK billions of pounds in 
absenteeism, reduced productivity and staff turnover (SCMH 2007). Despite this, the 
evidence shows that before during and after the deepest recession since the 1930’s, they 
hired significant numbers of people with this type of health history. In the UK only one in 
five of people who have a history of mental illness receive state benefits (Lelliot 2008); 
almost half of them are in paid employment as are a quarter of those who have severe and 
enduring conditions (Independent Commission on Mental Health 2016). The numbers 
involved indicate many employers knowingly hire some people with a history of mental 
illness
37
 and have considerable experience of people with a history of these conditions. 
However, the disability literature is unable to say anything about this. For, as was noted 
earlier, this body of work has failed to engage with employers (Riddell et al. 2005; Clark 
et al. 2010) other than to ask them for their reactions to imaginary people in hypothetical 
situations (Hayward and Bright 1997; Sharac et al. 2010).  
This failure means we know little about employers experiences of mental illness or how 
they have influenced their attitude towards job seekers with a history of these conditions. 
It means we are unable to answer the question, do employers hire them when they are 
willing and able to respond to market signals about price or is it because other factors are 
in play? This chapter will use evidence provided by employers to address these issues. It 
will start by looking at what they regard as the most important sources of information 
about mental illness: medicine the media and the workplace. After this, the beliefs of 
employers about mental illness, stigma and recovery will be explored. Then it will 
investigate the circumstances under which they hired people with a history of mental 
                                                             
37
 It could be argued felt stigma will prevent someone with a history of mental illness from telling an employer about 
their health history when they apply for a job. But employers take steps to establish work records. Given the numbers 
of people with this background that they do hire, it becomes untenable to claim they always do so unwittingly. Unless 
of course, one believes every person with this type of health history developed their condition after they found their 
current job or lied about their background in their application and employers’ checks are universally incompetent.            
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illness. Finally, it will come to a close by reflecting on what this discussion tells us about 
the ability of the UK government’s welfare policies to make it more likely private sector 
employers will hire more of them.  
6.2 Employers and their sources of knowledge about mental illness: medicine. 
The importance of medicine as a source of information about mental illness was evident 
in the way employers talked about it. Throughout our discussions, they used words linked 
to psychiatric discourse like anxiety, bipolar, depression, manic depression and 
schizophrenia. But as they progressed it became apparent they did not know the meaning 
of these terms or their associated symptoms. For example, Claire told me:     
“When my mother was diagnosed with depression we thought it might 
be Alzheimer’s because she was forgetting things. I never thought 
forgetting things had anything to do with depression .”  
While Andy said:  
“I hear terms like schizophrenia and depression all the time, but I 
don’t know what these words mean .”  
Others like Billy conflated diagnostic categories as this exchange shows:   
BMcN:  
“You used the word Schizophrenia, what do you think are the symptoms 
of Schizophrenia?” 
Billy:   
“Possibly someone being extremely bipolar”. 
These findings echo those made by Jorm (2000), who found the general public to be 
ignorant of diagnostic categories and Little et al. (2011) who found employers knowledge 
of psychiatric nosology to be poor. They raise questions about where else employers 
obtain information about mental illness. From the interviews, the two sources that 
emerged as being most important are the media and the workplace.     
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6.3 Employers and their sources of knowledge about mental illness: the media.  
Finding the media is one of the employer's primary sources of information about mental 
illness is unsurprising because the literature offers it as the lay person's primary source of 
knowledge about the subject (Wahl 1992; Coverdale et al. 2002; Whitley and Berry 
2013).  
The media disseminates information about mental illness in two ways: via fictional 
stories where it is used as a plot device and in factual reports where its presence is seen as 
relevant to an event (Caputo and Rouner 2011). Everyone was aware of the type of 
stories related to mental illness described by Thomas:   
“Well you read about murderers, which are extreme cases like Robert 
Mone and guys like that, who clearly have something wrong with them, 
then you read about guys with post-traumatic stress, and you wonder 
about them: people that came back from the war and shot people, they 
arm themselves and go mad.”  
During our discussions, there were frequent references to factual and fictional stories 
linking mental illness to aggressiveness, dangerousness and violence. Historically the 
media has tended to focus on bizarre and dangerous behaviour when reporting on 
mentally ill people (Byrd et al. 1980; Day and Page 1986; Corrigan et al. 2001). 
However, research suggests the influence of these stories does not depend on how much 
people engage with them but on the similarity between what is described in the story and 
their lived experience. Negative judgements seem to have an inverse relationship with the 
amount of common ground occupied by the person being told a story and the people it is 
about (Caputo and Rouner 2011). To put it another way, people’s responses to media 
stories are exercises in agency.    
It was noted in ‘Chapter Two’ that there have been substantial increases in the numbers 
of people diagnosed as suffering from mental illness (Whittaker 2010; Horowitz and 
Wakefield 2012), and that the community is now the locus of treatment for most of those 
who have severe and enduring conditions (Rogers and Pilgrim 2010). It is, therefore, 
reasonable to believe the general public is more familiar with them than they once were. 
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Indeed, it suggests many of them might identify privately, if not publically, as having 
been mentally ill. If familiarity with mental illnesses reduces the contempt experienced 
by people with a history of these conditions (Caputo and Rouner 2011; Corrigan et al. 
2001; Coutrie and Penn 2003), then it indicates people may be more likely to reject 
negative presentations of them by businesses and media outlets. The employers I spoke to 
reported they believed that people are increasingly hostile to such presentations. In the 
course of doing so, they highlighted the influence of celebrity culture, social media and 
24-hour rolling news organisations.         
6.3.1 Changes in media presentations of mental illness and the influence of celebrity 
culture, rolling news and social media.  
An example of the type of change that they were referring to is provided by Craig:     
“You don’t see people in Casualty  (A popular long-running TV programme) 
getting stabbed by somebody with Schizophrenia now. That used to be 
fairly regular on a Friday night.”    
They also frequently pointed out to me that it is now quite common for media stories to 
challenge the negative stereotypes associated with mental illness. For example, Mike told 
me:    
“There are more celebrities coming out, the Neil Lennon’s and all 
that, saying I did suffer from this. I was surprised when I read about 
Neil Lennon; there’s an example of a guy who is probably one of the 
hardest people you would get on a football park, a born winner ; he 
doesn’t have loser anywhere in his body.”   
The employers I spoke to frequently referred to media stories about high achievers, in 
business, sport, politics, and the arts, self-identifying or being outed as having a history of 
mental illness. In addition to Neil Lennon, they mentioned  Alasdair Campbell, Antonio 
Horta-Osorio, Catherine Zeta-Jones, Frank Bruno, Robin Williams, Ruby Wax; Stan 
Collymore, Stephen Fry and Spike Milligan. Some had read books by the likes of Fry 
(2008), Campbell (2012) and Lennon (2009); listened to broadcasts they had made or 
followed them on social media. They were aware some of these individuals had described 
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their conditions as enduring, disruptive, and occasionally life-threatening and indicate 
that they admired them for refusing to let their conditions prevent them from achieving 
goals beyond the reach of most of us.  
Their evidence resonates with the writings of William Anthony, who has been highly 
influential in shaping how Scottish policymakers think about recovery. In 1993, he 
described it as something that takes place when people successfully manage symptoms 
and make appropriate choices in pursuit of achievable goals. It offers hope these celebrity 
stories might have a positive effect on how employers look upon less prominent people 
with similar health histories. Benkler (2006) and Bruns (2008) offer support for this idea. 
Both argue people can use the media to redefine not just themselves but people similar to 
them in ways that create markets for what they have to offer. However, some degree of 
caution needs to be exercised about what this might mean for the employment 
opportunities of people with a history of mental illness. If the influence of negative 
stories depends on the relevance of these stories to the lives of the people who are told 
them (Caputo and Rouner 2011), then there is the possibility this is also the case for 
positive ones.        
In the following anecdote, Gus captures the thinking of many of the employers who 
spoke to me about how rolling news and the internet are changing media reporting of 
mental illness. He said,    
“What I would say is that we just used to have the Daily Mail, but now 
we have got 24-hour news and the BBC are all on the do-gooder's side 
of things and so the slightest, where people step over the line, you’ve 
got to be better than whiter than white. These large organisations and 
your ASDA’s put one foot out of line, and they’re going to get pulled, 
and maybe that’s right as well for companies that size, but that’s got 
more to do with social media. Reporting was never as good as that and 
that, the issue it goes viral, and these things explode.” 
Other employers made the same point about TESCO. In September 2013, both these 
supermarkets marketed Halloween costumes linking mental illness to violence. People 
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with a history of mental health problems, mental health user groups and their allies used 
social media to attack the use of unfair stereotypes for profit. Like situations that have 
been commented on by Benkler (2006), this was picked up by the BBC and Sky who 
broadcast it on their 24-hour rolling news channels alongside criticism of the 
supermarkets from famous people including Alasdair Campbell
38
 and Stan Collymore
39
. 
Subsequently, the story was picked up by newspapers of every political hue, from the 
Daily Mail
40
 to the Guardian
41
, who then attacked the supermarkets for their actions. It 
was not long before the supermarkets in question withdrew the offending products from 
sale and issued a public apology.  
Gus’s evidence also demonstrates the ambivalence felt by many employers about this 
development.  On the one hand, there was support for the idea that businesses, especially 
large ones, should be called to account for improper behaviour. On the other, there was 
fear, that if a small or medium-sized company was subject to a similar backlash, it could 
damage them out of all proportion to the offence they committed. The employers strongly 
suggested that they are frightened of what might happen if they get things wrong. It, 
therefore, becomes reasonable to believe many companies, particularly smaller ones, 
might be reluctant to engage with people who have a history of mental illness. Given 
small to medium-sized businesses employ almost half of the UK workforce UK (FSB 
2014); this is a matter of some concern.    
The development of communication systems whose speed makes the distribution of 
information less susceptible to state or corporate control explains why people with a 
history of mental illness can come together to challenge unfair stereotypes. However, it 
does not explain why traditional media outlets, which have a long history of insensitive 
and hostile coverage of mental health issues, sometimes support them. It could be argued 
they are reflecting changes in their customer base. No doubt there is some truth in this. 
But making this argument does not address why, as they are attacking the supermarkets 
for using negative stereotypes of mental illness for profit, they are attacking people with a 
                                                             
38
 http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-24278768 
39 http://news.sky.com/story/1146563/mental-costumes-asda-and-tesco-apologise. 
40 Outage as Tesco, ASDA and Amazon sell Halloween outfits of mental health patients. The Daily Mail 26 th 
September 2013.  
41 ASDA offensive Halloween costumes and mental health stigma. The Guardian 26th September 2013. 
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history of mental illness who receive disabilities benefits for lacking a work ethic (Briant 
et al. 2011).  
Help in understanding what is going on is provided by Hermann and McChesney (1997). 
They point out the owners of media companies possess substantial amounts of capital and 
that it is their interests to have competitive markets distribute economic resources. 
Consequently, they tend to support governments who are engaged in a project of rolling 
back and rolling out of the state’s functions (Harvey 2005). Currently, many people with 
a history of mental illness depend on the state for the resources to live their lives. Such 
dependency, together with public support for it, impedes the progress of this project. 
Removing this obstruction requires changing the public perception of people with a 
history of mental illness so that they are not seen as being unable to fend for themselves 
or as posing a threat to anyone. Marketing products using negative stereotypes make this 
more difficult. From this perspective, traditional media attacks on supermarkets for using 
negative stereotypes to sell products while attacking jobless people with a history of 
mental illness are entirely logical.      
6.4. Employers and their sources of knowledge about mental illness: the workplace.   
Only two of the employers I spoke to rejected the idea of employing someone they knew 
to have a history of mental illness. Over half of them had knowingly hired them, and 
three-quarters had experience of supporting members of staff who had become mentally 
ill. It was a universal belief that this type of health problem was is more disruptive to 
production than others because in addition to absenteeism there was also the possibility 
of disruptive behaviour at work. Two examples of the latter were provided by, amongst 
others, Billy and Richard. In the following exchange Billy tells a tragic story about a 
former employee:   
BMcN:  
“Have you any experience of managing mental illness in the 
workplace?”  
 
 Page 136 of 292 
 
Billy:  
“I have experienced it, but I haven’t managed it.” 
BMcN:  
“What do you mean?” 
Billy:  
“I had a chap here who took his own life at his work.”    
Here, Richard talks about troublesome experiences with employees that he knew had 
been diagnosed as being mentally ill, who worked on a remote site on a subcontracting 
basis with workers from other companies:       
“I have had two situations where I owned a company: one was a man 
who was a serious alcoholic, and I had another man who had a drug 
problem. I don’t know to what level their problems were, but it started 
to affect the work situation and the safety situation, and they had to be 
withdrawn from sites because of the danger. ”  
The negative tone of these stories was commonplace. They could be dismissed as 
evidence their tellers hold stigmatising beliefs. Why weren’t they also talking about 
successes? Where were the stories about the benefits of a diverse workforce or the greater 
motivation shown by people who have finally been given a chance? However using 
stigma in this way cannot account for evidence from, amongst others, Anna, Andy, Craig, 
Gavin, Julian, Mike, Naveed and Ross, which showed that once an employee became 
mentally unwell, they tried to keep them in employment despite the disruption. Anna told 
me about trying to support someone returning to work after being off with depression:      
 “I thought I am perfectly capable of providing a good workplace for 
this individual to find their place again…..and as I say within six 
weeks, and this was with a lot of task management. I really tried to 
produce a framework that would contain any difficulties, but it all 
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kicked off. In the end, things just imploded; it utterly imploded, the 
section literally shut down.”  
Anna’s evidence showed she was willing to make what the Equality Act 2010 calls 
reasonable adjustments to the workplace, to accommodate her employee’s health 
condition. When Andy, Gavin and Julian talked about trying to do this for a member of 
staff they indicated they had the same type of experience as Anna. While this might have 
been because making such adjustments was impossible, it could also have been because 
they did not know how to make them, which casts doubt on the efficacy of the Equality 
Act 2010. Not all support failed. Amongst the evidence from those who had some degree 
of success, Craig’s is of particular interest because he is one of the two employers who 
said he would never knowingly hire someone who had a history of mental illness. He told 
me:      
 “There was a member of staff who was clearly in a very difficult 
situation, she was in the psychology team, and you would generally 
expect that would be a good place to be if you were under the influence 
of mental illness. No?”  
BMcN:  
“No?”  
Craig:   
“Basically I had to go and rescue her, make adaptations or reasonable 
adjustments for her, she’s in another job connected to another team; 
she still works here. This has really worked out well for her, and she’s 
in a much happier place, and the psychology team don’t  have to deal 
with someone who is going through an emotional trauma .”  
An obvious explanation for the above behaviour is employers are responding to pressure 
from HR professionals. However, many of the businesses that took part in this study did 
not employ these people, and none who did had enough of them to police the behaviour 
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of their management
42
.  Their success and longevity suggest they are profit focused.  So, 
why are they acting in this manner?  Insight is provided by reflecting further on Anna and 
Craig’s evidence. Both of them became members of the same social group as their 
employee on the creation of the employer-employee relationship. Groups, allow 
significant amounts of information about people to be circulated over extended periods of 
time. They create stability by providing a forum for meeting social and affiliation needs 
(Handy 1993), creating feelings of identity and solidarity based on similarities with some 
and differences from others (Hall 1990), and facilitating the organisation and control of 
activities through the allocation of responsibilities (Handy 1993). If employers do not 
support staff members who become unwell, they risk creating instability. In time this 
could damage the reputation of their business, make it more difficult for them to recruit 
and retain experienced workers and threaten profitability. In this light, the benefits of 
shared group membership offer an explanation for why employers tried to keep staff who 
became mentally ill, which is consistent with arguments made by Simon (1997) about the 
use of bounded rationality; Williamson (1975; 2007) regarding transactional costs; 
Granovetter (1973; 1985; 1995a) about trade being embedded in social networks (Darity 
2005; 2009a) about cooperation and competition within and between groups and the 
insights offered by Zelizer (2007) about the role played by intimacy in economic activity.  
However, groups divide the world into the known and the unknown, insiders and 
outsiders, and competitors and associates (Darity 2005; 2009a; Hall 1990; Handy 1993). 
If group membership influences the reactions of employers to employees who have a 
history of mental illness it suggests shared group membership could also change their 
responses to job seekers with a similar health history. To examine this further the next 
three sections will look at the beliefs of employers about mental illnesses and whether 
shared group membership mediates recruitment decisions involving people with a history 
of these conditions. 
                                                             
42
 This appears to be the norm. The role of HR in staffing issues will be gone into in more detail in chapter 8.  
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6.5 Employers and their beliefs about mental health problems. 
Every employer who took part in this study spoke of mental health problems in terms of 
illness. However, they all agreed with David when he said:     
 
“What we call mental illness now is not what we used to call it forty 
years ago.” 
Every employer believed the identification of conditions such as anxiety, alcoholism, 
drug dependency, grief and nervousness as mental illnesses was a relatively recent 
phenomenon. A finding that resonates with the discussion in the literature review, which 
showed that what is identified as mental illness is often contingent on factors such as 
personal status, culture, time, and technology (Foucault 2006; Porter 2002; Scull 2009; 
Rogers and Pilgrim 2010). Their awareness that the concept of mental illness is fluid 
raises questions about what they believe is the cause of mental illness; how they identify 
its presence, what they believe is its relationship with social stigma and what their 
thoughts are about the possibility of recovery.  
6.5.1 Employers and their beliefs about the causes of mental health problems. 
Vincent captured the universal belief amongst those who participated in this study about 
the cause of mental health problems. He told me:            
“In one instance it can be where there is something wrong with the 
brain in the first place in the other it can be a reaction to a big 
shock.”  
The understanding of mental illness displayed by employers echoes the response of 
medicine to the fallout from the First World War, which was to parse mental illness into 
psychosis and neurosis (Bogacz 1989). They all spoke of mental health problems as being 
things that can be caused by a biological anomaly in the brain or an event with enough 
emotional power to cause it to malfunction. When they understood it to have an organic 
root the majority of them interpreted it as being the result of genetics, physical injury or 
some form of infection, which is an understanding that led some to identify conditions 
such as autism, epilepsy and learning difficulties as mental illnesses. Everyone thought ‘a 
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big shock’ such as bereavement, bankruptcy, divorce or redundancy could make someone 
mentally ill, but they also agreed with Ross who told me people could also become 
mentally ill when,        
“They haven’t been able to verbalise to their colleagues or friends 
things that are going on in advance, and then it comes to a signature 
moment.”  
The beliefs of employers appear to be that mental illness is a fluid and multifaceted 
phenomenon. Something caused by genetics, a biological or social trauma or a build up 
of pressure in response to several relatively unimportant events over time. In the 
academic literature, these characteristics have generated ontological debates and 
epistemological struggles. However, none of the employers I spoke to was conflicted 
about what mental illness signalled or how it should be dealt with. In line with 
Scambler’s (2006; 2009) insight that medical labels often marked a real difference they 
all believed mental illness indicated a different state of being, that this difference needed 
addressing, that medicine was the appropriate discipline for doing this; and that diagnoses 
provided an appropriate degree of orientation for mentally distressed people and those 
who engage with them.   
6.5.2 Employers and their beliefs about the behaviour associated with mental illness.  
Every employer thought there were two types of behaviour associated with this different 
state of being. Billy provided an example of the first of these when he told me:       
 “Well, quite often these people are talking to themselves, talking to a 
wall.”  
While Niall provided an example of the other when he said:    
“You’re aware of people that can act one way one minute and then 
within a minute act l ike a completely different person the next minute. ”  
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The universal belief was that mental illness signalled the potential for strange or 
unpredictable behaviour. Gavin captured what everyone thought the possibility of these 
types of actions meant for someone's employment opportunities: 
“If someone has a characteristic that is unsettling, then I might not be 
able to use them, and in saying that I am aware that the problem might 
lie with my  perception, but in business, the judgement has to be, does 
this damage my business?”  
The literature on mental illness also links mental health problems with strange, 
unpredictable and unsettling behaviour (Foucault 2006; Porter 2002; Rogers and Pilgrim 
2010). Except for schizophrenia, nobody I spoke to was concerned about this behaviour 
manifesting itself as violence. The idea that some diagnostic labels make people 
unemployable echoes an observation made by Stalker (2005) that particular labels can 
make their bearers socially unacceptable. However, here, Gavin identifies what their 
primary concern was:    
“I want somebody who’ll be here when they’re needed who’ll fit in 
with how we do things here.” 
Everyone thought a history of mental illness signalled someone might be unable to 
comply with the everyday demands of the workplace such as turning up for work 
regularly, being on time, notifying their manager if they were going to be absent from 
work, behaving in conformance with workplace norms, concentrating on the demands of 
the job and encouraging repeat business from customers. They believed strange 
behaviour might become manageable over time if they adjusted the workplace to suit 
someone’s idiosyncrasies or confined them to certain tasks such as back-office functions. 
However, they all thought it would be unreasonable to expect small employers to absorb 
the costs involved in doing this. As for bigger businesses, while they believed they could 
bear these costs, the consensus was that there would need to be a compelling reason for 
them to do so. As for unpredictability, everyone thought this was just unmanageable. In 
essence, the potential for strange behaviour increased the level of risk they had to deal 
with, and the prospect of unpredictability introduced an element of uncertainty. As a 
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result, they all thought job seekers with a history of mental health problems had to be 
treated with caution.  
This evidence shows employers do not see labour from people with a history of mental 
health problems as a commodity like any other: something that is distinct from its 
supplier. It demonstrates that when a business operates in a competitive environment, 
employers see the reality of mental illness as a barrier to paid employment that is distinct 
from stigma, which brings us to what role they think stigma plays in their recruitment 
decisions.   
6.5.3 Employers and their beliefs about stigma and mental illness.  
Every employer I spoke to agreed with Naveed who told me:      
“There is a stigma associated with mental illness.” 
He then went on to say: 
“People discriminate against them.”  
There was a general awareness that deviance from social norms is a precursor of stigma 
and that stigma is distinct from and a precondition for unfair discrimination. Some of 
them like Ross also showed awareness that stigma could provoke a reaction in the person 
diagnosed with a mental illness and that these feelings could inform how they acted:   
“Nobody is going to admit to having a mental illness at an interview 
because they would think it would make it less “likely they would get 
the job.”   
This evidence reflects the argument about felt stigma made by Scambler (2004) in that it 
shows employers are aware a diagnosis of mental illness can induce in people a fear of 
rejection and that this fear may cause them to conceal their health history. Given they all 
thought that stigma led people to discriminate against individuals with a history of mental 
health problems, I was interested to find out about how they saw their behaviour. 
Everyone, in one form or another, said the same thing as David:     
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“I’ll employ anyone if I think they will make me money.”  
Nobody accepted the idea that they held stigmatising beliefs or that they unfairly 
discriminated against job seekers with a history of mental illness. Their position was that 
they judged job seekers on the grounds of their ability to help the business make money. 
They thought that for the most part, this meant being able to do a job of work in a manner 
that fitted in with their demands and those of other workplace actors. A desire by 
employers for employees that conform to productive and social norms has been identified 
as ableist (Kumari Campbell 2008; Foster 2011). However, employers do not see their 
position as being unfair as Robert demonstrates in the following exchange about a job 
interview with someone with a history of mental illness who responded to a job 
advertisement.   
BMcN:  
“Say at an interview you were interviewing someone, and they said I’m 
going to be straight with you, I’ve got a history of mental health 
problems.’ How would you react to that?”  
Robert:  
“Well, I couldn’t take the chance ...I wouldn’t like them going into a 
house and doing a job of trust like mine.”  
BMcN:  
“Why?” 
Robert:  
“It’s a risk assessment.”  
Robert is an electrical contractor whose business requires his staff to work in people’s 
homes. Earlier, when I asked him about what he knew about mental illness, he told me: 
“Pass.” 
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When we talked about trust, he made it clear to me he was talking about working in a 
predictable and safe manner rather than honesty. He believed it was essential his 
employees were able to do this if he was to stay in business. For him, deciding not to hire 
someone because they had a history of mental illness was not acting unfairly it was an 
exercise in pragmatic self-interest. By using words like chance and risk, Robert was 
trying to present his recruitment decision as a rational judgement: an assessment of the 
likelihood that something hazardous might happen that could adversely affect his 
business. His self-professed ignorance about mental illness and his belief that he cannot 
predict the job seekers future behaviour points to him doing something else: trying to 
reduce uncertainty. Risk presumes possession of the knowledge necessary to calculate the 
probability an event will occur while uncertainty indicates awareness that such 
knowledge might not be available, either because it is not known or it doesn’t exist 
(Knight 1921; Taleb 2010). The evidence provided by Robert suggests he is not carrying 
out a risk assessment but reacting to uncertainty by exercising an exclusionary use of 
power in the hope he can keep things as predictable and safe as possible.  
Everyone I spoke to, including those who had knowingly employed people with a history 
of mental illness, thought along the same lines as Robert. Apart from the two employers 
who said a history of mental illness would result in the automatic rejection of a job 
seeker, they agreed that if the recruitment process revealed someone had a history of 
mental illness, it might not always result in rejection, but it would always demand further 
investigation. They argued that this was how they would act when someone had a record 
of poor physical health or unexplained gaps in their work history. In itself, there is 
nothing ominous about this for how could an employer make the reasonable adjustments 
demanded by the Equality Act 2010 if they did not behave in this way. But in the context 
of a desire for safety, predictability and profitability it suggests the employers I spoke to 
are rationalising their actions in ways that enable them to reject accusations of having any 
personal responsibility for the high levels of employment experienced by people with a 
history of mental illness.  
It is a line of thought that allows them to accept the idea stigma plays a role in shaping 
the employment opportunities available to people with a history of mental illness while 
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rejecting the possibility of it influencing their hiring practices. Consequently, doubt is 
raised about the efficacy of the ‘See Me’ campaign. The literature on marketing 
campaigns aimed at changing public behaviour indicates that success depends on whether 
their target audience sees them as being relevant (Kotler and Zaltman; 1971; Dolan et al. 
2010). The employer's beliefs about the influence of stigma on their hiring practices 
suggest they might see the ‘See Me campaign as being irrelevant43. It also casts doubt on 
whether the Government’s linking of recovery and paid employment and its idealisation 
of recovery as something determined by the attitude and agency of someone who is or 
has been mentally ill are realistic. The next section will examine this when it looks at 
what employers understand by the term recovery. 
6.5.4 Employers and their beliefs about recovery. 
To investigate employer’s beliefs about recovery I asked everyone whether they thought 
people with a history of mental illness could recover. I deliberately avoided using 
synonyms such as ‘cure’ or ‘get better’ in order tease out any awareness of the debates 
about mental health and recovery that run through the literature and mental health policy. 
The most optimistic group of employers about recovery were David, Mike and Richard. 
David captured their beliefs when he told me it would be possible,    
“With medication and treatment but I don’t think it would be a short 
treatment.”  
The most pessimistic group of employers was made up of Brendan and Michael. Brendan 
demonstrated what they thought when he told me,  
“I doubt if recovery would ever be possible,” 
 The majority of employers were to be found between these poles. This group believed 
the possibility of recovery depended on the cause of the illness as Anna shows here:  
“If I was presented with an individual who said they were feeling flat, 
or I’ve got an appetite problem, and they’ve made me late for work 
and through a conversation,  I was able to elicit that there had been 
                                                             
43 This will be discussed further in chapter eight. 
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the death of a parent, I would see that as probably temporary. I’m 
going to use the word fixable bearing in mind I have an issue I want to 
fix. I would see that as social circumstances coming to the fore. Now if 
I had someone who was unaware of their impact who displayed erratic 
moods and whatever else they might present. I model that in a medical 
framework, it might be manageable, but it’s not something that is 
going to go away.” 
 
In line with their shared position that mental illness signalled a real difference and that 
the role of medicine was to address it, they treated the word recovery as being a synonym 
for a cure. Paradoxically, most thought this would be more likely if the illness had a 
social root and less likely if it had a biological one. In general, the employers I spoke to 
seemed to look at the first category of mental illnesses as diseases, while the latter ones 
were viewed as a form of impairment. They appeared to see the role of medicine in the 
former instance to be to curative: to return to a former state of being, while in the latter 
cases it was to manage the deviant social behaviours that were a symptom of their 
condition.  This suggests that evidence indicating employers look upon the effect of 
mental health conditions as being temporary (Sainsbury et al. 2008) might be conditional 
on what they understand to be the cause of the illness. In the light of the earlier finding 
that employers regard people bearing particular diagnostic labels as unemployable this is 
an area that requires further research.     
The findings that employers believe recovery is a synonym for a cure and that their 
experience of and beliefs about mental illness makes them cautious about hiring someone 
with such a background sits in stark contrast to their earlier positive reaction to media 
stories about people achieving considerable success while living with severe and 
enduring conditions. However, employers knowingly hire some people with a history of 
mental illness including ones with severe and enduring conditions, which is behaviour 
that suggests there is some alignment between employers’ beliefs about recovery and the 
idea recovery involves successfully managing symptoms and making appropriate choices 
in pursuit of achievable goals. So, while caution needs to be exercised regarding the 
extent of this alignment, the evidence here suggests it could be improved if recovery 
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advocates constructed their arguments by taking on board employers experiences of 
mental illness and used words in ways that they are familiar with, which points to a need 
to involve employers in developing and communicating the concept of recovery.   
At the start of this chapter, it was said the evidence indicated employers knowingly hire 
people with a history of mental illness, including ones with severe and enduring 
conditions. The evidence of this study supports this, for more than half the employers I 
spoke to had knowingly hired such a person. Given the evidence that social relationships 
mediated how employers reacted to employees who had become mentally ill, the 
discussion will now explore these decisions by looking at whether pre-existing social 
relationships influenced these recruitment decisions. 
 6.6 Employers and their reactions to job candidates with a history of mental illness 
in the absence of a pre-existing social relationship.     
In ‘Chapter Four’ it was noted that when this study was carried out, there was a 
considerable surplus of labour in the Scottish economy and that this surplus was likely to 
increase as a result of the government policy of moving people with a history of mental 
illness off incapacity benefits. It follows that these new entrants to the labour market will 
have to persuade employers to hire them rather than people who have a more recent work 
history, and a better health record, who appear willing to accept jobs offering fewer 
rewards than their qualifications would usually demand.  
This led me to ask every employer how they would react to two job candidates that were 
unknown to them; one had been unemployed for a considerable period and had a history 
of mental illness, the other did not have this health history and had recently been made 
unemployed. The reaction by every employer to this question is captured by Robert:    
“Why would I take on someone who hasn’t worked for years and has 
been not well when there are a lot of superstars out there who are 
looking for work?”  
From what has been said earlier it is reasonable to believe Robert is assuming, in the 
absence of any information to the contrary, that the person with the history of mental 
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health problems is indicating the possibility of increased costs as a result of things like 
absenteeism, an inability to focus on the job, adverse reactions by other workplace actors 
and rusty or non-existent job-related skills.  
Robert’s response explains why only two of the sixteen employers I spoke to who 
knowingly took on someone with a history of mental illness did so as a result of any form 
of competition. The employers in question were Margaret and Julian. Margaret employed 
someone in an entry-level post in an old folk's home. The evidence she provided 
indicated that she was influenced by having a family member with the same condition as 
her new employee. Margaret felt she was familiar with the condition, would be able to 
manage her new employee successfully and had a responsibility to treat people with this 
condition in the manner that she would like her family member to be treated.  In many 
ways, despite the absence of a personal relationship, Margaret’s evidence is more about 
how familiarity can positively influence recruitment decisions. As I intend to deal with 
this in the next section, I will focus on Julian. Here he describes the circumstances 
surrounding the appointment of a member of his staff:    
“We recruited a guy; it was for an IT job, we used an agency; this chap had 
done a phenomenal amount of research on us he knew the job inside out, and 
he brought some really innovative ideas to the table. Here we were faced 
with a guy who stood out from all the other guys; the other guys were pretty 
much turn of the handle, what you see on the person specification was what 
you got. This was a new organisation, and this guy was bringing something 
extra in. After the second interview with my boss, we had a discussion and 
came to the conclusion that there was something not quite right here, but we 
didn’t know what it was, I was asked do you want to take a risk on this guy. I 
said well yes, he’s got some interesting ideas here. We decided to put him on 
a probationary contract for six months. Let’s put him through the process of 
a medical. So he’s got his contract, he’s on six months probation, so he’s ok. 
From the start he’s performing really really well; three months into his 
contract we get the results of the medical back.”   
BMcN:  
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“Were the arrangements made in-house or by a contractor?”  
Julian:  
“We have a parent organisation that uses a contractor, we’ve used the 
same contractor for a number of  years, who actually does the HR 
work. They have a company doctor. So this guy had to go down to 
London to see this company doctor. The report came back, which was 
obviously independent of his doctor. It turned out he’d been on Lithium 
for 25years. Anyway, the report came back, he’s on Lithium, he’s 
balanced, he’s managing it, he’s been managing it for a number of  
years, he has a partner in Edinburgh, and there is nothing to suggest 
that he won’t perform. So ok, now we understand what the issue was, 
why he was a little bit odd if I can put it that way, he was sometimes 
nervous and sometimes on edge .”    
Julian has made a judgement that he does not have enough time or expertise to search the 
labour market. He has also concluded that to do this, the appropriate course of action is 
not to directly employ HR professionals but to pay a recruitment agency on an as and 
when required basis. His behaviour could be used to support the idea these organisations 
facilitate competition (Autor 2008). However, it also resonates with the arguments of 
Simon (1997), (1937) and Williamson (2007) about the role played by bounded 
rationality and transactional costs in the conduct of trade. Either way, Julian appears to 
feel this approach to recruitment gives him considerable confidence that the information 
he was being supplied with is accurate and job relevant.  The reason being that he knows 
if the agency provides unqualified or unsuitable applicants, it will be putting its future at 
risk.   
The candidate that emerged as the preferred one from those furnished by the agency was 
one who had a good work record, the possession of scarce highly valued skills, that were 
in excess of those typically demanded for the job, the ability to generate exciting ideas, 
an interest in the company who lived his life in accordance with valued social norms. 
Julian made it clear it was not customary practice to send recruits to the other side of the 
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country for a medical as a condition of employment. Furthermore, nothing in the 
preferred candidate's work history seemed to give him reason to do so. But because the 
candidate's behaviour at the interview raised the spectre of mental illness Julian did 
exactly that. 
The information Julian had about his preferred candidate’s past gave him no reason to 
demand more of this person than he would have of other recruits. Indeed one might have 
thought the possession of superior skills might have led the job applicant to reject these 
demands and go elsewhere. The behaviour of Julian and his preferred candidate is 
evidence of enacted and felt stigma acting as barriers to employment in an actual hiring 
decision. It indicates that in the real world people who have a history of poor mental 
health and employers believe they will have to settle for jobs for which they are 
overqualified. A scenario that suggests those of them who have only entry-level skills, 
people moving into the labour market after a long time on disability benefits, for 
example, will struggle to find a job unless the demand for labour is very high.   
Julian's evidence indicates he consults HR professionals on an as and when required 
basis. Once more it appears the ability of this group of people to use their specialised 
knowledge of things such as equalities legislation, anti-stigma campaigns and work 
support programmes to influence how employers approach routine staffing issues is 
limited.   
6.7 Employers and their reactions to job candidates with a history of mental illness 
in the presence of a pre-existing social relationship.    
Earlier it was argued shared group membership can sustain employment after the onset of 
mental illness. Therefore it is not unreasonable to believe it could also influence how 
employers react to job seekers with a history of similar conditions. The evidence from 
Gavin, Gus and Michael indicates this is the case. During my meeting with Michael, who 
owned a coach hire business, he told me:  
“I’ve taken on my boy to work for me as a drive r.” 
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Michael and his son, as members of the same family grouping will have spent a 
considerable amount of time together, have a detailed knowledge of each other and have 
established roles within the family unit about how to report and deal with specific 
situations. It should, therefore, be unsurprising that he has given his son a job. But in 
another part of our conversation, he told me   
“My boy has a mental illness.”  
It would appear that when someone has a history of mental illness, membership of one 
type of group, the family, can catalyse membership of another kind of group, the 
workforce, as long as they have job-specific skills. Arguments can be made that 
biological imperatives and legal rights of inheritance are in play here (Gilding 2005). It 
would be ridiculous to ignore this possibility. However, Gus and Gavin show that when 
biology and inheritance are stripped out of the equation employers still behave in a 
similar way to Michael. Gus demonstrated this when he talked about a family friend, who 
had been diagnosed as mentally ill, he told me:     
“I have taken on somebody I know right now who has got a bit of a 
problem….. His family and my family go way back ... He has 
outstanding skills, and I gave him a job because he can do it and 
because he needs something to sort him out right now. ”  
It should be noted Gus is suggesting the person he hired is technically overqualified. As 
in Julian's evidence, stigma, felt and enacted, appear to be influencing the outcome of a 
recruitment decision, for both Gus and the new employee seem to accept a history of 
mental illness can be used to discount the value of labour. Gavin’s evidence shows how 
the power of groups to shape the employment opportunities available to people with a 
history of mental illness extends to vicarious relationships:    
 “I took her on, on the basis of my employee’s recommendation, I’m 
ashamed to say I’ve forgotten the lady’s name, it was someone he 
knew, she may have been a teacher, she certainly had a pretty 
responsible job, she had been involved in a pretty bad car accident, as 
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a result she had physical disabilities, she also suffered brain trauma, 
which affected her personality.”  
The evidence from Gavin, Gus and Michael shows them targeting people who have the 
skills to do the job needing to be done. But the way that they are doing this cannot be 
understood as evidence supporting the arguments of Williamson (1975; 1985; 2000; 
2007) about transactional costs. This is because the targeting is being done using non-
economic relationships that existed independent of the vacancy. Gus and Michaels’s 
evidence corroborates the position taken by Zelizer (2007) that intimacy plays a role in 
economic decisions and Gavins behaviour can be understood as evidence supporting the 
arguments from Granovetter (1985; 1995a), about economic activity being embedded in 
social networks. However, the discounting of the value of labour remains unexplained. 
This lacuna can be filled by reflecting on evidence from the literature that people are 
members of multiple groups the arguments of stratification economists, such as Darity 
(2005; 2009a). Darity’s thesis is that historical injustices rooted in cooperation and 
competition within and between groups produce structural frameworks that make it 
possible for members of powerful groups to value similar investments made by members 
of various groups differently. Because people are members of multiple groups, the signals 
sent out by membership of one group can be used to mitigate or amplify the signals sent 
out by membership of another group. In the above scenarios, the benefits of being 
intimate with an employer or a member of their social circles are being offset by the 
stigma associated people who have a history of mental illness.     
6.8 Conclusion. 
This chapter looked at what employers regard as the most important sources of 
information about mental illness; how they have shaped their beliefs about this subject; 
their reactions to people who have a history of mental illness, what mediates these 
responses and what this means for their willingness to hire them.  
It showed that employers believe the three most important sources of information about 
mental illness are medicine, the media and the workplace. From their evidence, it appears 
that while medicine provides the language used by employers to discuss mental distress 
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its educational role is limited for employers seem to be ignorant of the meaning of the 
terms they use and their associated symptoms. Concerning the media, the findings 
demonstrated a belief that celebrity culture, social media and rolling news has led to 
people with a history of mental illness being presented in a more positive manner. For the 
most part, employers were comfortable with this change, but they had mixed feelings 
about businesses being attacked for using negative stereotypes of mentally ill people to 
sell goods and services. On the one hand, they thought large firms should be called to 
account for improper behaviour but on the other, felt doing this to smaller companies 
could cause damage that is disproportionate to any harm caused. As for the workplace, 
this showed employers had widespread experience of their businesses being disrupted by 
employees becoming mentally unwell, that they were willing to respond to this 
development by making adjustments to the workplace, that this behaviour was 
independent of pressure exerted by HR professionals and that the changes they made 
were often ineffective. It would appear the catalysts for this behaviour is the mutual 
obligations, shared identities and organisational benefits that arise out of shared group 
membership. Taken together the sources of information employers draw on to understand 
mental distress appears to have led them to treat people with a history of mental illness 
with caution because they have generated a belief that the concept of mental illness is one 
with fluid boundaries that embrace real conditions with social or biological roots, which 
may or may not be temporary, whose presence is signalled by strange or unpredictable 
behaviour.   
Employers response to their multifaceted understanding of mental distress is pragmatic. 
Unlike academia, they do not concern themselves with debates about ontology and 
epistemology. Instead, perhaps illogically given their beliefs, they accept the authority of 
medicine over the mentally distressed and the idea that a diagnosis provides an 
appropriate form of orientation. In the overwhelming majority of cases their beliefs have 
not led them to unconditionally reject the notion of employing people with a history of 
mental illness but when they are confronted by a job seeker with this background they do 
lead them to reflect carefully on what employing them could mean for them and their 
business. It is an approach that has led some of them to regard people who bear certain 
psychiatric labels, especially ones like schizophrenia, which they associate with violence, 
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as being unemployable. Everyone accepted the reflections of others could mean their 
recruitment decisions are influenced by stigma. However, no one accepted this could be 
said of them. Instead, they asserted their hiring decisions were determined by economics. 
It is a finding that casts doubt on the ability of anti-stigma campaigns such as “See Me” 
to change their attitudes towards people with a history of mental illness because if they 
don’t believe they hold stigmatising attitudes, they are unlikely to see these campaigns as 
being relevant to their hiring practices.   
Despite their concerns, more than half of the employers who participated in this study 
had knowingly hired people with a history of mental illness, and only two rejected the 
idea of ever doing so. Given their beliefs about and negative experiences of mental illness 
this is surprising. Unpacking what has been going on showed that when they hired 
someone with a history of mental illness, they tended not to do so as a result of open 
competition or the use of recruitment agencies. In the vast majority of cases, it was 
information generated by personal knowledge and social networks that prompted their 
decisions. From this, it is reasonable to believe many of the forces that were in play when 
an employer tried to support employees who became mentally unwell are also in play 
when employers hire people with a history of mental illness.   
When these recruitment decisions are looked at more closely, it indicates that employers’ 
protestations that stigma does not influence their hiring decisions are evidence of a lack 
of insight. In both scenarios, they not only believed the people they hired could do the 
jobs needing to be done they also thought they had skills that were superior to those 
typically required for the posts in question. As a result, it becomes reasonable to believe 
enacted stigma was used to reduce the cost of the labour they purchased. Furthermore, the 
willingness of their new employees to accept this behaviour suggests felt stigma was also 
influential here.  
The work of Zelizer (2007) on the role played by intimacy in economic activity and the 
arguments of Granovetter (1975; 1985) about such activity being embedded in social 
networks can be used to explain the use by employers of personal relationships and social 
networks to make hiring decisions involving people with a history of mental illness. 
However, they struggle to explain why employers can discount the value of their labour. 
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Help in doing this is provided by evidence showing people are members of multiple 
groups and the thinking of stratification economists such as Darity (2005; 2009a). Darity 
argues historical injustices arising out of cooperation within and competition between 
groups produces structural frameworks that enable members of powerful groups to 
unfairly discount investments made by members of less powerful groups. It follows 
signals generated by membership of one group can be used to mitigate those sent out by 
membership of another. However, to take the discussion about the efficacy of the UK 
government’s welfare to work policies further, it is necessary to clarify whether this 
behaviour is evidence of employers’ normal labour market behaviour or an idiosyncrasy 
induced by the shadow of mental illness. To unpack this, it is necessary to identify 
employers’ beliefs about what shapes their demand for labour and how they engage with 
the labour market in the absence of mental illness. It is the first of these topics that will be 
discussed in the next chapter.  
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Chapter Seven:  
What private sector employers think shapes their demand for labour. 
7.1 Introduction. 
The second third and fourth chapters showed differences in belief are important: how a 
problem is framed determines how it is addressed. If the UK government does not share 
employers beliefs about what is involved in trading for labour, it calls into question the 
ability of its welfare to work policies to increase their demand for labour from jobless 
people who have been disabled by mental illness. The previous chapter looked at how 
employers deal with job seekers with a history of mental illness. There the possibility 
emerged that such a difference may exist. To explore this further the discussion in this 
chapter will draw upon the economic and sociological literature on the labour market to 
examine evidence from employers about what they believe shapes their demand for new 
employees.  
It will start by looking at what employers think creates a demand for labour and how they 
view it compared to other commodities they use to produce goods and services. 
Following this, it will investigate the attributes they find desirable in a supplier of labour 
and what they take into account when deciding to recruit a new employee. In the course 
of doing this, there will be a reflection on the roles played by risk, uncertainty and fear of 
harm, which will consider the topics of complicated and complex systems and subjective 
and statistical risk. Then it will examine the alignment between the beliefs of employers 
about hiring labour with how they behaved when they took on people with a history of 
mental illness. Finally, the chapter will draw to a close by highlighting any differences 
between employers and policymakers about their perception of the labour market and 
what this might mean for how employers engage with it.                  
7.2 When an employer looks for a new employee. 
Ross captured everyone's opinion about recruitment when he said:     
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“Nine times out of ten it would be driven by two things: it would be 
because somebody is leaving or winning new business, which by 
definition means growth.”  
There was also a consensus amongst them that in the current economic environment a 
worker moving on did not mean an employer would automatically enter the labour 
market, as Craig shows here,      
“If somebody goes the first thing I ask myself is do we need to repl ace 
them?”  
The explanations employers gave me for these approaches was summed up by Glen, 
when he said hiring staff is,       
“Is an economic commitment, it is something a company will take very 
seriously because for this commitment there has to be a justification 
for doing so economically, so there will need to be a return on the 
investment.”  
Given this, it was unsurprising to find everyone thought recruitment decisions are heavily 
influenced by the level of demand for the goods and services produced by their business.  
It follows that there is a reason to believe employers will, for the most part, agree with 
the neoclassical argument, which is that labour is a derived demand: something that can 
only exist when the marginal product revenue of labour is greater than its marginal cost 
(Ehrenberg and Smith 2012). In other words, employers will only hire new employees if 
they think they can profit from it.  
However, every employer thought deciding whether a purchase of labour would generate 
a profit was different from making a similar decision about purchasing other resources. 
Robert explains why:  
“You need to have employees who are not just there for the money.... 
who enjoy their work .”   
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Evidently, employers believe the feelings of well-being staff obtain from work influences 
the quantity and quality of the labour they provide. Such a belief is incompatible with the 
idea labour can be separated from its supplier like any other commodity. It indicates that 
when they are looking to purchase labour, they will not only be looking for a type of 
labour they will also be looking for a kind of person. What this means in practice will be 
part of the discussion in the next section.   
7.3 What an employer looks for in a new employee.   
If employers look on employing people as an investment and they believe certain types of 
people produce the best returns, then the next question is what personal attributes do 
employers look for when they have a vacancy to fill? Frank described one every 
employer thought was desirable:    
“Relevant experience; especially in a similar organisation, I want to 
recruit someone who is doing this job now, preferably in an 
organisation that’s bigger, better and whatever than what we are. I 
can bring them in and benefit from their experience fro m day one. 
Literally, the training process is you get to know our company. ”  
Frank is echoing evidence from the previous chapter, which indicated possession of job-
specific skills was a significant influence on employers when they hired people with a 
history of mental illness. It also resonates with findings from the literature about the 
importance of job-specific skills to employability (Van der Heijde and Van der Heijden 
2006). It suggests, for the most part, that employers will be less likely to hire someone if 
they have to train them. However, they may train them once they have hired them 
because as Margaret shows, they also want people whose skills can be enhanced: 
“If they have qualifications it shows the potential for future 
development.”  
At first glance, the attitude of employers seems aligned with work on education by 
neoclassical economists such as Becker (1993). He argues that when job seekers use their 
agency to signal a willingness to align their skills with market requirements, they will 
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obtain employment. However, the willingness of employers to train employees after they 
have worked for them for a while suggests this alignment is only partial. Further support 
for this interpretation of the evidence is provided by reflecting on another attribute that 
every employer desired in a new employee. Richard revealed what this was when he told 
me,   
“I want someone who can work as part of a team.”  
According to neoclassical economics, the purchase of labour is a spot event. One, where 
the price mechanism matches supply and demand at a particular point in time in a way 
that excuses the purchaser from having to consider the past, be concerned about the 
future or think about the effects of their actions on others (Ehrenberg and Smith 2012; 
Mandel 2012; Dutt and Wilbur; 2010). Demanding people to be able to work as part of a 
team raises the issues of asset specificity, opportunism and transaction costs (Williamson 
1975; 1985). It also brings into play questions of history, identity, mutual obligations, and 
who is an insider and who is an outsider that have been highlighted by Veblen (1899), 
Commons (1909; 1931), Granovetter (1985; 1995a), Hall (1990), Handy (1993) and 
Darity (2005; 2009a). Either way, it indicates that once a decision has been made to fill a 
vacancy, employers view the outcome of that decision as an uncertain threat to workforce 
stability, productivity and profitability. Making an internal appointment could disrupt the 
team because the new post holder is different from the previous occupant. Recruiting 
someone from outside the company could also disrupt the team because it could lead 
existing employees to believe their work is not valued properly. By indicating they 
believe interfering with the makeup of groups is potentially dangerous, employers are 
showing their thinking, regarding the hiring of staff, may echo arguments about 
uncertainty made by the old institutional economics, stratification economics, or the new 
economic sociology.    
Andy, Billy, Brendan, Frank, Gavin and Ross spoke for their peers in telling me what 
they take into account when deciding whether someone will be a good fit with a 
workforce team. Billy said he would want to find out, 
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“Whether there have been issues with them in the past, maybe with  
sickness and health.”  
Frank pointed out that a willingness to be flexible was important:  
“I want them to show they are willing to come in early when it’s 
needed and to stay in late when they have to.”  
While Brendan pointed to presentational skills being important:  
“I want people who look the part.”  
Ross and Andy told me how employers identified individuals with these attributes. Ross 
said:  
"They have to turn up at the interview looking like the job is  important 
to them, like they've made an effort to impress me."  
While Andy's evidence highlighted their employment background, 
“Look at their job history, if  they have had two or three jobs a year; if  
it's erratic then no.”  
Gavin showed that he agreed with Andy when he said,  
“If there are gaps in their work history, then they’re going to have to 
have a good explanation for them.”  
Evidently, employers want to fill vacancies with people who can signal the job they are 
applying for is important to them. Job seekers that can show they have a solid work 
record, which demonstrates they have the skills to do the job; the ability to use those 
skills predictably, the capacity to support their colleagues and the flexibility to respond to 
the changing needs of the business. However, it also shows that they are concerned about 
their ability to find people with these attributes for they use information about the past to 
predict how a supplier of labour will act in the future. From this, it is evident they do not 
believe the price mechanism contains all the information necessary to make a recruitment 
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decision. An important consequence of using the past to predict the future is highlighted 
by Frank:    
“Once you’ve been out and you’ve been out for  any length of time it’s 
very hard to get back in.”  
Frank’s evidence echoes the literature on employment, which shows the longer someone 
is out of work, the more likely they will remain jobless (Koen et al. 2013). UK 
government statistics indicate more than half of the people who receive disability-related 
benefits because of their mental health have been out of work for more than two years 
(DWP 2015a). Absence from the labour market of this length suggests their mental health 
problems are chronic and that many of their job-specific and work-related skills will be 
rusty or out of date. In other words, they are unlikely to possess all of the attributes 
employers seek in new employees. As a result, it becomes reasonable to believe many 
people with a history of mental illness will struggle to convince employers to hire them.  
The indications are as the Scottish economy continues its move away from manufacturing 
towards services this struggle will become harder. Why becomes apparent by reflecting 
on evidence from Niall, the owner of several bars and restaurants. His testimony is 
typical of evidence from employers working in the service sector. He told me: 
“What is really difficult is to find people with the knack of how to deal 
with people or who have good communication skills .”  
He then elaborated on the importance of communication skills:   
“You’ve got to deal with situations involving people…My biggest 
concern is to try and make people comfortable, to  seek to make people 
want to come in, make them feel welcome. I think the most important 
thing is dealing with customers rather than being the best at pouring a 
drink for instance. You can always learn that.” 
In the service sector, customers can be described as the leaders of workplace teams. Here, 
customers are often the judge of how good a worker is at their job. Consequently, when 
people are looking for work, they must be able to signal to employers they are an 
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appropriate social fit with customers and existing staff. Doing this means job seekers 
must be able to convince employers they can navigate paths through obstacle courses 
comprising of social norms, individual character traits and conflicting and contradictory 
demands. The aim of this being to ensure customers enjoy feelings of importance and 
come to believe the employee desires to provide them with a more comfortable and 
enjoyable experience than they could obtain elsewhere (Hochschild 2012). There is more 
to this than being able to chart a course through a collection of static obstacles. These 
obstacles will constantly change as a result of how the employee, their colleagues and the 
firm’s customers feel. Here customers can allow their feelings to inform the signals they 
send out while employees must strive to prevent this from happening. Hochschild (2012) 
has described this type of work as emotional labour. She provides evidence that 
successfully performing it requires more than a talent for acting. It demands workers 
continually rearrange their mental wiring to prevent their subconscious from informing 
how they react to the variety of social stimuli generated by the workplace. She argues 
using this ability incurs psychic costs, which can pose a threat to the worker's mental 
health. It is an argument whose potency is enhanced by evidence from the UK, which 
shows work-related mental health problems are in the increase (SCMH 2007; Davies 
2014) and that they are increasing fastest amongst occupants of service sector jobs that 
require dealing directly with the public (Johnson et al. 2005). With the Scottish economy 
becoming increasingly dependent on the service industry for jobs the indications are that 
employers, all things being equal, will become less likely to view the jobs they have on 
offer as being suitable for people who have a history of mental health problems.   
From what has been said up till now, it appears employers divide the workforce into 
insiders who will be considered for employment and outsiders who won't on the basis of 
work history, personal presentation, current employment status, skills levels, signals 
about flexibility, the potential for development and, as the economy becomes more 
service orientated, the capacity to manage conscious and subconscious responses to 
stimuli. Dividing the workforce into insiders and outsiders in this way indicates 
employers believe recruitment is a dangerous activity and that the price mechanism does 
not provide them with all the information they need to make a hiring decision. To 
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investigate this further the next section will look at the hazards that employers associate 
with searching for labour. 
7.4 The hazards involved in searching for a new employee.  
When it came down to it, every employer thought there was only one danger associated 
with recruitment: that the costs might outweigh the benefits. Every employer thought 
there were two types of cost associated with recruitment: those incurred in searching for 
labour and those linked to recruitment failure. Gavin talked about the first of these when 
he told me, 
“The business I am in here is very tight on costs ...it’s not as if we have 
£750K to play about with on recruitment, we don’t have that sort of 
slack.”  
No one thought the costs associated with the search for a new employee were likely to 
become hazardous because a business can impose preset limits on the amount of time and 
money spent on this endeavour. On the other hand, everyone thought controlling the costs 
associated with recruitment failure was problematic. David told me this is because once 
you’ve decided to hire someone,   
“You don’t know what you are going to get.” 
David then went on to show what this could mean:   
"We had an engineer who we only had for seven or eight weeks; he 
physically assaulted a customer."  
David's business involved installing and servicing equipment in people's homes and other 
businesses. Naturally, he was concerned about how his existing staff and customers 
would react to hearing about these events and what it would mean for his business' 
reputation. Deciding a recruitment decision was a failure because of a single incident was 
unusual. It was far more common for this conclusion to be reached over time as a result 
of several events, as Anna and Craig demonstrate here. Anna talked about a new member 
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staff performing their work in a way that clashed with her business’s established way of 
doing things:     
“We recruited somebody who was hugely gifted but who had an 
appetite for causing disturbances in an organisation. That's just what  
they do; they do that divide and conquer stuff. We're a young fast -
growing business. They obviously thought that if  they got in early, they 
had an opportunity to get to the top. Anyway, that aggressive and 
competitive behaviour doesn't fit in with how we do things here, and it 
came to a head, and they were invited to go.” 
Whereas Craig talked about hiring somebody that failed to give their job the priority the 
businesses management expected them to:   
“Within the first week he was calling in to say he would be late 
because of this, or he couldn’t do this shift because of that, at first we 
tried to accommodate him but after a few weeks nothing had changed, 
at times he even started trying to change things he had already 
changed and sometimes he just didn’ t turn up. It was a situation that 
was hugely disruptive.”   
Why an employer continues to employ someone after they have shown they are a 
problem is more than complying with the legal requirement to use due process before 
dismissing them. If a lathe fails to work according to the warranty provided on its 
purchase, the buyer can legally compel the supplier to provide another machine, demand 
the costs of its purchase be refunded or seek another form of compensation. If after the 
warranty expires, the lathe breaks down the purchaser can replace it with a new one 
without the threat of outside interference. Labour is different, the influences on an 
employer-employee relationship are complex. It is impossible for a written contract to 
capture and benchmark all the relevant factors that arise from these. As a result, the 
quality and quantity of labour provided as part of a contract for labour will be subject to 
continual negotiation and renegotiation (Ehrenberg and Smith 2012; Brown et al. 2011). 
Consequently, the quality and quantity of labour provided as part of a contract will 
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continuously vary during its lifetime. Therefore, employers must take the time to balance 
the problems that could be created by rejecting an existing supplier of labour against 
those involved in searching for and hiring a new provider. Because of this, hiring 
someone can create a bilateral monopoly situation, whose existence will vary in length. It 
is a situation that can be explained by utilising the arguments of Schein (1992; 1996; 
1999) about business culture or those of Williamson (1985; 1988) about transaction costs.      
It is at the end of this balancing act that due process enters the equation for the law sets 
out requirements an employer must satisfy when terminating an employer-employee 
relationship. Failing to comply with them carries the threat of having to absorb the costs 
associated with legal action. It would appear some employers, especially the smaller 
ones, are unaware of how to meet these requirements or how to avoid those costs. 
Richard shows this with the following story about the events that led him to an industrial 
tribunal, 
“I sacked someone for turning up drunk on a site, they were a danger 
to themselves and others, it turned out they were an alcoholic, I didn’t 
know this, but apparently you can’t sack alcoholics for being drunk at 
work. Anyway, that decision cost me a lot of money; it's an experience 
that makes me think twice about taking people on because at the back 
of my mind I'm thinking what might this cost me if it goes wrong. ”  
Richards's belief that you could not dismiss somebody whose health is causing them to 
misbehave at work was widespread amongst the smaller employers. Amongst those who 
voiced similar views were Billy, George, Michael and Thomas. It is a mistaken one: 
legally an employer can dismiss someone who is behaving incorrectly at work, but they 
cannot sack them on the spot. Due process must be used to establish whether dismissal is 
justified and whether the dismissal is for conduct or capability (East Lindsay District 
Council v Daubrey 1977 IRLR 181). The ACAS code of practice on disciplinary and 
grievance procedures (ACAS 2009) outlines how Richard should have behaved. He could 
have immediately sent his employee home while he investigated why events developed as 
they did. In this case, they were influenced by a medical condition so as part of the 
investigation Richard should have sought medical advice about whether the health of his 
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employees made them incapable of doing their jobs. Once the inquiry had been 
completed, Richard should have informed his employee of the results of the investigation, 
met with him to discuss them, gave the employee the right to be represented at the 
meeting, decided on a course of action and provide the employee with the opportunity to 
appeal against an adverse decision. Richard said he was unaware of this until after the 
tribunal hearing. It was evident from the way he described these events that he was 
annoyed by the way they played out. Clearly, there are costs associated with this process: 
the employer will have to divert resources away from production towards investigating 
what has happened, and while this is going on they may have to decide whether to 
operate while being short staffed or take on additional staff. These factors are likely to 
have a disproportionate impact on the ability of a small business to compete against their 
rivals, and they could give rise to a narrative of you can't sack people with disabilities, or 
it is too expensive to sack them, so it is better not to take them on. Every employer I 
spoke had or knew of experiences like Richard's, and it made them reluctant to take on 
staff when they had a background signalling the potential for future difficulties.    
The expense associated with searching for a new employee, judging whether the decision 
to recruit was correct and ensuring the process used to reach this judgment is 
appropriately aligned with legal duties are all what Williamson (1995; 2007) would 
describe as transaction costs: ones that must be incurred in order to compete in the 
market. The evidence indicates these costs are a significant influence on an employer’s 
decision to recruit. Frank talked to me about how the threat associated with these costs 
varied with the size of the firm:  
"In a larger company even when it goes terribly wrong, ok you're 
probably on three to six months probation, if  it's a complete disaster, 
and I've had a couple of those unfortunately, you lose them after three 
to six months and you move on; and you go through the process again. 
In a small or medium-sized company, if you make a mistake even at a 
middle level that can be a major blow for you, you don’t have six 
months.”  
When I asked Frank what he meant by major blow, he said: 
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“It could put you under.”  
Michael demonstrated that this was not hyperbole in a way that showed going under 
could be a personal as well as commercial experience:   
“There’s a guy I know, he used to own a business, I used to work for 
him before I went out on my own, he had this manager who was 
dipping the till, which was one of the things that sent his business tits 
up, I mean he lost everything, he started drinking his wife divorced 
him, he got kicked out of the house. This guy was minted, I mean kids 
at private school and everything, and he lost it all, now he’s going 
from pub to pub trying to cadge drinks.”  
The evidence suggests recruitment failure is a common problem and that employers fear 
the damage it can cause. The human resources literature offers corroboration for this. A 
survey by the CIPD in 2009 found the average cost of recruiting a new employee to be 
around £6,000; while a study by Oxford Economics in 2014 estimated the average cost of 
staff turnover to be close to £30,000
44
. In some industries in the UK, mainly low paid 
private sector ones  such as retailing, hotels, catering, leisure and call centres, which are 
the ones that the UK government expects to absorb people with a history of mental illness 
that are moving off disability benefits, recruitment failure runs at between 30 and 40% 
(CIPD 2009). For a small business, the effects of these costs can be considerable, which 
gives rise to the possibility that the courts may view it as unreasonable to also ask them to 
absorb the costs of making adjustments to the workplace to accommodate disabled 
people. Given these businesses account for 48% of private sector employment in the UK 
(FSB 2014) the possibility emerges that a significant proportion of the trade in labour will 
be conducted beyond the reach of the Equality Act 2010.       
There is no doubt appointment failure is undesirable, and it is easy to understand why 
small businesses might see it as being potentially disastrous: over 60% of the owners of 
small businesses are self-employed, and some of them risk losing everything they have if 
                                                             
44
 These costs are not just related to searching for labour or recruitment failure they also include those associated with 
the normal process of staff churn and the enhanced overtime payments to existing staff that arise from working short 
staffed.     
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their business fails. It was not immediately clear why employers working for larger firms 
felt recruitment failure could be disastrous. Obviously, failed appointments at the most 
senior levels could be catastrophic, but it was harder to see how this would be the case for 
the junior posts, which are the ones most people moving off disability benefits would be 
eligible for. Frank clarified this when he told me:      
“You only recruit for direct reports.”   
In the private sectors, many employers are also employees who are responsible to more 
senior managers in the business. Frank said that in such circumstances when recruiting 
staff,    
“You are analysing your own risk.”  
Even in relatively small businesses, the authority to recruit is delegated downwards 
sometimes to quite a low level (Mintzberg 1990). As an employee, they are responsible to 
other employees higher up the chain of command for the outcomes of their decisions. 
These inform judgements about competence and ability that can threaten their existing 
employment status and prospects for promotion (Handy 1993). It appears that for the 
most part, the threat posed to a business and its owners by failed recruitment decisions is 
inversely proportional to the size of the business; however the evidence from the 
employers I spoke to who made hiring decisions indicates they feel the threat posed to 
them by getting a recruitment decision wrong is relatively constant. 
Given the frequency of recruitment failure and its potential to cause calamity, it is 
reasonable to ask why it happens and why are employers unable to prevent it from 
happening. Glen captures the consensus about why it happens:  
“Fit with the culture is quite important. Really that is why most people 
fail in organisations.”  
Studies conducted by Meglino et al. (1989) and Sheridan (1992) support Glen’s position. 
They identified clashes of values between employers and employees as the greatest 
influence on staff turnover. Presumably, the people hired by Anna, Craig, David and 
Richard performed well on whatever screening tests they used. However, their failure to 
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identify a suitable recruit does not mean their approach to recruitment was substandard. 
Cultural fit is a difficult concept to define or identify at an interview (McDonald and 
Ganz 2006). It indicates an important arbiter of an appointment’s success is the ability of 
employers to determine the parameters that contribute to cultural fit and then define and 
measure them. Accepting this as an explanation for recruitment failure raises questions 
about the role played by risk and uncertainty in the recruitment process.   
7.5 The role of risk and uncertainty in the recruitment process: why employers 
think hiring staff is always hazardous. 
The employers I spoke to said that any investment in labour has to be justifiable. They 
have also all admitted to making recruitment decisions that failed. If one assumes these 
people are not reckless or negligent, a reasonable assumption given the success and 
longevity of the businesses they own or work in, their experience implies there is no 
guarantee about the outcome of recruitment decision. It points to hiring decisions being 
something of a gamble. Inherent in gambling are questions regarding risk and 
uncertainty. Evidence showing employers use the past to predict the future points to a 
process of risk management being undertaken: by looking at the rhythms and patterns of 
their environment they can make rational decisions about the future. However, the costs 
associated with recruitment failure and the inability of employers to prevent it points to 
uncertainty also playing a role. Every employer who spoke to me thought this was the 
case as Gavin shows here:  
"You could take someone on with the greatest CV in the world, but 
when he is actually doing the job, he could be a disaster."  
For the most part, employers often used the words risk and uncertainty interchangeably 
but as the conversations went on it became apparent that the majority of them 
differentiated between these two concepts as Frank shows here:   
“In the larger organisations you’ve got the resources to employ good 
agencies, good headhunters, to go through a very structured and 
expensive process in terms of finding a candidate…..the smalle r the 
organisation, the more recruitment becomes about managing 
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uncertainty; not managing risk, because you don't know what the 
probabilities are .”  
Risk and uncertainty are two topics absent from the literature on mental health and 
employment. An explanation for this is that risk and uncertainty are related to 
strangeness; unpredictability; deviance and danger (Taleb 2010). These characteristics are 
commonly associated with mental illness (Aneshensel et al. 2013; Bentall 2003; Foucault 
2006; Rogers and Pilgrim 2010; Szass 1987). Because it is employers that are indicating 
that trading for labour in the market involves risk and uncertainty their absence from the 
literature on mental health and employment is something that needs addressed.  
It will be recalled the concepts of risk and uncertainty first came up in ‘Chapter Three’ 
when different understandings of economic activity were discussed. On one side were the 
neoclassicists who took the reductionist position that systems are the sum of their parts 
and when they are allowed to function normally there will be no such thing as uncertainty 
only risk (Savage 1972). Here the results of human decisions as presented as being the 
product of a closed system, which complexity theorists would identify as complicated 
(Reitsma 2003). On the other side were the old institutional economics, the new 
institutional economics, stratification economics and the new economic sociology. With 
the exception of the new institutional economics, who argue the world is uncertain 
because of asset specificity, bounded rationality and opportunism (Williamson 1975; 
1985) they were all open to the argument the world is uncertain because reality is a 
dynamic system where outcomes cannot always be reduced to their component parts 
(Hodgson 1998; Rutherford 2001; Darity 2009b and Granovetter 1985; 1995a). From the 
perspective of the old institutional economics, stratification economics and the new 
economic sociology human decisions are part of what Manson (2001) calls an open 
complex system. Complicated systems are qualitatively different from complex ones 
(Reitsma 2003). Ultimately, every part of a complicated system and how they interact 
with each will be knowable as will the odds of every potential outcome they can produce. 
Complex systems are open and dynamic. Their components can vary over time as can the 
results they produce. Consequently, every outcome and the odds of it occurring are not 
knowable with any certainty. 
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The literature on risk and uncertainty frequently uses the metaphor of a game to explain 
how someone tries to achieve a particular outcome from given circumstances. For an 
employer, the aim of the game is to secure the services of an employee who can fulfil 
their need for labour at an acceptable cost. There are two approaches in the literature to 
risk and uncertainty. On the one hand, there is the approach taken by Savage (1972). He 
presents decisions about the future as being confined to a set of events that are believed to 
be possible, where the probability they will occur will inform their price. Here, reality is 
qualitatively but not quantitatively similar to a die: it is a complicated closed system, 
where all outcomes and their associated probabilities are subjective and known. In 
Savage's approach, there is no uncertainty only risk. The use of Bayesian probability by 
neoclassicists and bounded rationality by the new institutional economics are attempts to 
present the market as such a system. The former approach theorises uncertainty out of 
existence by presuming people make decisions based on what they believe rather than 
objective reality. The latter argues that although cognitive limitations and asymmetric 
distributions of information create uncertainties, people strive to act rationally when it 
comes to economic decisions.  On the other hand, there is the tack taken by Knight 
(1921). Here, reality is an open complex and objective system where risk and uncertainty 
are different but related phenomena. As before risk is calculated by reference to 
probabilities that are constructed out of past events. But, because the system is open these 
probabilities are historical: a statistical representation of the past. Using them is 
problematic because some events cannot be predicted by reference to anything (Taleb 
2010). It can be implied from Knight's arguments about risk and uncertainty that systems 
which appear subjective, complicated and closed will occasionally produce unexpected 
results not just because of imperfect knowledge but also because of evolution. It is a view 
of the world that resonates with the approach to economic analysis of the old institutional 
economics, stratification economics and the new economic sociology.  Now that we have 
discussed the nature of and relationship between risk and uncertainty we can now move 
on to look at the roles employers believe that they play in the recruitment process. 
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7.6 The role of subjective risk in an employer’s search for a new employee. 
In Savage’s (1972) model of subjective risk a decision maker can be assumed to see the 
world as a set S of every possible state; a set C every possible consequence of every 
possible course of action and a set F consisting of these actions. The relationship between 
the sets in the decision-making process is that a decision maker can map from the set of 
events S to the set of consequences C via the set of actions F. After an action has been 
taken its consequence becomes a state and part of set S. The likelihood a decision maker 
will take a particular course of action will be established by ranking the set of 
consequences in the order of the product of the satisfaction and subjective probability 
they associate with an event. Here, the former is a matter of individual taste while the 
latter a question of personal belief. The values allocated to taste and belief will be 
decided on by reference to past patterns of personal choice. From this perspective, the 
probability that a course of action will be taken can now be understood as something that 
is rational, subjective and calculable.  
 
Presenting risk as state-independent theorises uncertainty out of existence: no matter 
what state the decision maker resides in, they will believe it is possible to achieve an 
outcome that is a member of the set C of possible outcomes. By quantifying beliefs about 
the occurrence of an event and the desire for that event and presenting someone’s 
decisions as being the products of those beliefs and tastes, this model of decision making 
offers an explanation for why individuals with the same information make different 
decisions, why people require different amounts of information to make a decision and 
why they often make decisions when they don’t have to. As long as a decision maker 
perceives an event as a possibility no matter how remote, they will gamble on an event 
taking place if they believe the utility produced by doing so is sufficiently high 
(Plumpton Ramsey 1925; de Finetti 1937 cited in Taleb 2010).   
 
Karni (2005) has criticised the idea of state independence. He points out it fails to make a 
distinction between an event the decision maker deems to be impossible and one that they 
don’t care about. To illustrate his point he provides an example of a person taking a flight 
who is indifferent to the consequences of his death, even if the plane is poorly maintained 
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and likely to crash the value allocated to the likelihood of such an event will be zero. In 
the same paper, Karni also uses disability to critique state independence in a way that 
recalls Scambler’s (2009) insight that medical labels indicate a real difference. He does 
this in two ways: by pointing out that different impairments will influence a disabled 
person’s attitude to risk. For example, hearing voices could result in someone listening to 
music even though they would prefer to go for a walk, while someone with a hearing 
impairment might prefer to listen to music but because they can't, they go for a walk. In 
the light of an economy that is moving from manufacturing to services and from 
demanding physical labour to emotional labour this is an important point to make for it 
indicates the symptoms of some mental illnesses will influence the ability of people to 
engage with the labour market independent of the possession of appropriate work-related 
attitudes and abilities.   
 
Despite these criticisms of subjective risk and state independence, every employer I 
spoke to provided evidence Savage’s position on risk and uncertainty resonates with their 
own, at least in part, as Julian demonstrates here:      
“If it’s a technical job something I can put boundaries around, then 
you know the skills sets you’re looking for.”  
This opinion was echoed by Glen, who said: 
“You’re unlikely to get the technical skills and attributes side of things 
wrong.”  
The employers I spoke to all appeared to believe identifying technical competence is a 
question of subjective risk. They felt they had the experience to test the claims of job 
seekers about their expertise. None of them thought this meant they were guaranteed to 
be able to recruit the most technically skilled candidate but they did believe they were 
sure to identify someone who was competent. A way of looking at this is that an 
employer who wants to recruit someone who is competent to do a particular job is in state 
S. Experience will enable them to identify and test for the necessary skills. Experience 
will also allow them to rank each mix of skills by desirability and to estimate the 
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probability they will be able to hire people with given combinations of skills at particular 
prices. The potential outcomes can be understood as the set of consequences C. The 
employer will also use their experience to select from set F, a course of action such as 
drawing up a job description and a rewards structure that will map them from set S to set 
C in a way that will maximise their satisfaction.   
Where the employers I spoke to departed from Savage’s worldview can be seen by 
reflecting on the following comments from Andy and Richard. Andy said 
"I want my staff to want to socialise with each other to enjoy each 
other company I think if they do this it raises morale, and it helps the 
business." 
 While Richard told me:  
 “I want people to be happy when they come to work: I want people to 
want to be here.”  
Once again, the social aspect of work raises its head. Neoclassicism and the new 
institutionalism both presume employees prefer the utility of leisure to the disutility of 
work (Ehrenberg and Smith 2012; McMaster and White 2013). Every employer I spoke 
to indicated they wanted their employees to see work as having an intrinsic value. 
Wanting workers to be happy is not necessarily a demonstration of altruism for it is a 
widely believed that happiness and productivity are interlinked (Cropanzano and Wright 
2001). As such, Andy and Richard’s attitude can be interpreted as evidence they are 
keeping an eye on the bottom line. This finding reinforces one made earlier in the 
discussion, which was that no employer thought a search for a new employee was a 
merely a question of making a series of discrete recruitment decisions based on which job 
applicant offered the greatest individual ratio of profit to cost. They all thought a new 
employer had to be a social fit with their current employees and increasingly with 
customers. Karl spoke for his peers when he told me what he thought the consequences 
might be of getting that fit wrong:    
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“It could destroy the makeup and camaraderie of that team. That could 
impact on the whole performance not only of the new employee but 
also of other employees.”  
Everyone thought a job could be broken down into the sum of its parts. No one thought 
the same of workplace teams. It appeared they believed a team was what Manson (2001) 
and Reitsma (2003) would call an open complex system: something that could transform 
a collection of people into something distinct from its constituent parts. This 
characteristic led them to conclude that if a new recruit was not to harm a businesses 
ability to compete successfully, they had to be compatible with its existing social 
structure. Earlier, when discussing employers opinions about identifying someone with 
appropriate work-related skills their views seemed to echo the views of the neoclassicists 
and the new institutionalists. Now, it appears that with respect to cultural fit their 
opinions resonate more with the work the the old institutional economists such as Veblen 
(1899) and Commons (1931); Stratification economists such as Darity (2005; 2009a); and 
new economic sociologists such as Zelizer (2007) and Granovetter (1985; 1995a) on the 
symbiotic relationship between intimacy, social structures, group identities and economic 
decisions.   
7.7 The role of statistical risk in an employer's search for a new employee. 
In the previous chapter, Michael said he had employed his son; Gus indicated he had 
hired a friend of the family and Gavin told me he had taken on a friend of one of his 
employees as the result of a personal recommendation. Evidence employing someone on 
the basis of biological or social connections is not behaviour limited to acquaintances that 
have a history of mental illness is provided by Karl. He told me that to get people who 
would be a good fit with his existing workforce team he wanted,     
“People that are similar to those I’ve already got. ” 
From what has been said so far it appears that employers identify such people by using a 
two-part process. First, they bound the pool of labour that will be considered for 
employment on the basis of a prior judgement (Bryman 2008). Then they finesse the 
search by using the information they have about potential sources of labour to identify the 
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extent of any overlap with the existing workforce. In effect, they are selecting a sample P 
from a population R that display similar characteristics to their current workforce Q on 
the basis that refining the sampling process by choosing a person S from sample P will be 
more likely to identify someone who will fit in with the people from group Q. It is a 
process that can be described as the drawing up relative frequency tables for the 
workforce, and the job candidates, which can be used to create what statisticians call 
probability density functions (Chatfield 1983; Ehrenberg 2007). The greater the overlap 
between these probability density functions the more likely a job candidate will be a fit 
with an existing workforce team. However, the predictive power of these functions will 
always be subject to a degree of uncertainty because they depend on information whose 
volume and accuracy can always be increased or improved. It is an approach that sits 
comfortably with the ideas of Williamson (1975; 1985; 2000) about transaction costs; 
Darity (2005; 2009a); about cooperation within groups and competition between groups; 
Granovetter (1985; 1995a) about the embeddedness of economic activity in social 
networks and Zelizer (2007) regarding the role of intimacy in commercial actions. 
Arguing employers use statistical methods to measure social fit is open to the charge of 
mathematical overreach for, as was noted earlier, the parameters involved are difficult 
and possibly even impossible to identify, define or measure with any real rigour. 
However, this is drawing too strong a distinction between the mathematical and the 
social. Habits are rooted in observations made over time that doing X will result in Y. It 
follows that at one time a calculation about an outcome has proven accurate and that this 
accuracy has repeatedly held good over the passage of time, even if the parameters that 
produced that outcome have not been clearly identified or defined. In other words, 
employers know from experience some courses of action are more likely to produce 
desirable outcomes even if they don’t know why.      
7.8 Conclusion. 
The evidence shows employers tend to look for new employees when an old employee 
moves on, or there is an opportunity to grow the business. It indicates their beliefs about 
the demand for labour are aligned with neoclassical theory in as much as their demand 
for labour is created by a situation where existing suppliers of labour cannot satisfy the 
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demand for a business' goods and services. In layman's language, an employer will hire 
someone when they think there is a profit to be made by doing so. However, this 
alignment is only partial because they also believe that the quality and quantity of the 
labour is to some extent dependent on the well-being of the supplier.   
When an employer looks for labour, they want people who can demonstrate five things: 
up to date job skills, predictability, flexibility, the potential for future development and 
the ability to fit in with existing workforce teams. To identify someone with these 
attributes: they use evidence about a job candidate’s past to reach a judgement about 
future outcomes. This use of history indicates people with a history of mental illness, who 
are moving off disability benefits, will struggle to find work because their conditions 
make it more difficult for them to signal possession of attributes employers find desirable 
in job seekers. The indications are this struggle will become more challenging as the 
Scottish economy moves away from manufacturing towards services because it means 
customers will increasingly become the leaders of workforce teams. As a result of this 
development, job seekers will increasingly have to demonstrate an ability to induce in 
customers feelings of importance and well-being. Something that demands the ability to 
continuously rearrange their internal psychological wiring (Hochschild 2012), which the 
evidence indicates is behaviour that will threaten workers mental well-being (Johnson et 
al. 2005). In such circumstances, it is likely that employers will become more cautious 
than they are now about employing jobless people who have been disabled by mental 
illness.      
The use of the past to predict the future indicates employers regard recruitment as a 
hazardous activity with an uncertain outcome, which means they do not believe the price 
mechanism generates enough information to protect them from harm. The potential for 
harm lies in the possibility the costs involved in hiring labour will outweigh the profits it 
makes. Employers appear to believe recruitment costs have two sources, those relating to 
searching for labour and those associated with getting a hiring decision wrong. They do 
not seem overly worried about managing search costs because they can pre-set the 
budget, but they are concerned about the costs associated with recruitment failure. The 
root of this concern is their belief recruitment involves risks and uncertainties. They look 
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upon identifying someone with the skills to do the job needing to be done as a matter of 
subjective risk because they believe their knowledge can guarantee they will find an 
appropriately skilled person if not the most skilled person. But, they look upon finding 
someone who is a fit with the existing workforce team as a matter of uncertainty because 
they cannot determine the success of a recruitment decision until sometime after the 
appointment has been made. Consequently, they look for suppliers of labour from a 
similar social background to those working for them in similar posts.   
The evidence shows employers working for businesses of all sizes believe the outcomes 
of recruitment decisions are uncertain and potentially harmful to them and because of this 
they prefer to target sources of labour whenever they can. It suggests their behaviour 
when they hired people with a history of mental illness is evidence of how they normally 
go about identifying new members of staff. Clearly, the view of the labour market held 
by employers and their practice when they engage with it are different from the 
assumptions of policymakers. The next chapter will discuss this practice in more depth 
and how it has been influenced by the UK government's welfare to work policies.   
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Chapter Eight:  
Employers’ recruitment practices and the influence of the UK government's welfare 
to work policies. 
8.1 Introduction. 
Here the sociological and economic literature will be used to explore the evidence from 
employers about how they address the potential for harm they believe is inherent in 
making recruitment decisions and how this has been impacted by the UK government’s 
welfare to work policies. It opens by investigating the sources of information used by 
employers to make recruitment decisions: how they rank them, why they rank them in the 
way they do and the circumstances that govern their use. From here, it will move on to 
examine the degree of overlap between employers actual use of HR professionals and the 
assumptions of policymakers. After this, it will look at how the Equality Act 2010; 'See 
Me' anti-stigma campaign and the ‘Work Programme’, ‘Work Choice’ and ‘Access to 
Work’ vocational support initiatives have influenced their hiring decisions. In the course 
of doing this, it will draw on agency theory and research into the contracting out of 
welfare to work services in other countries to discuss the attitudes of employers to the 
businesses with ‘Work Programme’ contracts. Then, it will come to a close by reflecting 
on what we have learnt about the engagement of employers with the UK government's 
welfare to work policies.  
8.2 How employers search for labour.  
The discussions with employers revealed they identify recruits in four ways. They use 
information provided by personal experience; the experiences of people they trust; 
recruitment agencies in return for a fee and market competition between jobseekers 
generated by an advertisement. This section will discuss what employers thought about 
the effectiveness of each of these approaches and what tells us about how they search for 
labour. 
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8.2.1 The use of Personal experience by employers as a recruitment tool.  
An indication of how employers working in smaller and medium-sized businesses look 
upon knowledge gained by personal experience is provided by Robert and Frank. Robert, 
who runs an electrical contracting company, told me: 
“I only employ people I have a history with.”  
Frank, whose experience ranges from starting and supporting small businesses in various 
parts of the country to working as a director in a multinational company described how 
he recently went about hiring a new member of staff for a medium-sized training firm he 
is involved with:      
“How I recruited him was, I basically acted like a stalker. I didn't do 
anything other than obtained the telephone number of our biggest 
rival, and I tapped him up, and I met him three times and offered him 
the job. He had absolute direct experience; I didn't want to even see 
two or three candidates, I wanted him.”  
Behaviour such as this, suggests employers working for smaller businesses believe 
knowledge gained independently of a vacancy as a result of personal experience is the 
gold standard. A contrary position has been taken by Cassell et al. (2002) who argues 
such behaviour is the result of resource poverty. If this is the case, it would suggest 
employers working for larger companies would think and act differently. Brendan, who is 
a board member of a large media company with international interests, captured the 
views of people like Julian and Ross who had worked in senior positions in large private 
sector organisations when he told me:  
 
 
“If there are promoted positions well I think it’s only fair and 
reasonable that you first invite applications from your existing staff.”  
It would appear the directing minds of larger companies, who do not have to worry too 
much about resource poverty, think along similar lines to their counterparts in smaller 
ones. Understanding why requires some reflection on a significant benefit provided by 
the internal management structures of large businesses. They generate vast amounts of 
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information in digestible chunks over time (Handy 1993). If employers use it to fill a 
vacancy rather than signal a job opportunity to the market, they can save time and money, 
improve morale, maintain stability, retain staff and facilitate succession planning (Handy 
1993). This evidence could be interpreted as evidence supporting the argument 
Williamson (1985) makes about members of primitive teams being recruited from the 
market and members of relational teams being offered security training and promotion 
paths in order to reduce transaction costs. Contrary to Williamson’s position, it is 
reasonable to argue employers working in large businesses might want to hold on to as 
many of the benefits of recruiting from within when looking outside of the firm to fill a 
vacancy and that this might, at least initially, lead them to confine their search to people 
they know about. Evidence from Craig supports this line of thought. Here, he talks about 
his move from a management post in one business to a more senior one in another:    
"It was all done on the back of a fag packet. We knew of each other; 
they approached me, we talked a bit; there wasn't even an interview as 
such. It was all done on the back of a stamp.”     
Robert, Frank and Craig are employers working in small medium and large private sector 
companies operating in different business sectors. Their evidence indicates that 
irrespective of the size or type of firm, employers prefer to use personal knowledge to 
target sources of labour inside and outside of their business. The indications are many 
employers will have made up their minds about who is suitable for employment 
independent of the creation of a vacancy, which is something that resonates with the 
thinking of Zelizer (2007) about the role of intimacy; Darity (2005, 2009a) on group 
identities and Granovetter (1985; 1995a) on social networks in determining 
employability. Robert was the only employer I spoke to who indicated he would end his 
search for a new worker if he could not recruit someone he knew personally. The rest felt 
that this position was too restrictive, which brings us to their use of the experiences of 
people they trust as a recruitment tool, in other words, word of mouth. 
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8.2.2 The use by employers of the experience of people they trust as a recruitment 
tool. 
Richard captured the views of the remaining small and medium-sized employer when he 
told me: 
“It’s nice if somebody is recommended to you .”  
Here, Ross captures the opinion of employers working for larger firms when he said 
someone's likelihood of being employed increases when there is, 
“Some connection somewhere along the line that gets that person in 
front of you.”  
The consensus amongst employers of every size is that after knowledge gained from 
personal experience, information from a trusted source is the most reliable data to use in 
recruitment decisions. Gerry, the deputy chief executive of a prominent business 
lobbying firm, showed that the root of this reasoning was a desire for security when he 
told me,      
“It’s a great safety net to know that somebody you value has 
recommended somebody, there is a great deal of peer pressure 
involved, I am not going to recommend somebody I have doubts about 
to a person whose friendship I value or whose custom is important to 
me.”  
Why employers think word of mouth is the most reliable source of information after 
personal knowledge becomes apparent by returning to the discussion in ‘Chapter Seven’ 
on groups. There it was shown that groups facilitate the distribution of information about 
member’s technical and social skills over an extended period, in digestible chunks, whose 
accuracy is guaranteed by feelings of mutual obligation and the threat of punishment 
(Handy 1993). In this light, their use of word of mouth reinforces the idea decisions about 
employability often being made independent of the existence of any vacancy.  But what 
about those occasions when this is not the case? To start and look at this the discussion 
will move on to look at recruitment agencies. 
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8.2.3 Employers use of recruitment agencies as a recruitment tool.  
The following exchange with Julian, who has been a director of large manufacturing 
firms and is now actively involved in running several small ones, shows when employers 
use recruitment agencies:       
Julian:  
"If you are looking for a very senior person for a very large company, 
like a multi-national, you would use agencies because you always want 
to cast your net outside your network. In small companies, you tend to 
cast your net within your network."  
BMcN:  
“Say we’re talking about more junior posts what about them?”  
Julian:  
“Well, again it depends on, I would look first of all at my network of 
people that I know, and I would only really go to an agency if we drew 
a blank. It's strange, but as you go further  in your career, you tend to 
know most people. I think for medium-sized companies where you have 
a level of staff turnover, so say you're getting into the region of 50 to 
150 people, there is going to be natural attrition. Even if you're 
talking about two or five percent annually you're going to be talking 
about recruiting up to seven people a year, when you are recruiting at 
that level I think then your into agencies because it's more effective, 
when you’re with a small company which is where my focus is a t the 
moment you basically go to the people you know.”    
Julian's testimony echoes research by Houseman (2001; 2003), which found employers 
use agencies when their demand for labour can only be satisfied by recruiting someone 
with highly specialised and difficult to find skills or when they require a relatively large 
number of employees over or for a short period. These agencies are HR specialists who 
offer their services to multiple employers on a contractual basis. There are two economic 
 Page 184 of 292 
 
perspectives on recruitment agencies: they facilitate the creation of a competitive market, 
or they emerge to reduce the transactional costs involved in competing for labour in a 
variety of markets (Autor 2008). Julian's eschewing of open competition in favour of 
using personal networks before moving on to recruitment agencies when looking for staff 
indicates he starts this search by binding his pool of candidates as tightly as possible and 
then loosening these binds only if he has to. This sequential segmenting of the labour 
market, suggests the thinking behind his use of recruitment agencies is more in line with 
new institutionalist thinking about transactional costs than it is with neoclassical ideas 
about facilitating competition.    
In ‘Chapter Six’, Julian was identified as one of only two employers to have knowingly 
employed someone with a history of mental illness in the absence of a prior relationship 
with them. He did this as a result of the recommendation of a recruitment agency. It will 
be remembered the recruit's skill set was greater than was required for the post, he had a 
good work record, and that the agency apparently did not refer to his mental health 
problems for Julian only began to suspect this might be the case at the interview. It will 
also be recalled that this prompted Julian to depart from normal custom and practice and 
demand this recruit submit himself to a medical examination. Two things emerge from 
this: information from a recruitment agency can go part of the way to contextualise a 
history of mental illness and job candidates with this background will have to submit to 
greater scrutiny than their peers if they are to gain employment.   
Here, Glen, who owns several recruitment agencies, states why the employers I spoke to 
tended to prefer using agencies rather advertising when looking for recruits: Glen, who 
owns several recruitment firms, he told me: 
“An agency that provides businesses a poor service won’t be in 
business for very long .” 
Recruitment agencies are organisations that make money by reducing the potential threat 
posed to an employer from hiring new staff. They do this by turning personal knowledge 
and word of mouth into a commodity, which they can only do by showing employers 
they can reliably supply people who can provide the nature, quality and quantity of 
 Page 185 of 292 
 
labour required, as and when demanded (Houseman 2001; 2003). Using them is 
consistent with the idea employers protect themselves by targeting suppliers of labour 
using information from sources who have an incentive to prevent them coming to harm.      
When commercial recruitment agencies believe recommending someone for employment 
might backfire on them, they will not do so. However, the evidence here suggests it 
cannot be presumed this means they will never recommend people with a history of 
mental illness for work. Research from New Zealand supports this for it shows they will 
propose job candidates with this background for vacancies when they have the skills to 
do the job (Biggs et al. 2010). Together they indicate it would be worthwhile researching 
whether jobs agencies in the UK are willing to do likewise and under what 
circumstances.  It is now time to move on to examine what employers regard as the least 
reliable source of information about job candidates: signalling a vacancy to the open 
market.       
8.2.4 Employers use of advertising as a recruitment tool. 
 A flavour of what most of the research participants thought about this is captured by 
Gus, who told me: 
“I never advertise jobs.”  
Most of them did not go as far as this, but they were all sceptical about the benefits of 
advertising a vacancy. Why this is the case is shown by Michael, he told me that 
advertising an apprentice hairdressing job resulted in him obtaining 42 applicants. He 
said that he decided to send out interview letters to every applicant. What happened as a 
result of doing this is demonstrated in the following exchange: 
Michael:  
“50% of them turned up, and 50% of the ones that turned up turned up 
late.” 
 
 
 Page 186 of 292 
 
BMcN:  
“What about the quarter that turned up on time how did they present 
themselves?”  
Michael:  
“We get people who are really well turned out to the one who is 
texting while I’m interviewing her.”  
BMcN:  
“Texting?”  
Michael:  
"Texting, I don't know who she was texting, maybe she was phoning a 
friend for the answers to my questions, they don't turn up on time, 
they're not prepped properly. Right, you come for a hairdressing job, 
and you’re not presentable, I  mean what does that tell you?”  
He then went on to say:  
“We got three to come back and do trials: three out of the ten, of the 
other seven, the fact that they turned up on time, and they were semi-
presentable got them a chance. The three that we gave a trial to were 
actually very, very good. However, I got my fingers burnt with the one 
I took on because she was telling me a pack of lies. ” 
Michael's evidence was about an entry-level vacancy, which is the kind that will be 
available to most people that have been disabled by mental illness who will be moving 
off incapacity benefits. He was not alone in having this type of experience. Andy also 
talked about people not turning up for interviews and texting during them; Anna, 
Brendan, David and Gavin talked about people lying in their applications; Ross recalled 
being confronted by interviewees that looked like they hadn’t washed; Craig, 
remembered someone telling him during an interview that they could not work weekends 
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because they went to the football and Clare spoke about a person who came in chewing 
gum, curtly rejected an invitation to take their coat off and responded to questions about 
their background in a hostile and rude manner. It can be argued such behaviour shows 
unemployed people are jobless because they don’t want to work. This will be the case in 
some instances, but assuming it is the case in every instance fails to take account of 
evidence from this study showing jobless people want work so badly they will lie to get it 
and from the literature indicating this desire for work is shared by people with a history 
of mental illness who are in receipt of disability benefits (Boardman 2003; Boardman et 
al. 2003; Bond 2004; Dunn Grasso and Saunders 2014; Rinaldi et al. 2008).  
Reconciling inappropriate behaviour at interviews with a desire to work can be done by 
reflecting on evidence showing the DWP threatens unemployed people with the 
suspension of their benefits if they don’t apply for as many jobs as possible (Benefits and 
Work 2013; The Independent 2015). Such threats suggest many jobless people will try to 
protect themselves from sanction by applying for unsuitable jobs. It is reasonable to 
believe that when some of them get an interview, their frustration at losing control of 
their lives will, from time to time, manifest itself as inappropriate behaviour. On such 
occasions, it is understandable many employers will conclude their time and money is 
being wasted by disrespectful people and that this will generate hostility towards the 
jobless. If one presumes jobless people are aware of this hostility, then it becomes 
predictable they will lie about their past when they apply for a job they actually want. It 
follows that when these untruths are uncovered by employers, it will also generate 
hostility towards them. If one accepts this attempt to reconcile the aforementioned 
contradictory evidence, it suggests the DWP is behaving in a way that will increasingly 
undermine the efficacy of the UK government’s welfare to work policies.  
Evidence employers find it difficult to control the number and quality of applications 
they receive when they decide to fill a job vacancy through competition does not 
necessarily sit uneasily with the neoclassical theory upon which the UK's welfare to work 
policies are based. It is reasonable to presume that the inappropriate presentations by 
interviewees described by employers could be caused by supply-side factors such as a 
lack of presentation skills; a lack of familiarity with the demands of the workplace or the 
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malign effects of the influence of non-market institutions like the DWP. However, it is 
harder to make this case about misleading an employer to get a job. Neoclassicists argue 
competitive markets guarantee honesty: dishonesty will result in the loss of the job and 
make the liar less attractive to other employers in the future (Ehrenberg and Smith 2012; 
Mandel 2012; Dutt and Wilbur; 2010). But, research shows job seekers will be dishonest 
when employers use competition to fill a vacancy because they think the benefits of 
doing so outweigh any potential repercussions (Weiss and Feldman 2006). The scale of 
the dishonesty in the UK labour market can be gauged by a survey of 2000 job applicants 
by CV Library (2014), which found 75% thought it was the employer's responsibility to 
uncover lies rather than their duty to be honest, while 54% thought high levels of 
competition meant job seekers had to lie to get a job. The threats to an employer inherent 
in such a situation helps explain why most of the employers I spoke to agreed with Gavin 
when he said,    
 “Advertising a job would be a last resort.”  
Nevertheless, a small minority of employers were less hostile than their peers to 
advertising. Amongst this group was Gerry, who told me,  
“The formal process (to recruitment) has worked both ways for us, we’ve 
unearthed a couple of really, really good individuals and we’ve been 
less successful in one or two roles as well. It’s all bit hit and miss.”        
Both groups felt using open competition to fill a post is problematic. The majority 
thought this justified eschewing its use. A minority accepted behaving in this manner 
offered some protection against hiring poor quality sources of labour while pointing out 
that it also obstructed access to high-quality ones. It appears this insight led some of this 
latter group to take a bet on the market even though they were unsure about the odds it 
was offering.   
The evidence so far suggests it would be useful to know the percentage of vacancies that 
are made available to the general public. No UK studies appear to have investigated this 
although there is work from the US that suggests the figure there is as low as 20% 
(Hansen 2013). UK Investigations into related areas indicate the number here may be 
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higher but that it is still relatively small. Work by the FSB (2009) found only 20% of 
small businesses use Job Centre Plus to advertise posts while work by (Machin 2002) 
revealed that just 44% of vacancies are notified to the job centre. To advertise vacancies 
in this way is free. Given this, there is a strong possibility the percentage of unfilled posts 
that employers pay to advertise will be lower than this figure. Evidently, there is a need 
for UK research into the nature and proportion of jobs employers fill through open 
competition if we are to gain an accurate picture of the employment opportunities that are 
available to jobless people who have been disabled by mental illness.  
8.2.5 Conclusions about how employers search for new employees. 
The evidence here indicates employers rank sources of information about labour in a 
hierarchy of desirability based on the reliability of the information they generate and the 
costs of getting access to it. In descending order, this ranking runs as follows: personal 
experience; the experience of people they trust; recruitment agencies, which is the 
experience of people whose trust can be bought and finally open competition where the 
reliability and cost of the information on offer can only be determined after someone has 
been selected for employment. The evidence from ‘Chapter Seven’ indicates the 
recruitment decisions of employers are an attempt to balance the desire for profit with the 
fear of loss. It suggests that employers will descend this hierarchy until a new source of 
labour has been secured, or they get to the point fear of loss outweighs the desire for 
profit. In its early stages, this approach resonates most strongly with the thinking of 
Zelizer on intimacy and economic activity (2007); Darity (2005; 2009a) on group 
identities and Granovetter (1985; 1995a) on the embeddedness of commerce in social 
networks. When the imperative is to continue searching for labour, their approach 
becomes increasingly aligned with the thinking of the new institutionalist economists 
such as Williamson (2007; 1975) because they now engage with recruitment agencies, 
which they appear to view as businesses that can reduce the transaction costs involved in 
finding suitable staff. When this approach fails, and they still want to hire someone, the 
point is reached where the overlap between reality and neoclassical theory is it at its 
strongest. For now, they invite suppliers of labour to compete for the vacancy by 
signalling its availability to the market. As a description of how employers respond to the 
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challenges involved in searching for workers, this descent down a hierarchy of reliability 
is congruent with the evidence from ‘Chapter Six’ about the use by employers of social 
networks when they hired people with a history of mental illness. It also offers an 
explanation for why so few vacancies are advertised and why so many of them go 
unfilled that does not place the whole blame for unemployment on the shoulders of the 
jobless. However, it is also an approach that indicates the role of human resource 
professionals and what they regard as best practice in recruitment decisions is limited. It 
is this that will be looked at in the next section.   
8.3 The role of human resource professionals in an employer’s search for labour.   
The reason looking at this is important is that UK Government policy presumes private 
firms use HR professionals and their beliefs about recruitment best practice to hire staff 
(Keep and James 2010). Michael captured what employers working in small businesses 
thought about the validity of this assumption when he told me:     
"I'm the admin, the electrician, the cleaner the personnel 
officer; I'm everybody." 
No small employer I spoke to directly employed HR professionals, and only one of them 
paid for access to them on as required basis after being punished by an industrial tribunal. 
As for the view of the larger businesses, the following exchanges with Brendan and Craig 
demonstrate this:   
BMcN:  
“(To Brendan). You were indicating that your personnel department 
was quite small for a company of over 300 people, how many staff is 
there?”   
Brendan:  
“One.” 
BMcN:  
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“One?”  
Brendan:  
“One plus an assistant that does some other things as well. ”  
Another demonstration of the scarcity of HR professionals in larger businesses is 
provided by Craig, who is a senior manager in a company employing over 10,000 people, 
he said:    
“We’ve only got about three personnel staff in the whole company, so 
all HR is managed locally, you only bring them in when you’re in 
bother basically.”  
The finding here contradicts the UK government’s assumption that businesses of every 
type employ sufficient numbers of professionals to implement HR best practice. It is one 
supported by the HR literature. Several studies into small businesses have discovered 
they do not employ HR professionals because their owners believe the costs of hiring 
them outweighs any benefits they have to offer (Cardon and Stevens 2004; Hornsby and 
Kuratko 2004; Lechner and Leyronas 2009). Other research into larger businesses found 
employers did not rely on HR expertise to recruit staff because they saw it as too 
technical to be accessible; irrelevant to the conduct of their business, or too impractical 
for the real world (Rynes et al. 2002).  
The effects of these beliefs can be seen from a survey of UK private sector businesses by 
Xpert HR (2012), which found the average ratio of HR professionals to staff is around 
one in one hundred and twenty; with the ratio increasing in line with company size. No 
business I spoke to had ratios anything like this. However, the discrepancy can be, at least 
partially, explained in two ways. First, what method is used to construct these figures, 
would it count the assistant Brendan talked about as a member of the personnel 
department or some other one or both? And second, companies may define the role of HR 
differently: for example is payroll an HR or finance function, is the keeping of up to date 
staff records an HR or a departmental duty, and how are those who make training 
decisions counted? However, even with the ratios identified by Xpert, the indications are 
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that the roles of human resources professionals in private firms are mainly 
communication and facilitation rather than policing and regulating.   
However, the scarcity of HR professionals in larger business does not mean they are 
never directly involved in recruitment. Julian, who owns several small businesses and has 
also sat on the boards of several large companies, spoke for every participant in this study 
who is or has been a senior manager in a large firm when he said that this was most likely 
to occur,   
“In large organisations, it’s quite common for the HR directors to be 
joined at the hip with the CEO or MD simply because building teams is 
so important at that level.”  
Julian is indicating HR participation in the recruitment decisions of larger companies 
increases in line with the seniority of the post. The relevance of this to the employment 
prospects of people with a history of mental illness moving off disability benefits is that 
most of them will only be eligible for low or entry level posts. The indications are that 
these are posts where managers, some of the relatively junior members of staff, will have 
greater levels of discretion in making recruitment decisions.     
Glen, who owns several businesses, including four employment agencies, explained the 
limited involvement of HR professionals in recruitment:  
“Increasingly there is a view that human resources departments should 
not step in between a management subordinate relationship, that it is 
the manager's responsibility to develop these.”     
In the last chapter, Frank observed that in larger businesses employees are given the 
authority to hire the people who report to them and that they are held accountable by 
more senior managers for the outcome of these decisions. Here, the evidence indicates 
that many companies also delegate the authority to decide how to produce the best 
possible recruitment outcomes, to do what Frank described as ‘analysing your own risk’. 
The argument for doing this is that it cuts costs, provides managers with more flexibility 
to manage and build workforce teams and enables the business to react more quickly to 
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situations as they develop on the ground (Bysted and Jespersen 2014; Fernandez and 
Moldogaziev 2013).  
Neither the evidence provided by the employers for this study nor the HR literature 
describes a labour market where HR professionals regulate and police the recruitment 
decisions of employers. The difference between the assumptions of the UK government 
about how employers search for labour and how they have described how they go about it 
raises further concerns about the engagement of employers with the UK government’s 
welfare to work policies. The next three parts of this chapter will discuss these concerns 
by looking at the influence on employers of the Equality Act 2010; and the ‘See Me’ anti-
stigma campaign; their experience of private sector welfare to work contractors and the 
likely effect of this on their willingness to engage with the ‘Work Programme'; and their 
awareness of the ‘Access to Work' and ‘Work Choice' programmes.   
8.4 The influence of the Equality Act 2010 on the recruitment practices of 
employers. 
 Evidence from the spheres of public health and transport indicates public behaviour can 
be changed by rigorous law enforcement even when the law in question is controversial 
(Avineri and Goodman 2009). The indications are that for this to happen the law has to 
meet specific criteria: it has to have a clear rationale; possess unambiguous tests of 
compliance; be easy to monitor and police; and the public mood has to reinforce 
enforcement with social approval (Avineri and Goodman 2009). Satisfying these criteria 
requires there to be widespread awareness of the legislation. The following exert from my 
meeting with Mike is typical of the responses received from smaller employers:   
BMcN:  
“Here’s something; have you heard of any legislation governing equal 
opportunities for people with a history of mental health problems?”  
Mike: (Pause) 
“Governing equal opportunities?”  
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BMcN:  
“Yes, equal opportunities” .  
Mike: (Long pause) 
“Well, I know you’re not allowed to discriminate.”   
BMcN:  
“What if I was to say to you, the Equality Act 2010?”  
Mike:  
“Never heard of it”.  
Given the absence of HR professionals in small businesses and the prevalence of 
multitasking, this finding is unsurprising. Larger employers were slightly more 
circumspect in how they phrased their response. Nevertheless, their answers indicated 
they did not think it was relevant to how they conducted their business. Andy who owned 
a medium sized business responded to the question I put to Mike in the following 
manner:    
"No, I know it's there, but I don't know anything about it."  
Nor was Ross, a director of a large UK wide business, who said:   
“Well, I am aware that there is an Equality Act, but I am not aware 
that there is anything in it about mental health. ”  
Awareness of the Equality Act (2010) and its provisions ranged from total ignorance to a 
vague awareness. Similar findings were made by studies investigating the awareness of 
employers of this legislation's antecedent, the Disability Discrimination Act (1995) 
(Kelly et al. 2005; Simm et al. 2007; Clayton et al. (2012). While the absence of HR 
professionals in small businesses explains the ignorance of this legislation amongst 
employers working for them, it does not account for the ignorance amongst those 
working for large companies. There are three possible explanations for this.   
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The first is that many of its provisions only relate to the public sector or those private 
sector businesses working for it. The second is congruent with the idea HR departments 
have circulated information about the Equality Act 2010. It emerges by juxtaposing the 
demands of the Equality Act 2010 with how they rank the sources of information they 
use to recruit staff. The Equality Act does not require vacancies to be thrown open to 
public competition unless the post in question relates to a contract of work for the public 
sector. The way employers rank and use sources of information to recruit staff indicates 
that, to a large extent, how they trade for labour is governed by the informal rules 
developed as part of the creation of social groups. Consequently, people with a history of 
mental illness who are not members of employers’ social networks or those of their 
employees will rarely get into a position where they will become aware of a vacancy. As 
a result, they will not get into a situation where they can exercise the rights given to them 
by the Equality Act. The use of a hierarchy of reliability to recruit staff also suggests that 
when they have a relationship with an employer that causes them to be considered for a 
vacancy, it may be counterproductive to assert their rights because it could lead to them 
being denied information about future jobs. It follows that many employers working for 
large business will have little reason to have more than enough awareness of the Equality 
Act 2010 to cause them to seek advice from HR staff when they decide to fill a vacancy 
via recruitment agencies or open competition.  The last explanation emerges by reflecting 
on how the demands of Equality Act 2010 are enforced. In line with UK historical 
practice, the rights granted by disabilities legislation are policed and enforced by disabled 
people. To assert them, job seekers with a history of mental illness will often have to 
make employers aware of their impairment because it will not always be apparent. If they 
have done this and they feel they have been mistreated by the employer because of their 
impairment they have to think about four questions before calling them to account. First, 
because their complaint may result in an examination to determine the nature of their 
impairment and how it disables them, they have to ask themselves, what level of personal 
intrusion are they willing to allow?  Second, because case law and the code of practice 
(EHCR 2011) accompanying the Equality Act 2010 makes it clear that what is reasonable 
for a small employer may not be reasonable for a large one, they have to ask themselves, 
could the costs associated with accommodating their impairment allow the employer's 
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behaviour to be judged by third parties as being reasonable? Third, will the demonisation 
by the government and the media of jobless, disabled people identified by Briant et al. 
(2011) make this more likely? And lastly, will attempting to assert their rights result in 
them being seen as troublemakers by other employers?  Together the answer to these 
questions is likely to lead many disabled people with a legitimate grievance to conclude 
that enforcing their rights under this legislation is not worth the bother.  
The above discussion makes it reasonable to conclude employers’ awareness of the 
Equality Act 2010 and its influence on their recruitment practices is likely to be marginal. 
Such a conclusion is supported by previous research, which has found legislation to be 
ineffective in facilitating employment opportunities for people with disabilities (Bambra 
and Page 2007; Simm et al. 2007; Clayton et al. 2012). It also suggests a three-pronged 
way of addressing this ineffectiveness: fund initiatives that develop links between 
disabled people and employers independent of the existence of vacancies; demand all 
vacancies are thrown open to fair competition and create an adequately resourced 
independent body with inspection and enforcement powers to ensure the provisions of 
any equalities legislation are complied with,  for as Habermas (2010) has pointed out, 
rights are only as good as the rigour with which they are policed and enforced.  
8.5 The influence of campaigns to reduce the stigma and discrimination associated 
with mental illness on employers recruitment practices.  
In line with neoclassical theory, the government’s welfare to work policies conceptualise 
stigma, and the unfair discrimination it gives rise to, as barriers to the market, which is 
why one of the aims of the Scottish Government funded ‘See Me' campaign is to prevent 
them from influencing recruitment decisions. ‘See Me' is a social marketing campaign; as 
such it assumes people's attitudes and behaviour towards something can be changed by 
increasing their awareness and knowledge of it (National Audit Office 2011; Kotler and 
Zaltman 1971). For such a campaign to achieve its goals, the target audience has to be 
aware of the campaign. The awareness of the employers I spoke to about ‘See Me' is 
captured in the following evidence from Anna and Neil. Anna spoke for a small majority 
of employers when she told me: 
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“No I’m not aware of any campaigns; they just don’t come into my 
head.” 
The following exchange with Niall captures the extent of the awareness amongst the rest 
of them:      
BMcN:  
“Are you aware of any campaigns aimed at reducing the stigma 
experienced by people with a history of mental health problems?”    
Niall:   
“I've seen it advertised on the telly; you see a lot of things about 
mental health you see it on billboards, you see it on buses.”  
BMcN:  
“Can you think of the name of any of these campaigns?”   
Niall:  
“I can actually, there was one on the telly recently about mental illness 
and one in four it mentioned a number one in four, one in five where 
people have a slight mental health issue.” 
However, despite several prompts, Niall was unable to remember the name the campaign. 
Our exchange continued as follows: 
BMcN: 
“What do you think of these campaigns?”  
Niall:  
“I think they make you aware of mental health issues and I think that is 
a good thing, I think everyone should be aware because if people do 
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things, then you can have some sort of understan ding of why, how or 
what."  
BMcN:  
“Have they influenced your recruitment practices?”  
Niall:   
“No.” 
Employers appear to be more aware of the anti-stigma campaign than they are of the 
equalities legislation. Given the ones I spoke to seemed to believe it was other people 
who held stigmatising beliefs about individuals with a history of mental illness and 
unfairly discriminated against them, this could be because the campaign tries to challenge 
stigma in every environment, not just the workplace. In short, they were more likely to 
see the campaign as relevant to the lives of the people around them. However, more 
employers were unaware of 'See Me' than were aware of it and even those who knew of it 
did not see it as being relevant to their business lives. There could be two reasons for this. 
Once again it could be because they do not believe they hold stigmatising beliefs or 
behave in an unfairly discriminatory manner. The other reason crystallises by reflecting 
upon the approach of the anti-stigma campaign. It treats workplaces as generic: it does 
not take account of differences in management structures between the public and private 
sector and large and small businesses, or the influence on them of trading environments. 
Acting in this way flies in the face of evidence from the literature on marketing 
campaigns, which strongly indicates that to be successful; campaigns must use identify 
different groups and target them by using language that means something to their 
members (Kotler and Zaltman 1971 and Dolan et al. 2010). An explanation for why the 
'See Me' management have acted in the way they did emerges from the two reviews of 
the ‘See Me' campaign carried out by Myers et al. in 2009 and Pilgrim and Corry in 2013. 
Both show that there is hardly any private sector involvement in the campaign's planning, 
implementation or evaluation. It is, therefore, reasonable to argue that if there had been 
greater private sector participation, the diversity of that sector might have been more 
likely to have been taken into account.   
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The evidence indicates the proportion of employees with a disability is greater in the 
public sector than it is in the private one (Hirst et al. 2004) and that the number of public 
sector jobs is in decline. Given this, the ‘See Me’ campaign will need to positively 
influence private sector employers if it is to build on whatever positive effect it has had 
on their employability. The data presented here suggests it will be required to do two 
things if it is to achieve this goal. It will need to persuade private sector employers that 
they hold stigmatising beliefs and it will have to take account of the diversity of the 
private sector. Together they suggest there is a need to increase the involvement of 
private sector employers in the campaign’s steering group.      
However, these observations should not be taken as saying ‘See Me’ will not have had 
any positive effects. As was noted above, its remit is broader than employment. It aims to 
address the social identity of people with a history of mental illness. The evidence from 
the two reviews suggests that it has helped to make people with a history of mental health 
problems more socially acceptable. It follows that they will be more likely now than they 
were in the past to have relationships with or be members of the same social networks as 
employers or those who have access to them. In the light of evidence from this study that 
employers are more likely to hire people with a history of mental illness when they can 
use personal relationships and social networks it suggests that that the campaign will 
have had a positive influence on their employability even if employers don’t know about 
the campaign or regard it as irrelevant to their recruitment practices. However, it does so 
in a way that reveals what Sayer (2005) calls the moral significance of class, for the 
evidence shows the majority of people with a history of mental illness being moved by 
the government off state benefits live in areas of high unemployment (Dohrenwend 1992; 
Hollingshead et al. 1958; Johnson et al. 1999; Meltzer 1997; Butterworth et al. 2009; 
Crisp et al. 2009). Notwithstanding issues about work-ready skills, these locations are 
ones where people are less likely to share social circles with employers or people who 
have access to them.       
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8.6 Employers experiences of welfare to work contractors and its possible influence 
on their reaction to the Work Programme.    
Earlier, in ‘Chapter Two’, there was a discussion about the government’s welfare to work 
policies. There it was shown that they require people with a history of mental health 
problems, who are in receipt of incapacity benefits, to participate in a rolling programme 
of ‘Work Capability Assessments’ (WCA), which will sift them into three categories of 
benefit recipient: those on ‘Support Group’ (SG); and ‘Work Related Activity Group’ 
(WRAG) ‘Employment Support Allowance’ (ESA) and ‘Job Seekers Allowance’ (JSA). 
The businesses performing these assessments claim to be making no judgement about the 
nature or existence of a person’s impairment merely whether it prevents them from 
working and if so what at and where. It will be recalled the first group do not need to look 
for work, the second group are expected to prepare for work by engaging in work-related 
activity, and the third group are supposed to look for work immediately. The primary 
policy initiative supporting the latter two groups is the Work Programme. As with all the 
government's vocational support efforts, this initiative is implemented by private and 
voluntary sector organisations, who have won contracts as a result of a competitive 
tendering process. 
One could look at these organisations as being similar to recruitment agencies. After all, 
one of their roles is to help match people to vacancies. As we have seen, employers 
appear to favour recruitment agencies over the use of open competition. This practice 
could lead one to believe employers would look favourably on these bodies as a source of 
information about potential recruits. Amongst the employers I spoke to, there were seven, 
all from small and medium-sized firms, which indicated they had experience of working 
with welfare to work organisations. The following evidence from Andy, Billy and 
Richard describes these experiences. They all relate to events that took place before the 
introduction of the Work Programme. But since the companies involved in these stories 
are all currently delivering that programme there is a strong argument to be made that 
their past behaviour is relevant to the Work Programme’s success. Andy describes a 
typical encounter with these organisations:          
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“Well I’ve certainly had experiences in the past where  (Names welfare to 
work company) would send me groups of CV's, and I would respond 
with, do you realise that we are recruiting for the offshore oilfield 
service industry? You are sending us people that we cannot possibly 
accommodate in that environment. That caused that organisation to 
lose credibility in my eyes.”  
 Andy's evidence indicates these organisations may be seen by employers as ones that 
make little attempt to try and develop a relationship with an employer that might help 
them get to know their business, the environment it operates in and the demands it 
produces. This type of failure raises the concern that the reputation of welfare to work 
organisations amongst employers will be poor. Worries about this reputation are 
amplified by the following anecdotes provided by Billy and Richard. Billy's experience, 
bad as it was, was at the positive end of the spectrum of stories about these businesses. It 
relates to one of their clients who he found out to be autistic after he had agreed to take 
him on. I asked Billy:     
 “What about the support that was offered by the support agency?”  
Billy:  
“There was very little support . There was just a guy. Sometimes you 
would get a phone call in the morning just to make sure they turned up 
for work, to make sure they were here”.  
BMcN:  
“Did they ever come into the workplace?”  
Billy:  
“Maybe once a month or something and checked on them, make sure 
they were here, to have a wee word from them to see where they were 
going from there.”  
BMcN:  
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“Did they ever talk with you about the needs of the person?”  
Billy:  
“Never, they would maybe tell you they had someone very special here 
and that they would be the person for a job here. ”  
The worst story I heard about the behaviour of a welfare to work contractor was provided 
by Richard: 
"We had one particular lady on placement, a very nice person but she 
had serious problems with toilet issues. We discovered that within a 
couple of hours. They were ones that she couldn't manage herself, she 
needed assistance, and the other two girls in the office weren't 
prepared to help her, and the other p roblem was that her personal 
hygiene was appalling. So we had to phone these people to come and 
pick her up, but they wouldn't come to pick her up until night time, so 
we had to find somewhere for her and basically humour her all day 
until they came back to pick her up again.”  
It is almost beyond comprehension any organisation purporting to have the interest of 
their client at heart would place somebody with autism or toilet issues with a company 
without holding in-depth discussions with it about the best way to accommodate them. 
Similarly, it is difficult to understand how these firms could believe visiting a workplace 
once a month or failing to respond to an employer's urgent request for help is the 
provision of adequate support. In both cases, the attitude seems to have been to get their 
clients a position under any circumstances, even if it means keeping the employer in the 
dark because once we do this, we get paid, and then we can move on to the next client. 
The attitude of these agencies towards their clients and the businesses appears to have 
been uncaring, disrespectful and callous. Employers talk amongst each other about this 
type of experience. Karl, an employer with a large organisation, who has never dealt with 
these organisations, provided evidence of the effect on the reputation of the welfare to 
work industry of this kind of behaviour when he told me:     
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 "My view of these companies is that they have no interest in the 
person’s well-being, career or future of the people they are 
supporting. They are only in it for the money. My opinion is that these 
companies, they might even employ self-employed people that will only 
get paid if they find an unemployed person a job or a work placement , 
they will only be in it for the money."  
He went on to say,  
“They will have no interest in my company, well except in so far as 
they would be desperate for you to buy into their service.”  
These experiences and the hostility they seem to have generated, suggest many private 
sector employers will be, at the very least, sceptical about the benefits of dealing with 
welfare to work companies. An explanation for why some of these contractors have 
behaved in this way is provided by agency theory, which was mentioned briefly in 
‘Chapter Two when the above policies were introduced and in ‘Chapter Three’ when the 
focus of the discussion was the new institutional economics. Therefore it is worthwhile 
looking at agency theory in more detail here. This model defines the parties to a contract 
as the principal, who wants a job done, and the agent, who does the work (Eisenhardt 
1989). Their relationship can become problematic when the principal is unable to monitor 
the behaviour of the agent or when the interests of the principal and agent diverge 
(Eisenhardt 1989; Fernandez 2007). It is easy to see why the activities regulated by 
welfare to work contracts would be difficult to monitor: it would involve checking up on 
how the agent and their subcontractors have behaved towards large numbers and varieties 
of job seekers and employers who are located all over the country. To make matters 
worse, the interests of the government are not the same as the welfare to work 
organisation: the former wants to minimise the costs involved in getting people into work 
while the latter intends to maximise the profits they can realise from doing this.     
The solution agency theory offers for agent principal problems is structuring rewards to 
align the self-interests of the agent and the principal by making payments dependent on 
how an outcome meets a variety of conditions (Fernandez 2007). It would appear the 
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experiences of the employers I spoke to were not uncommon, for the UK government has 
made this type of change to its vocational support programmes. As well as jobs gained 
payment now depends on the length of time a client stays in employment and the 
challenges they pose (Rees et al. 2014). The aim of this change is to encourage agents to 
address the needs of individual clients by incentivising them to maintain regular, 
purposeful contact with them once an employer has taken them. Before the UK 
government made this change, other countries, including Holland and Australia, took a 
similar tack. Their experience indicates welfare to work businesses have reacted to these 
changes by focusing on those clients who were most attractive to employers and parking 
the rest (Struyven and Steurs 2005; Considine et al. 2011). It would appear that despite 
protests from the DWP to the contrary (PAC 2013), the Dutch and Australian experience 
is repeating itself here (National Audit Office 2014; Finn 2011; 2013; Rees et al. 2014). 
However, even if the DWP's is correct, it is hard, given that many of the companies that 
participated in earlier vocational support programmes are involved in current ones, not to 
think the changes that have been made are an exercise in shutting the barn door after the 
horse has bolted.   
An alternative solution to the agent-principal problem that takes into account the needs of 
employers would be to incentivise welfare to work organisations to build up long-term 
and ongoing relationships with them independent of the placing of individual clients. In 
the course of doing this they could help; circulate information about the different parts of 
the welfare to work programme and provide advice about reasonable adjustments and 
vocational support programmes, which would help address any image problems they 
might have. Such an approach might lessen the pressure on welfare to work organisations 
to park difficult to place clients by making employers more amenable to taking a chance 
on them. However, constructing a programme that could do this requires identifying a 
starting point, which requires research into the current state of the relationship between 
employers and welfare to work organisations.    
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8.7 The influence of vocational support programmes aimed at reducing the costs 
associated with impairments on the recruitment practices of employers.  
‘Access to Work' is a scheme designed to help pay for the additional costs faced by 
disabled people when they look for and are engaged in paid employment. Examples of 
these are those associated with travel and making reasonable adjustments to the 
workplace to accommodate impairments. ‘Work Choice’ is an initiative that focuses on 
those disabled people whose capability assessments have concluded they should not be 
required to look for paid employment but who wish to do so anyway. Again, its purpose 
is to help them find and keep a job; it offers help with training, skills development and 
confidence building. The reviews of these programmes carried out by the DWP (2013) 
and (Sayce 2011) indicate those employers who have engaged with these programmes 
have a positive view of their experiences. However, no one I spoke to knew anything 
about them. Gus's response was typical: 
“I’ve never heard of them.”  
Employers’ ignorance of these initiatives does not mean they are uninterested in them.’ 
Michael was one of the several employers, who asked, 
“Where do you find out about these things?”  
 The DWP review of the Work Choice programme did not specifically investigate 
employer’s awareness of this programme, although it did note that the knowledge and 
understanding of parties to it are problematic. The review of the ‘Access to Work’ 
scheme carried out by Sayce (2011) offered evidence the knowledge of job seekers and 
employers about this scheme is also unsatisfactory, and it suggested this was because it 
was poorly publicised. One alternative explanation for the employers' lack of awareness 
of these programmes is that they are both supply-side initiatives. Therefore, the money 
follows the disabled job seeker. As a result, publicity about them might not be directed at 
employers. Given employers seem to start their search for labour by targeting prospective 
employees, this indicates there would be no reason for them to find out about them unless 
a targeted pool of labour included a disabled person who was aware of them. Another is 
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that the scarcity of human resource professionals may have prevented information about 
them from being circulated efficiently. Whatever the reason, nobody who took part in this 
study knew about ‘Work Choice’ or ‘Access to Work’. Because of this, I can only 
conclude that their influence on employers’ recruitment decisions is minimal. In the light 
of the favourable opinion of them held by those employers who have engaged with them, 
this is unfortunate. It is a finding that suggests publicity about these schemes should 
target employers as well as disabled people.  
8.8 Conclusion.   
The evidence from this chapter indicates employers deal with the uncertainty involved in 
recruitment by ranking sources of information in terms of reliability and cost. The 
hierarchy of desirability they construct by doing this identifies information arising out of 
personal experience as the preferred source of information, followed by information 
generated by the experience of people they trust, the payment of a fee and then open 
competition in a market. When they have a vacancy, they tend to look for staff by 
descending through the hierarchy for as long as their desire for profit outweighs their fear 
of loss. At each stage its alignment with understandings of trading for labour changes.  
Initially, their use of this hierarchy resonates most with the ideas of new economic 
sociologists such as Zelizer (2007) on the role played by intimacy in economic activity 
and Granovetter (1985; 1995a) about commercial activity being embedded in social 
networks and stratification economists such as Darity (2005; 2009a) about competition 
between groups for economic dominance. Then as the search continues, it resonates more 
with the work of new institutional economists such as Williamson (2005; 2007) on 
transaction costs. Until finally, it comes to bear its closest resemblance to neoclassical 
theory’s thinking about price competition. The descent down the hierarchy identifies 
employers engagement with the labour market as something that is constrained by supply 
and demand. By doing so, it explains why many jobs never seem to reach the open 
market and the simultaneous existence of vacancies and unemployment that does not 
presume unemployment is evidence of a preference for leisure over work or that the 
jobless are skivers rather than strivers. 
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This ranking of sources of information into a hierarchy of desirability and its use is 
consistent with the evidence from ‘Chapter Four’ about employers hoarding of labour, 
from ‘Chapter Six’ about the circumstances surrounding their recruitment of people with 
a history of mental illness and ‘Chapter Seven’ indicating they believe the outcomes of 
hiring decisions are always uncertain. However, it runs contrary to two assumptions of 
the UK government regarding the labour market. The first is the one that underpins the 
UK government’s welfare to work policies, which is the neoclassical belief that jobs are 
distributed as a result of the willingness of suppliers of labour to compete for work by 
responding to market signals about price (Ehrenberg and Smith 2012; Mandel 2012; Dutt 
and Wilbur; 2010). The second is that employers use what human resource professionals 
understand as best practice to facilitate price competition between suppliers of labour for 
a vacancy (Atour 2008; Keep and James 2010). The use of the hierarchy indicates the 
preferred approach of employers to recruitment is targeting sources of labour. Its use 
explains why smaller companies tend not to employ HR professionals and why larger 
ones only seem to hire enough of them to participate in the recruitment of senior staff and 
to facilitate the recruitment decisions of managers at more junior levels. As far as the 
posts that most people with a history of mental illness who are moving off disability 
benefits are concerned, it seems managers not only to have the delegated authority to fill 
a vacancy but also considerable freedom in deciding how to go about doing so.   
The differences between how the UK government thinks employers trade for labour and 
how employers perform this task appears to have adversely affected the engagement of 
employers with their welfare to work policies. In general, employers working for small 
and large businesses seem to be ignorant or only vaguely aware of the provisions of the 
Equality Act 2010. There was some awareness of the ‘See Me’ campaign but although 
nobody thought it had influenced their recruitment decisions there is an argument for 
saying it may have indirectly made them more likely to hire people with a history of 
mental illness. As for the vocational support programmes, employers experience of 
agency-principal problems has caused them to be hostile to the contractors implementing 
the ‘Work Programme’. Furthermore, there is a reason to believe that changes to this 
programme will fail to diminish this hostility. With respect to the ‘Access to Work' and 
‘Work Choice’ programmes, employers appear to be ignorant of them. My conclusions 
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about the recruitment practices of employers and their failure to engage with the UK 
government's welfare to work policies for their ability to increase demand for labour from 
jobless people who have been disabled by mental illness is the topic that will be 
discussed in the next chapter. 
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Chapter Nine:  
Conclusions. 
9.1 Introduction. 
Earlier, I said personal reasons had sparked my interest in the ability of the UK 
government’s welfare to work policies to make it easier for people disabled by mental 
illness to find a job. Looking at the thinking behind these policies, I found they are rooted 
in models of recovery and economic activity, which identify causal relationships between 
agency and attitude and well being and financial security. However, the literature review 
and the evidence from government labour market statistics suggested such thinking is 
problematic.  
‘Chapter Two’ showed the model of recovery in question emerged from debates about 
the concept of mental illness, the treatment of people diagnosed as mentally ill and the 
efficacy of asylums. Debates fuelled by psychiatry’s failure to link many of its diagnostic 
categories to biology, research in neuroscience, developments in pharmacology, and 
work by sociologists on the effects of deviance, and stigma. On opposite sides were 
people who argued mental illness is a biological phenomena and those who see it as a 
social one (Rogers and Pilgrim 2010). Eventually, they the state responded to them by 
deciding most people diagnosed as mentally ill should live in the community where their 
support would be overseen by general practitioners (Rogers and Pilgrim 2010). Although 
they were now less vulnerable to compulsory confinement, they were still prevented from 
working for a living. It was a situation that led many of them to reflect on the nature of 
mental illness and the meaning of recovery (Davidson& Roe 2007; Deegan 1998; 
Liberman and Kopelowicz 2005). In Scotland, policymakers reacted to these reflections 
by adopting a version of recovery demanding that people accept the reality of mental 
illness, follow medical advice about realistic goals and accept they have a duty to pursue 
these goals enthusiastically (SRN 2007).  
A catalyst for identifying paid employment as a realistic goal for people who had been 
disabled by mental illness was the development by disabled scholars of the social model 
of disability. It identified impairments as biological issues and disabilities as social ones 
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(Pinder 1995; Coles 2001). International policy makers reacted to this challenge to 
orthodoxy by adopting Engel’s (1977; 1980) complex laminated biopsychosocial model 
of well-being (Engel 1977; 1980). Consequently, they were able to adopt the social 
model’s parsing of disability and impairment while identifying biology as the root of 
disability (Imrie 2004). Later, UK policymakers drew on work by Waddell and Aylward 
(2006), which reduced Engel’s model from a complex one to a complicated one and then 
went on to argue disability is solely a deviance from biological norms and the outcomes 
of disabled people’s lives are determined by attitude and agency.  
In the light of studies arguing paid employment is good for mental health (Waddell and 
Burton 2006a, b), people with a history of mental illness want to work (Boardman 2003; 
Boardman et al. 2003; Bond 2004; Dunn Grasso and Saunders 2014; Rinaldi et al. 2008) 
and they can successfully compete for work when they are provided with appropriate 
support (Drake et al. 1996; Becker and Drake 2003; Bond 2004), UK policymakers were 
able to use the thinking of Waddell and Aylward to identify paid employment as evidence 
of recovery in as well as recovery from mental illness (HM Government 2009). To 
pursue this vision of recovery, it implemented a tranche of welfare to work policies that 
were underpinned by the assumption that, all things being equal, people disabled by 
mental illness would be able to find work as long as they could enter the labour market.     
In ‘Chapter Three’ it was shown these policies had been identified by Jessop (1994; 
1999; 2002) as part of a move by policymakers to change the ‘Keynesian Welfare State’ 
into a ‘Schumpeterian Workfare State’. Fuelling this move is an understanding of the 
labour market offered by neoclassical economics. Neoclassicism has dominated 
economic policy for almost forty years. It benchmarks the economy in the real world 
against a static theoretical model where equilibrium between supply and demand for 
scarce resources is established by price competition between rational, utility, maximising 
all knowing individuals with stable sets of preferences (Cassidy 2009; Crouch 2010; Dutt 
and Wilbur 2010; Ehrenburg and Smith 2012). In this theoretical economy, a willingness 
to supply goods at market prices creates its own demand, and macro-economic outcomes 
are the sum of its micro-component parts (Cassidy 2009; Crouch 2010; Dutt and Wilbur 
2010; Ehrenburg and Smith 2012). 
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Here, suppliers of labour strike a balance between work (disutility) and leisure (utility); 
money is a facilitator of trade rather than a store of value, a statement of account or a 
source of power; the outcomes of economic activity are a question of risk rather than 
uncertainty and exogenous institutional factors, such as out of work benefits, employment 
protection legislation and social norms, result in economies having natural rates of 
unemployment (Ehrenburg and Smith 2012; Layard et al. 1991; Layard and Nickell 
2003). From this perspective, the role of policy should be to facilitate price competition 
by incentivising people to look for work and preventing institutional influences from 
acting as barriers to the labour market.   
Like the medical concept of mental illness, neoclassical thinking about the labour market 
has been subject to criticism, which revolves around their model’s construction, its denial 
of uncertainty and its identification of institutions such as firms, the law, money and 
social networks as being exogenous to the market. The new institutional economics and 
the new economic sociology see institutions as things that are endogenous to economic 
activity, whose purpose is to make an uncertain world more predictable. Something they 
do by creating multiple markets where movement into and between them can be difficult 
(Williamson 1975; 1985; 2000; Granovetter 1985; 1995). However, they disagree on 
what causes uncertainty, how it gives rise to institutions and how institutions protect 
people against it (Williamson 2000); Granovetter 1985). New institutional economists see 
the economy as a static system. They adapt neoclassical theory to argue the outcomes of 
price competitions between utility maximising actors for control of scarce resources are 
rendered uncertain by the interplay of asset specificity, cognitive idiosyncrasies and 
opportunism (Williamson 1975; 1985; 2000). Contrarily, the new economic sociology 
looks upon the world as being uncertain and the economy as an open, dynamic system 
embedded in a network of human relationships, which evolves in response to the 
interaction of agency and structure (Granovetter 1985; 1995a). The new institutionalist 
economists see uncertainty as a generator of transaction costs and institutions as entities 
that emerge when one to one spot contracts are unable to prevent opportunism from 
undermining market efficiency (Williamson 1975; 1985; 2000). The new economic 
sociology looks upon uncertainty is a generator of social networks and institutions as 
entities that emerge when social networks and their ability to foster identities, habits, trust 
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and asymmetric distributions of power have been unable to make the outcomes of social 
action predictable (Granovetter 1985; 2004).    
Neoclassical economics and the new institutional economics offer under socialised views 
of the world (Granovetter 1985), while the new economic sociology offers an over 
socialised one (Uzzi 2012). However, all three perspectives provide insights into 
economic activity in the real world. The neoclassical focus on profit offers a simple 
explanation for why businesses routinely terminate long-standing relationships with 
workers and communities by moving production around the world; the new institutional 
perspective does likewise for the existence of firms such as recruitment agencies, which 
generate profits by linking buyers and sellers of labour; and the reasons why business 
owners routinely hire family members, friends and people that are known to existing 
employees even when the market signals the availability of cheaper sources of labour are 
captured by the arguments of the new economic sociology about embeddedness and 
intimacy. Together they show the demand for labour cannot always be reduced to a desire 
by employers to satisfy or saticfy a desire for profits, or the pressure exerted by social 
norms. In other words, Neoclassicism, the new institutionalism and the new economic 
sociology offer partial and complementary descriptions of the reality the demand for 
labour.  
Taking the heterodox approach to the analysis of the economy used by the old 
institutional economics offers the opportunity to draw on the insights supplied by the 
above three schools of thought as well as the arguments of stratification economists about 
cooperation within and competition between groups and Zelizer on intimacy connected 
worlds and circuits of commerce. Now it can be argued the economy is an open, 
complex, dynamic and laminated social arena, which emerges from the constant interplay 
between agency and structure in response to people’s desire for order in an uncertain 
world (Hodgson 1998; 2000; 2009; Rutherford 1997; 2000). Here capacity, competition, 
cooperation, cost, identity, peer pressure and social location shape the demand for goods 
and services: power is ever present, causal relationships and market equilibrium are 
contingent, and the demarcation lines for economic analysis are relevant conditions rather 
than disciplinary boundaries (Myrdal 1978). Adherents of this schools of thought believe 
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theories are contingent and should be rooted in reality and used to develop an 
understanding of the use and distribution of economic and political power in specific 
historical, geographical and social environments (Myrdal 1978; Rutherford 1989; 
Hodgson 1998). For them it can be right and proper for a country's welfare system to do 
more than incentivize people to respond to labour market signals because they believe the 
demand for labour cannot be reduced to how someone disabled or not strikes a balance 
between the utility of leisure and the disutility of work in response to market signals. 
Recently stratification economics has used the heterodox approach of the old institutional 
economics to argue creating a level playing field requires the state to act to offset the 
influence of historical injustices experienced by stigmatised groups on the outcome of 
their economic activities (Darity, Hamilton and Stewart 2015).  
In the light of the influence of neoclassical economics on UK policymakers, its 
marginalisation of the influence of institutions on labour market outcomes and concerns 
voiced by the OECD (2014) that these policies ignore the role of structure on demand 
there is a clear need to investigate the effect of the UK government’s welfare to work 
policies on the demand from private sector employers for labour from people disabled by 
mental illness. Conducting such research will add to the disability literature because until 
now research into the employability of people with a history of mental illness, such as 
that by Manning and White (1995) and Brohan and Thornicroft (2010) on stigma and 
Bond et al. (2001) and Burns et al. (2007) on employability, has viewed joblessness as 
problem of supply rather than of demand.    
The fourth chapter opened my investigation into the workings of the market. It set the 
scene for my interviews with employers by looking at the overall state of the economy 
and the labour market. Here it was shown that the financial crash of 2008 had caused the 
demand for labour to fall significantly and that this fall manifested itself in a decline in a 
surprisingly small rise in unemployment, a drop in vacancies  and a sharp rise in 
underemployment. When one looks at UK and Scottish government statistics it would 
appear the demand for labour in Scotland will have to grow by a third if the private sector 
of the Scottish labour market is to absorb the numbers of people with a history of mental 
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illness the UK government’s welfare to work policies hope to introduce to the labour 
market.  
In the course of discussing the crash, Hyman Minsky’s work was used to show the 
consequences of everything being related to everything else. Decades before the events of 
2008, he drew on the thinking of Keynes and Schumpeter and the idea of money as a 
statement of account, a store of value, a source of power and a medium of exchange to 
argue the financialisation of the economy will have an adverse effect on society (Pollin 
2008; Cassidy 2009; Mason 2009; Wolf 2014; Knell 2015). The core of Minsky's 
argument is rational self interested profit-seeking behaviour by financial businesses will, 
unless the state intervenes, result in erratic cycles of boom and bust with hedge, 
speculative and Ponzi phases, which in the long term will slow economic growth, make 
recessions more frequent and polarise labour demand around a few stable highly paid 
highly skilled jobs and a relatively large number of low skilled, low paid and unstable 
ones (Minsky 1982; 1992; Palley 2007). In other words, promoting rational utility 
maximising behaviour at the micro level will produce results at the macro level that 
generate feedbacks that make it less likely groups of new entrants to the labour market, 
such as people who have been disabled by mental illness, will be able to find secure and 
stable employment. 
Minsky’s work shows there is more to the demand for labour than a willingness of 
suppliers to respond to market signals about price. It is relevant to the employment 
prospects of everyone, but his insights are especially important for groups of people who 
have historically been excluded from the labour market. History suggests disabled people 
are more likely to find employment when labour markets are tight and that the least 
desirable source of labour is jobless people who have been disabled by mental illness 
(Boardman 2003; Fothergill 2001). In other words, they are the source of labour of last 
resort.  
Government statistics show unfilled vacancies co-existing with high levels of 
unemployment. Minsky's identification of rational behaviour by financial institutions as 
something that can adversely affect the demand for labour suggests policymakers will 
have to do more than spend money on removing barriers to the market, provide legal 
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rights and fund anti-stigma campaigns if they are to improve the employability of jobless 
people who have been disabled by mental illness. It points to a need for the state to 
ensure financial institutions lend to businesses that innovate to create new assets, prevent 
them from speculating on the paper value of existing ones and in an echo of the thinking 
of Darity Hamilton and Stewart (2015) address the consequences of the historical 
exclusion of this group of people from the labour market by providing them with jobs, a 
framework for interacting with employers and training in the job-specific skills that 
employers have trouble in sourcing.   
Nevertheless, the evidence shows employers knowingly hired people with a history of 
mental illness even while the recession was giving them access to potentially cheaper 
sources of labour with up to date skills and better health records. This scenario suggests 
there are factors in play at the micro level of the economy that shapes employers’ demand 
for labour other than price and up to date skills. It is possible the UK government’s 
welfare to work policies will build on these factors and make it more likely employers 
will hire people with a history of mental illness for they have aspects that resonate with 
schools of economic thought critical of neoclassicism. It is consistent with the thinking of 
Williamson (1975; 1985; 2000) to argue the Equality Act 2010 will improve their 
employability because it will facilitate a rational calculation of the transaction costs 
involved in employing them. Following Poire (1978), it is reasonable to believe this 
legislation will prevent the generation of inflationary pressures and a reduction in jobs by 
non-disabled workers as they act to protect the pay differences between them and their 
disabled peers. It is also in line with the thinking of new economic sociologists such as 
Granovetter (1985; 1995a) on embeddedness and stratification economists like Darity 
2005; 2009a) on cooperation within and competition between groups to argue anti-stigma 
campaigns such as ‘See Me’ will improve their employability because they make it more 
likely they will gain access to the social circles inhabited by employers and those who 
have access to them. If so they will be able to inform them of programmes like ‘Access to 
Work and ‘Work Choice’whose purpose is to reduce the costs of employing them. It 
follows that identifying the effects on the employability of jobless people disabled by 
mental illness of these policies requires gathering and analysing evidence from employers 
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about their experiences of mental illness and the labour market. It is how I went about 
gathering this evidence that the discussion now turns.    
In ‘Chapter Five’, I talked about how my interest in the research question arose from my 
conflicted experiences of supporting someone who had become mentally ill and being an 
employer who routinely rejected job applications from people similar to them who had 
episodic work histories. I wanted to investigate the effect of the UK government’s 
welfare to work policies in the real world, help people with a history of mental illness to 
improve their engagement with the welfare to work debate and identify ways of 
improving their employability that did not pose a threat to the quality of their lives.  
The literature led me to believe the power of a theory lies as much in the willingness of 
people to accept it as it does in any ability to provide realistic explanations. It also 
convinced me that despite their mutual hostility, the insights offered by medicine and 
sociology and on mental illness and neoclassicism, the new institutionalism and the new 
economic sociology on economic activity described important and different aspects of 
reality. Furthermore, the discussion of the 2008 crash and its aftermath led me to 
conclude the labour market could not be reduced to the sum of its parts and that 
adherence to a theory could result in action that changed the world in unpredictable ways. 
Consequently, I decided to sacrifice depth for breadth and take a heterodox approach to 
mental illness and the labour market when conducting my research, one that resonates 
with the approach taken by old institutional and stratification economists.  
Taking a heterodox approach to the research question meant accommodating different 
and apparently conflicting understandings of a phenomenon and the possibility that 
transcendence, feedback and causal relationships may be in play in isolation or together 
at different times in different places. This challenge led me to embrace critical realism. 
An approach to research that prioritises ontology over epistemology and epistemology 
over axiology. Critical realism views reality as having three transcendental lamina: the 
empirical, which is how events are seen, the actual, which is the events, and the deep, 
which consists of things that give rise to events such as culture, habit, location, price 
competition, money, power, rules, shared identities, social networks and values.   
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Concerning the sample, it was clear I would have to interview employers. Given the 
resources available to me and Scottish demographics, I thought it reasonable to draw the 
sample from employers operating in the central belt of Scotland. As for the nature of this 
sample, I wanted to talk to employers in business of every size to see if their approach to 
hiring staff was similar. This desire and my adoption of critical realism meant I had to 
provide definitions of buyers and sellers of labour, which is something I did by drawing 
on diagnostic and benefits histories and common and statute law. With respect to the size 
of the sample, I was influenced by the historical difficulty of getting employers to 
participate in social research (Winkler 1987; USEOC 2003; The Observatory 2003; 
Wood et al. 2009), the advice of (Becker 1998) to aim for one that would convince a 
sceptic and the suggestion by Warren (2002) that in qualitative research a sample of 
between twenty and thirty interviews is appropriate. However, it has to be acknowledged 
that my approach to the research question means any attempt to generalise the findings 
and conclusions of this study will be speculative to some degree.   
The rest of this chapter will use the literature on disability and the labour market to 
discuss the four key findings that emerged from my analysis of the evidence obtained by 
this study. These are:   
1. Employers search for labour when their business cannot meet the demand for its 
goods and services. However, because they view workforce teams as being 
different from the sum of their parts they believe the outcomes of recruitment 
decisions will always be uncertain and potentially hazardous.  
2. Employers seek to protect themselves from these hazards by ranking the sources 
of information they used to make hiring decisions in a hierarchy of desirability. 
Here desirability is determined by their beliefs about the accuracy and cost of the 
information provided by these sources. In descending order of preference, these 
are personal experiences; the experiences of people they trust; people who 
circulate information for a fee; and information generated by competition. They 
only move down this hierarchy when they think carrying on with a search for 
labour is less dangerous than continuing with existing suppliers.  
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3. Employers tended to hire people with a history of mental illness only when they 
or someone they trust has personal knowledge of them, and this knowledge 
indicates their skills are greater than those typically required for the post and they 
can be a social fit with other workplace actors;  
4. The flow of money through an economy is an uncertain and volatile regulator of 
the demand for labour, which can suddenly and unexpectedly create labour 
markets where for prolonged periods there are far more job-seekers than jobs. 
The literature review showed policymakers had identified agency as the arbiter of 
employability; employment as a realistic goal for people with a history of mental illness, 
and successful engagement with the labour market as evidence of recovery in and 
recovery from mental illnesses. The above findings make it clear the demand for labour 
is, at least partly, regulated by factors beyond the control of the people who supply it. But 
before an answer to the question driving this thesis can be provided, the above findings 
have to be pulled into a coherent narrative.  
I have partly completed this task by using the work of Minsky to identify the macro and 
micro components of the economy as being ontologically distinct. To complete it, I will 
lean on work by Zelizer (2007) on intimacy to discuss the circumstances under which 
employers hired people with  a history of mental illness; the work of Schein on business 
culture, Jones (2002) on racism, and Darity (2005; 2009), Darity Mason and Hamilton 
(2010) and Darity Mason and Stewart (2015) on stratification economics to look at how 
employers use the structures generated by social and economic pressures to prevent 
recruitment decisions from harming them; and the ideas  of Zelizer (2011) about 
connected worlds and circuits of commerce to discuss employers ranking of information 
about prospective employees in a hierarchy of desirability. Here, the mechanisms that 
regulate the establishment of this hierarchy, the barriers that separate its components and 
the movement of employers down it will be identified. Then it will move on to look at 
what this narrative indicates about the efficacy of the UK government's welfare to work 
policies. Finally, the chapter will come to a close by looking at how to build on this 
study’s findings by reflecting on its strengths and weakness.    
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9.2 Private sector employers’ beliefs about, experiences of and reactions to people 
that have a history of mental illness.    
In this section, I explored the interface between mental health stigma and employment. 
The evidence shows employers associate mental illness with strange unpredictable and 
disruptive behaviour. A significant proportion of them have beliefs that echo the work of 
Stalker (2009) in that they look upon people bearing particular diagnostic labels such as 
schizophrenia as being unemployable. Inappropriate media coverage, which stigmatises 
people who have been mentally ill, appears to have helped shape these beliefs; but so has 
experience of managing individuals who have become mentally ill. Nevertheless, more 
than half the employers in this study knowingly hired someone with a history of mental 
illness, and only a tiny minority rejected the idea of ever doing so. However, only one 
employer hired someone with this history from the open market, and another did so via a 
recruitment agency. The rest hired people that were known to them or people they trusted 
independent of the existence of the vacancy. Furthermore, there is evidence suggesting 
they discounted the value of the skills of the people they hired. Together, this evidence 
suggests the influence of mental health stigma on employers hiring decisions depends on 
social location, diagnostic labels and job-related skills. As a result, it becomes reasonable 
to believe the picture painted by so many employers being willing to consider hiring 
people with a history of mental illness is rosier than reality and that it would be better to 
research employability by social location and diagnostic label rather than by the 
portmanteau term mental illness.   
The behaviour of the employers who spoke to me does not resonate with the thinking 
behind neoclassical or new institutional economics. In part, it can be explained by 
drawing on the thinking of Zelier (2007) about the role of intimacy in economic activity 
and Granovetter (1985; 1995a) about it being embedded in stratified social networks. 
However, their explanations do not account for why they were able to discount the value 
of the labour of the people they hired. If we draw on evidence people are members of 
multiple groups (Handy 1993) then we can argue some people are simultaneously 
members of privileged and stigmatised groups. This approach allows us to use the 
thinking of stratification economists such as Darity (2005; 2009a) to fill this lacuna. He 
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argues cooperation within, and competition between groups has built a structural 
framework that allows powerful groups to use historical injustices to reduce the value of 
labour from stigmatised groups. From here it becomes apparent that membership of a 
privileged group can mitigate but not eradicate the corrosive effects of the stigma 
associated with another group. Nevertheless, employers’ use of intimacy and social 
networks as recruitment tools offer a powerful explanation for why they reject the 
accusations they hold stigmatising views about people who have a history of mental 
illness and unfairly discriminate against them. For not only do they know some people 
with this background; they socialise with them, circulate information about jobs to them, 
and knowingly hire them.  
The idea that in addition to competition, intimacy and social networks also shape the 
recruitment practice of employers is new to the literature on improving the employability 
of people with a history of mental illness. An explanation for its absence is provided by 
Zelizer (2007; 2011). In ‘Chapter Three’ when discussing her thinking about circuits of 
commerce and connected worlds she was shown to argue orthodoxy identifies economic 
decisions as rational and social ones as irrational and allowing the rules governing one 
world to be used in the other as dangerous because everything in the social world could 
be reduced to a commodity and everything in the economic world could be directed away 
from economic imperatives towards servicing personal relationships.   
From Zelizer's perspective, the UK government's welfare to work policies can be seen as 
an attempt to erect barriers between the social and economic spheres of activity while 
extending the reach of the market. Crystallising this line of thought can be done by 
returning to each of the planks of this policy. The Equality Act 2010 is an attempt to 
prevent social beliefs about disabled people from interfering with commercial decisions. 
Why becomes apparent from by reflecting on what it allows and how this is interpreted. 
Employers can unfairly discriminate against disabled people when it is reasonable to do 
so. Case law and the code of practice accompanying this legislation make it clear this is 
largely a question of relative costs because they expect large companies to spend more on 
accommodating disabled people than small ones. In effect, rights are subordinate to 
turnover and profit. When one turns to the changes to the benefits system and the periodic 
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use of ‘Work Capability Assessments’ these can be seen as an attempt to reduce the 
resources distributed to people with a history of mental illness as a result of social action. 
Similarly, Work Choice and Access to Work vocational support programmes become 
transformed into attempts to make it more difficult for disabled people to argue 
employers will not hire them because accommodating their impairments make them a 
more expensive source of labour. As for anti-stigma campaigns such as ‘See Me’, they 
complement these policies by trying to educate people on both sides of the labour market 
to see the labour on offer from people with a history of mental illness as being distinct 
from the people supplying it, a necessary precursor to having its value determined by the 
market.       
However, the evidence from those employers who have knowingly hired individuals with 
a history of mental illness shows that when they make recruitment decisions, they did not 
think it is always necessary to keep their social and economic activities separate. Their 
behaviour echoes another argument of Zelizer (2011), which is that the economic and 
social lives of people are connected. However, it does not mean employers are unaware 
that failing to keep these worlds apart can be harmful. Several of them talked about 
experiences when hiring someone they knew to have a history of mental illness as a result 
of social relationships had gone wrong. These experiences raise the question, would they 
ever hire someone with a history of mental illness again? I did not ask this question, but 
the evidence that when an employee became mentally ill, some employers strove to keep 
them in employment suggests it is not beyond the bounds of possibility. The reason for 
believing this is they all had experience of recruitment decisions that had gone wrong 
where mental health was not an issue. It would appear experience has led them to look at 
recruitment failure as being an ever-present and unpredictable threat. When it happened, 
they thought of it as unfortunate, but they did not look upon it as something that justified 
abandoning the use of personal relationships and social networks as recruitment tools. An 
explanation for this could be these relationships allow potential hazards, including those 
signalled by a history of mental illness, to be contextualised and they provide some 
degree of protection when things go wrong because it is standard recruitment practice.  
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Earlier studies from the business management literature support this position. They show 
social networks protect people by identifying acceptable ways of doing things and 
generating information over time in digestible chunks whose accuracy is guaranteed by 
feelings of shared identity, mutual obligations and the threat of punishment if the 
provider of information does not honour this guarantee (Handy 1993). Furthermore, there 
is evidence their use can improve business performance by increasing the feelings of 
control and commitment held by workplace actors because it shows the business values 
them and their opinions; enhancing the effectiveness of communication inside and 
outside of the business by creating a variety of information flows that the business can 
use for different purposes, creating a mutually supportive working environment by 
ensuring the workforce has a similar background and embedding the business socially 
and politically in the communities where it is based (Handy 1993).  
The UK government’s welfare to work policies identify barriers external to the market as 
the cause of the disproportionately high levels of unemployment experienced by people 
with a history of mental illness. Their approach to this problem is reducing these barriers 
by cutting the resources distributed to them through social action, offsetting what they 
have identified as the additional costs associated with employing people with a history of 
mental illness and reducing the influence of social factors on economic decisions. Two 
things are suggested here: the government believes social forces are causing economic 
resources to be wasted and that the market should have an increased role in distributing 
them. It indicates a desire to keep the economic and social worlds apart and support for 
market imperialism. However, the behaviour of employers suggests they are sceptical 
about the benefits of open competition, at least as far as hiring people with a history of 
mental illness is concerned. It indicates that an important influence on the ability of the 
UK government's welfare to work policies to improve the employability of this group of 
people will be the degree of overlap between the understanding of the UK government 
and employers about what shapes employers' demand for labour. It is this that will be 
discussed in the next section. 
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9.3 What private sector employers think shapes their demand for labour.  
Their desire for profit means that when private sector employers look for workers, they 
want people who will enable their business to produce goods and services that people 
want to buy. The evidence shows they believe that finding people like this involves 
questions of technical skills and social fit. They see identifying someone with the skills to 
the job as a question of risk. While they believe there is no guarantee the most skilled 
person available will be hired they are confident they will hire someone who is 
competent. As for identifying someone who will be a social fit with existing workforce 
teams, which in service industries include customers, they look upon this as a matter of 
uncertainty. They believe that because of uncertainty the success or failure of a 
recruitment decision cannot be determined until some time after it has been made. The 
reason they gave for this was not asset specificity, but the notion teams are different from 
the sum of their ever-changing parts. Employers fear the potential consequences of this 
uncertainty, and it appears they have good reason to do so, for everyone who took part in 
this study had experience of social fit causing recruitment failure and they all knew of 
situations where the consequences of this were catastrophic for the employer as well as 
the employee.   
Evidently, employers do not think labour is a commodity like any other. Given 
someone’s view of something shapes how they engage with it, whether they want to use 
it to keep things the same or change them, business culture emerges as an influence on 
recruitment decisions. Schein (1992; 1996; 1999) has shown that a business’ culture is 
the product of how it resolves problems thrown up by changes to its external environment 
and how it integrates changes to its internal one. He argues business culture has three 
levels. At its deepest, it consists of a set of underlying tacit assumptions about how the 
world is and how it ought to be that is shared by a group of people, which determines 
how they think and feel about their environment, and to some degree react to it. At the 
next level, it consists of the stated strategies, goals, and philosophies that shape 
operational policy. And at the final strata, are the manifestations of culture, which include 
how people are recruited, how the workspace is organised and how workers present 
themselves. These three levels can conflict with each other. For example, a written policy 
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commitment to equal opportunities may exist at the second tier of an organisation as a 
reaction to the demands of legislation. But at the same time, the internalisation of norms 
and practises that have emerged over time to protect against uncertainty can result in a 
rejection of these policies at the first and third levels. To reflect on the implications of 
this for the employment opportunities available to people with a history of mental illness 
it is helpful to draw on the literature on racism and stratification economics. In doing this, 
it is important to recall what I said in ‘Chapter Three’: racism and disablism are not the 
same. However, their differences will not affect the argument I am making.  
Racism is a system of structuring opportunity and assigning values based on ethnic 
grouping, which unfairly discriminates against some people and unfairly favours others. 
It wastes human resources and undermines the ability of society to realise its full 
potential (Darity 2005; 2009a; Darity Mason and Stewart 2010; Phyllis Jones 2002). It 
takes three forms: personally mediated racism, where individuals consciously or 
unconsciously use race to differentiate how they act or fail to act towards people with a 
different ethnic origin; internalised racism where members of an ethnic group accept 
negative judgements about their abilities as being justified and as a result fail to challenge 
racism when it manifests itself; and institutional racism where norms, policies, practices 
and structures lead to people of different races having different access to goods, services 
and opportunities. My argument draws on ideas developed in addressing the subject of 
institutional racism. Phyllis Jones (2002) describes this as the structures policies practices 
and norms that differentiate access to goods, services and opportunities by race. In other 
words, racism against an ethnic group is something that results in members of that group 
inheriting disadvantage because over time racism creates and reinforces a stratification of 
economic activity and access to power (Darity 2005; 2009a; Darity Mason and Stewart 
2006; 2010).  
Recently, stratification economics has moved beyond race to look at caste gender and 
religion (Darity Hamilton and Stewart 2015). The relevance of its argument that 
historical injustices can result in members of maligned groups inheriting economic 
disadvantage to mental illness can be seen by revisiting the discussion in ‘Chapter Two’. 
With respect to material conditions people who have been mentally ill have historically 
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been made wards of the state and excluded from the workforce, and until very recently 
this exclusion has been justified by medicine, legitimised by policymakers and accepted 
by the public (Rogers and Pilgrim 2010). In a society that prefers market to public 
ordering, the resources allocated to their support has resulted in a disproportionate 
number of them living in areas with high levels of unemployment and poor access to 
high-quality healthcare, education and housing (Dohrenwend 1990; Dohrenwend 1992; 
Meltzer et al 1990; Thomas et al 1996; Marwaha and Johnson 2004; Butterworth et al 
2009; Crisp et al 2009). So not only have they historically been viewed as being unable to 
work many of them are actually unable to work or have a reduced capacity to work and 
have a limited ability to change this situation. As for access to power, living in these 
areas means they tend not to have access to employers or members of their personal 
networks. Why these disadvantages become inherited ones emerges by linking the debate 
that started when Faris and Dunham (1939) found a connection between having a history 
of mental illness and living in an area with multiple social problems with evidence about 
social mobility in the UK. For most of the time since Farris and Dunham, this link was 
explained by social drift, but now the evidence identifies social causation as being the 
primary cause (Fox 1990; Cooper 2005; Hudson 2008; Stilo et al. 2013). As social 
mobility is extremely limited in the UK (Blanden et al. 2005; Social Mobility and Child 
Poverty Commission 2014), this points to the disadvantages associated with mental 
illness being, to some extent inherited ones.   
In ‘Chapter Six’, it was shown employers associate mental illnesses with uncertainty and 
that when they hired people with history of these conditions, they only tended to do so 
when they shared a personal relationship or were members of the same or overlapping 
social networks. The evidence indicates that they were using the benefits of shared group 
membership to protect themselves from uncertainty producing outcomes harmful to them. 
Given they believe the trade in labour is always uncertain, the possibility is raised that 
their behaviour towards job seekers with a history of mental illness is evidence of how 
they normally go about satisfying their demand for labour. It is important to identify 
whether this is the case because if it is, it suggests the labour market is institutionally 
disablist, and a cause of disability and it also casts doubt on the ability of the UK 
governments welfare to work policies to change things. It would be institutionally 
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disablist because it causes the abilities of some people with a history of mental illness to 
be judged unfairly; a cause of disability because it will prevent many of them from 
having their talents assessed at all, which means they and their children will be unable to 
use paid employment to realise their potential or prevent poverty from degrading their 
mental well-being and it cast doubt on the efficacy of the UK governments welfare to 
work policies because the only social influence on employability they address is stigma 
and they do not confront the question of job specific skills at all.             
9.4 Employers recruitment practices and the influence of the UK government's 
welfare to work policies.   
The evidence indicates that when employers search for staff, they try to protect 
themselves from the potential for harm inherent in uncertainty by ranking sources of 
information in a hierarchy based on reliability and cost. Here information supplied by 
personal experience is seen as the most desirable followed by, in descending order, 
information provided by people they trust; information provided for the payment of a fee 
and information generated by competition in a market. If we map a search for labour that 
descends every stage of the hierarchy, then their behaviour can be more plausibly 
explained by different understandings of trade. At the start of the search, their use of 
personal knowledge resonates with Zelizer’s ideas about the role played by intimacy in 
economic activity. When they move on to use information from people they trust, their 
actions echo more with the thinking of new economic sociologists such as Granovetter 
(1985; 1995a), and stratification economists such as Darity (2005; 2009a) about groups 
and social networks shaping and being shaped by economic activity. As their search 
continues, their use of agencies can be better explained by the arguments of Williamson 
(1975; 1985; 2000) that market actors use institutions that have emerged to manage 
transactional costs. Finally, at the last stage when they invite applications for a vacancy 
their actions bear their closest resemblance to the neoclassical model favoured by 
policymakers: trading for labour in a market regulated by price competition.  
Their use of this hierarchy to recruit staff indicates that when they hired people with a 
history of mental illness, they were using standard practice when they filled the vacancy. 
It also shows that employers use ties that cut across different economic and social settings 
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and specific ties in specific settings when they make recruitment decisions. Examples of 
ties cutting across economic and social settings are Michael hiring his son; Gavin 
allowing a manager located at the other side of the country to use information generated 
by his social circles to hire someone with a history of mental illness and Gus hiring 
someone who was a friend of the family. Examples of specific ties being used in specific 
settings are Brendan’s preference for giving his existing employees first crack at any 
vacancy he had; Julian’s use of agencies when he had to locate someone with scarce 
skills or find large numbers of workers at short notice and the willingness of the 
overwhelming majority of employers to use price competition after all other options had 
been exhausted.  
Different perspectives on the labour market have different strengths and weaknesses. On 
the one hand work by new economic sociologists such as Zeliter (2007) and Granovetter 
(1985; 1995a) and stratification economists such as Darity (2005; 2009a) can 
accommodate the use of ties that cut across different settings. For example using 
information generated by an intimate relationship or shared group membership to justify 
hiring a friend, a friend of a friend or someone with a similar background. But they 
struggle to explain the use of different ties in different settings such as hiring someone 
where there is no pre-existing social relationship or common identity. On the other hand, 
work by neoclassicists such as Layard and Nickell (2003) and Layard (2001) on 
incentives and the natural rate of unemployment and new institutional economists such as 
(Williamson 1975; 1985; 2000) on transaction costs can comfortably accommodate the 
latter but not the former. If a coherent narrative about the trade in labour is to be 
constructed, then these differences will have to be reconciled. 
Help in doing this is provided by reflecting on groups. Groups can be loose or tight, and 
they form and evolve in response to a variety of economics and social pressures. These 
groups serve different purposes and send out different signals about their members. 
People are simultaneously members of various groups that have different levels of status 
and power. Someone can be rich or poor and have a history of mental illness, prominent 
politicians can come from various castes, and successful academics can belong to a 
variety of ethnic groups. Here acts of agency and their results influence how groups are 
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perceived. However, structural inertia also means acts of agency and their results are 
interpreted through the lens of those groups people are members of (Handy 1993). It 
follows that the influence on acts of agency exerted by membership of one group can be 
amplified or mitigated by membership of another.  
With this in mind, I intend to use the work of Zelizer (2011) on circuits of commerce that 
was discussed in ‘Chapter Three’ to create a narrative about the recruitment practices of 
the employers who spoke to me. Her heterodox approach to economic analysis echoes 
with the tack taken by old institutional economists such as Veblen (1909); Myrdal (1978), 
and Hodgson (2009) and stratification economists such as Darity (2005; 2009a). She 
reconciles the differences between the under socialised understanding of economic 
activity on offer from neoclassical and new institutional economics and the over 
socialised one provided by the new economic sociology by stratifying economic activity. 
Her use of stratification goes beyond that of the stratification economists for not only 
does she use it to show how agency and structure; and cooperation and competition 
influence economic activity; she also explicitly demonstrates how the media of exchange 
varies as economic actors move between strata.   
It will be remembered Zelizer (2011) states the connections between people’s social and 
economic lives creates circuits of commerce, that commerce includes but is not limited to 
exchange for money, that each circuit has a well-defined border where movement across 
it is policed and monitored and that in each circuit a distinctive set of transfers is 
facilitated by specific media and ties whose meaning is shared by members of the circuit. 
Zelizer argues that because people are members of multiple circuits of commerce they 
can use them to create an institutional structure that allows them to utilise modes of 
exchange and levels of trustworthiness that are appropriate for their current needs, desires 
and freedom of movement. If we apply this line of thinking to how the employers who 
took part in this study ranked the sources of information they used to make recruitment 
decisions, then each tier can be viewed as a circuit of commerce. At the top are intimate 
relations and social networks where it is appropriate to circulate information about jobs 
and employability as a gift whose value is underpinned by custom and practice; a shared 
sense of identity; feelings of mutual obligation; and the existence of penalties for 
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breaking with established norms. It is attractive to employers because not only is it low 
cost it is also seen as the best way of making an uncertain world safer; more predictable 
and less threatening. The next most desirable source of information is a circuit of 
commerce where a fee is paid, to a recruitment agency for example, for information about 
potential recruits. Here the nature of the relationship means it is in the interests of the 
agent receiving the fee to provide the principal with accurate information if they want to 
receive more business from them. Lastly, there is a circuit of commerce where 
information is circulated as a result of competition. Here the lack of any pre-existing 
social relationship or prior alignment of economic interests means the employer has no 
control over who is providing information. As a result, they have to manage a situation 
where job seekers might think it is in their interests to provide inaccurate information if 
they believe it will give them a competitive advantage.   
The indications are it is the means of exchange and the appropriateness of their use that 
are the mechanisms that create the boundaries separating the circuits of commerce. As for 
the mechanism that catalyses movement between them, the evidence suggests it is the 
answer to the question, what is less threatening: continuing with existing sources of 
labour or searching for new ones? One influence on the answer to this question is the 
flow of money through the economy. The more robust it is, the easier it is to gain access 
to it in the form of credit and retained profits, and the further an employer will travel 
down the hierarchy. Because, in such circumstances, demand for a business’s goods and 
services will tend to be greater; the pressure to fill the vacancy higher; and worries about 
the consequences of getting a recruitment decision wrong lower. Another influence on 
the answer to the question about threat is membership of a historically stigmatised group. 
Given the employers I spoke to tended to hire people with a history of mental illness only 
when they knew them, or they were known to someone they trusted the illness the 
indications are the ability of the stigma associated with a specific group to devalue the 
labour on offer from a member of that group increases as employers descend the 
hierarchy. It follows that the malign influence of stigma will be reduced by increases in 
the flow of money through the economy. Evidence supporting this conclusion comes 
from the literature, which shows employers are more likely to hire disabled people when 
the demand for labour is high (Boardman 2003; Fothergill 2001).   
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During this descent, information used to make recruitment decisions changes from a gift 
guaranteed by shared identity, mutual self-interest and feelings of obligation; to a 
commodity secured by commercial self-interest; to a tool used to gain a comparative 
advantage. The use of the hierarchy explains why many jobs never seem to reach the 
open market; the paucity of HR professionals in private sector businesses; the ignorance 
of employers about the UK government's welfare to work policies and their hostility to 
welfare to work contractors. The reason jobs never reach the open market even in areas 
when there are high levels of unemployment is that employers have decided it is not in 
their interests to move from a circuit of commerce where the accuracy of information is 
guaranteed by social pressures or financial self-interest to one where this accuracy can be 
undermined by the self-interest of the job seeker. This explanation does not blame the 
unemployed for being out of work, and it confirms the suspicion that the labour market is 
institutionally disablist and a cause of disability because many people with a history of 
mental illness will be unlikely to have access to the circuits of commerce employers 
prefer to use when filling vacancies because disproportionate numbers of them live in 
areas with high unemployment (Dohrenwend 1992; Meltzer et al. 1990; Thomas et al. 
1996; Marwaha and Johnson 2004; Butterworth 2009; Crisp 2009).      
From the perspective of connected worlds and circuits of commerce, the reluctance of 
employers to hire HR professionals and their ignorance of welfare to work policies are 
interrelated. Government policies assume jobs are filled through competition based on 
price (Crouch 2010; Dutt and Wilbur 2010; Mandel 2012) and that businesses hire 
enough HR professionals to create competition; interpret the information it generates and 
to ensure compliance with the law (Ulrich 1997; Kaufman 2010; Keep and James 2010). 
However, employers tend to regard open competition as the recruitment tool of last 
resort. As a result, smaller businesses do not employ HR professionals, and larger ones 
only employ enough of them to facilitate the recruitment decisions of its managers. 
Consequently, unless someone, for whatever reason, draws the attention of an employer 
to the UK government's welfare to work policies, there is no reason why they would have 
or need to have more than a passing acquaintance with them.    
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As for the hostility of employers towards private sector welfare to work organisations, it 
is reasonable to believe this is rooted in their use of personal relationships and social 
networks to protect them against harm in an uncertain world. The relationship between 
the government and welfare to work companies is one where the former body is the 
principal and the latter are the agents. It is one that marginalises employers, and it can 
lead to situations where the agent will try to get paid by persuading them to take on 
unsuitable clients and offering as little support as possible. The evidence from employers 
such as Andy and Billy indicates this has happened and the evidence from Karl suggests 
it has led many of the employers who participated in this study to mistrust these 
organisations because they believe the only interest these companies have in the 
businesses they approach or the clients they support is as income generators. The recent 
actions of the UK government indicate this belief has some substance for they have 
changed the financial structure of welfare to work contracts to make payment contingent 
on the challenges posed by a client and supporting them after they have found work. 
However, this change does not address the marginalisation of employers or the legacy of 
past behaviour. Why would an employer take on somebody they don’t know, who has no 
job-specific skills and a health history signalling the potential for disruptive behaviour on 
the recommendation of someone they don't trust, who does not know their business or the 
challenges they face? Evidence the failure to address this question is causing problems 
can be found in studies that show welfare to work organisations are parking more 
difficult clients in favour of giving support to more employer-friendly ones (National 
Audit Office 2014; Finn 2011; and Rees et al. 2014). An alternative approach that could 
address this problem, which is consistent with Zelizer’s circuits of commerce and 
connected worlds approach is for the state to require welfare to work organisations to 
help members of disadvantaged groups to develop the skills employers find difficult to 
source and build supportive relationships with employers independent of attempts to 
move their clients into employment.  
Using Zelizer’s thinking to frame the findings of this study does not inevitably lead to a 
conclusion that the UK government’s welfare to work policies will not have any positive 
effects on employers’ recruitment decisions. The reviews of the ‘See Me’ anti-stigma 
campaign suggest it has succeeded in making individuals with a history of mental illness 
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more socially acceptable (Myers et al. 2009; Pilgrim and Corry 2013). If this has resulted 
in people with a history of mental illness becoming members of employers social 
networks, then Zelizer’s thinking suggests it will also have had a positive effect on their 
employment prospects However, the discounting of their labour suggests it will do so in a 
way that resonates with the arguments of Darity (2005; 2009a) about the influence of 
group membership on economic success and those from Sayer (2005) about the moral 
significance of class.    
The evidence shows employers beliefs about what is involved in hiring labour and how 
they go about this activity is different from the presumptions of policymakers; that the 
demand for labour has declined and changed as a result of the financial crisis of 2008, 
and disproportionate numbers of people with a history of mental illness live in areas of 
high unemployment. It has led me to two conclusions about the ability of the UK 
government's welfare to work policies to increase demand from employers for labour 
from jobless people who have been disabled by mental illness. The members of this 
group who will benefit most any increase will be those whose social circles include 
employers or people known to them, but that overall it will be unlikely to be anything 
like enough to prevent the vast majority of them from remaining jobless. Given these 
findings, it needs to be asked, how can the evidence from this study, which suggests the 
demand for labour cannot be reduced to price competition between individuals and 
Zelizer’s connected worlds and circuits of commerce approach to economic activity be 
used to improve this situation? But before answering this question, it is first necessary to 
reflect on this study's strengths and weaknesses 
9.5 Strengths of the study. 
Empirically this study has demonstrated employers working in a variety of businesses of 
different sizes operating in various sectors and locations are willing to participate in 
sociological research. It is a finding that should encourage anyone thinking of carrying 
out similar work who has been worried by assertions to the contrary in studies such as 
those by Mungham and Thomas (2003); US EOC (2003); and The Observatory (2003).  
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The approach taken in this study has demonstrated interpersonal ties connect people in 
one setting to different arrays of people inside and outside of that setting. These circuits 
incorporate different understandings, practices, information obligations rights symbols 
and media of exchange. Doing this has shown that the hostile worlds approach to 
analysing the labour market, which underpins the UK government’s welfare to work 
policies, is methodologically unable to deal with the intersections between people’s social 
and commercial worlds created by those ties. It has also shown that critical realism in the 
form of Zelizer’s connected worlds and circuits of commerce approach is compatible 
with the yoking together of economic, medical and sociological thinking in a way that 
allows the influence of trade, medicine and the social relationships to be explored. As a 
result, it has been able to demonstrate that employers satisfy their demand for labour in a 
way that is institutionally disablist and open the door to developing a theory or theories of 
demand for labour that can be used to improve the employability of jobless people who 
have been disabled by mental illness.   
It can be argued abandoning a hostile worlds approach on a contingent basis is 
dangerous. For example, Becker (1996) has identified social problems involving money 
as economic ones whose true nature is obscured by a cultural fog. Ignoring this could 
allow economic arguments to be used to undermine any support offered to people with a 
history of mental illness, which does not have the goal of turning their activities into 
commodities. However, this argument cuts both ways. Darity, Mason and Stewart (2006; 
2010) have argued that competition between groups has stratified the economy in ways 
that resulted in different people from groups being rewarded differently for the same 
effort. Feminist economists have argued excluding non-market work from economic 
consideration reduces female claims on the income of other family members (Philipps 
2008). These points are relevant to mental illness. They can be used to argue politics and 
the law should take account of the nature of an employer's demand for labour in ways 
that grant people who have a history of mental illness rights and protection against the 
outcomes produced by market ordering and compensation for past injustices, which is 
something stratification economics has done with respect to race and caste (Darity, 
Hamilton and Stewart 2015).  
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The indications are the need to make these arguments will become more urgent as the 
economy moves away from manufacturing towards services. Increasingly, customers are 
becoming members of workforce teams. Consequently, employers increasingly want 
workers who can induce feelings of well-being in others. As a result, workers have to be 
able to separate how they are feeling from how they present themselves. To do this, they 
have to be able to continually rearrange their psychological wiring as they move from 
customer to customer (Hochschild 2012). Not only might this be harmful to the less 
mentally resilient it also suggests employers will become increasingly cautious about 
hiring them. By taking the above into account, it would be possible to develop welfare to 
work policies that improve the employability and lives of people with a history of mental 
illness by striking a balance between choice and coercion that reflects the realities of 
mental illness and changing demands for labour.   
9.6 Weaknesses of the study. 
The literature on qualitative methods advises researchers to treat research subjects as 
seams of information to be mined until exhaustion (Bryman 2008; David and Sutton 
2004; Ritchie and Lewis 2003; Creswell 2013). This study only conducted one interview 
with each employer. With hindsight, the willingness of employers to participate in the 
research and the time they were willing to grant me suggests it would have been possible 
to have conducted a pilot study to refine the research instrument and to have interviewed 
them more than once. Doing this would have meant spending more time with employers, 
which would have given them a greater opportunity to reflect further on their evidence. 
So although I reflected carefully over time upon the evidence from each interview, it 
would be difficult to claim I had extracted all the information my sources could provide. 
 It also has to be acknowledged that the data generated by the interviews is subjective. 
The nature of the research subjects, the power they wielded and the sensitivity of what 
was being discussed made it impossible to independently corroborate their testimony. So 
while it was possible to identify medical, social and economic considerations as 
regulators of how employers satisfy their demand for labour and to see that the outcomes 
of this regulation influences on the employment opportunities available to jobless people 
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who have been disabled by mental illness, it was impossible to compare the weight given 
to them by individual employers or employers working in different sectors.    
As I have discussing depth versus breadth in ‘Chapter Five’ and earlier in this one, I do 
not intend to do so here, other than to address questions about the size of the sample. The 
literature can be used to attack or defend it, which reflects the tension between a desire 
for understanding to be deep and generalisation to be broad (Silverman 2006; Bryman 
2008). Consequently, it can be accused of making sweeping generalisations using limited 
empirical evidence. Only four of the employers interviewed were women, all of them 
were white, and they were all based in a highly urbanised part of Scotland. As a result, 
the findings of this study may not apply to businesses run by women, members of ethnic 
minorities or ones based in rural areas.   
Reflecting on the conduct of the study and its effect on the results it produced requires 
acknowledgement that I framed the questions, recruited the participants, carried out and 
transcribed the interviews and interpreted the evidence. So although I can claim my 
approach to the research question and the findings it has uncovered have been influenced 
by the literature, I also have to accept my experiences, prejudices and values have been in 
play. However, unlike most studies in this area, this one let employers speak for 
themselves about their influences rather than make presumptions about them. 
Consequently, I can claim to have minimised the role played in this study by 
essentialism.   
9.7 Building on the findings of this thesis.   
Current UK welfare policy identifies paid employment as evidence of being in recovery 
from and in recovery in mental illness. It presumes people will recover if they can engage 
with the labour market and react positively to is signals. This thesis has shown that the 
overall demand for labour is subject to something volatile and beyond the control of 
employers and workers: the flow of money in the economy and that currently, this has 
created a market where there are many more workers than jobs, and many of those in 
work are underemployed. It has also shown employers believe the outcomes of 
recruitment decisions are uncertain, experience has taught them uncertainty can produce 
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hazardous outcomes, and they prefer to fill vacancies by targeting sources of labour that 
can do the job needing done in a way that is acceptable to other workplace actors by 
using personal experience, the experience of people they trust, or have paid to trust. It is 
an approach that has led them to hire some people with a history of mental illness who 
share their social circles. But even when this has happened, the stigma associated with 
mental illness has allowed them to discount the value of their recruits’ labour.   
Many people with a history of mental illness who are moving off disability benefits are 
unlikely to inhabit the same social circles as employers, those who have access to them, 
or have up to date job-specific skills. In the light of the above evidence, this suggests the 
labour market is institutionally disablist towards them. Matters are made worse by the 
negative attitude employers appear to have towards the companies employed by the UK 
government to implement their vocational support programmes. In an echo of the 
thinking of Darity Hamilton and Stewart (2015), it follows that even though equalities 
legislation has given them the right to compete for work on less unequal terms than 
before and anti-stigma campaigns have made people with a history of mental illness more 
socially acceptable, history means recovery in the form of paid employment cannot be 
seen as a matter of choice. Consequently, welfare to work policy needs to embrace the 
idea historical, social and structural factors influence an employer’s demand for labour, 
move away from individual to collective notions of recovery and be more thoughtful 
about linking paid employment to recovery if it is to improve the lives of those people 
with a history of mental illness who have been in receipt of disability benefits.    
The evidence in this study indicates this will require research to move away from 
identifying and quantifying barriers to the market towards looking at how markets create 
structures and why they affect different groups in different ways. Doing this requires 
researchers to engage with employers and the debates in economics and sociology about 
the labour market. With this, the ontology of demand suggested by Zelizer’s connected 
worlds and circuits of commerce approach to trade, and this study’s strengths and 
weaknesses in mind the following are areas my investigation leads me to believe would 
benefit from further research.      
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a) How the flow of money in the economy influences the employability of people 
with a history of mental illness;  
b) The proportion and types of vacancies that are filled through personal 
relationships, social networks; recruitment agencies and competition by different 
types of employer in different geographic areas; 
c) How employers target labour, the aim of this would be to facilitate the 
development of initiatives that would include people with a history of mental 
illness in the pools of labour generated by employers personal experience; social 
networks and recruitment agencies; 
d) The role of stigma in devaluing the labour of people with a history of mental 
illness.  
e) How to support people who have a history of mental illness to develop those job-
specific skills employers have difficulty in sourcing; 
f) How to improve employers' perceptions of welfare to work contractors and make 
it more likely they will engage with them, and 
g) How to improve employers' knowledge of mental illness, institutional disablism, 
stigma and making reasonable adjustments to the workplace. 
The need for this work is becoming more important as the economy moves away 
from manufacturing towards services. Increasingly customers are members of 
workforce teams. Because of this employers increasingly want employees who can 
induce feelings of well-being in others. The psychological challenges involved in this 
could lead to jobs being more mentally demanding and employers looking for 
mentally resilient workers. Embracing the idea normative thinking will always 
influence recruitment decisions allows this to be taken into account in ways that 
justify granting people who have been disabled by their mental health rights and 
access to resources that will not only improve their employability but also enable 
them to lead fulfilling lives when there is no demand for their labour or when it would 
be harmful to them to work for a living. Acting in this way opens the door to recovery 
being used to improve the lives of people with a history of mental illness rather than 
as a Trojan horse for market fundamentalism.      
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Appendix One. 
 Introductory Letter. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
  
 
 
                                                                                                                                                     
DD/MM/YYYY 
Dear Sir/ Madam 
How has the governments welfare to work policies affected the demand from private sector 
employers in the central belt of Scotland for the labour of people who have been disabled by 
mental illness? 
 
My name is Bernard McNally I am researching the above question as part of my PhD studies. I 
am writing to invite you in your capacity as an employer/welfare to work organisation to 
participate in this investigation, which has been approved by the ethics committee of the 
University of Glasgow’s college of social sciences. 
Historically a proportion of the living costs of many people disabled by mental illness have been 
borne by the state through incapacity benefits. Government is now challenging this. Last year it 
announced the intention to move 90% of them, almost half a million people, into the labour 
market by 2013. To achieve this it has implemented policies underpinned by the belief supply 
will create its own demand. It assumes these policies have created an environment where 
employers will be willing and able to successfully recruit from this pool of labour. 
It is not clear if this is the case: little is known about how employers’ attitudes to and experience 
of mental illness will interact with other influences on their recruitment decisions. The purpose of 
this research is to investigate this and gain and understanding of where people disabled by mental 
illness will be located in the labour market. As an employer/welfare to work agency your insights 
would be invaluable, not only go this research, but to potentially inform future developments.  
To help you decide if you wish to participate I enclose an information sheet, this provides more 
detail about how you would be involved and the conduct of the research. If you want more 
information please contact me at the Strathclyde Centre for Disability Research, University of 
Glasgow, Room 204, Adam Smith Building, Glasgow G12 8RT, Tel 0141 330 4651, Email: 
b.mcnally@research.gla.ac.uk. 
  
I enclose a research consent form for you to indicate if you wish to take part and a stamped 
addressed envelope which you can use to indicate if you wish to take part and a stamped 
addressed envelope, which you can use to return this form to me. 
Yours Sincerely 
 
Bernard McNally 
PhD Research Student 
University of Glasgow 
Strathclyde Centre for Disability Studies 
Enc: Subject information Sheet; Research Consent Form 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Appendix Two. 
 Plain language Sheet. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
  
 
  
 
                                                                                                                                                     
DD/MM/YY 
How has the governments welfare to work policies affected the demand from private sector 
employers in the central belt of Scotland for the labour of people who have been disabled by 
mental illness? 
 You should read this sheet in conjunction with your letter of invitation. Take what time you need 
to reflect on these or to discuss them with others. If you agree to participate it is on the 
understanding that this agreement is voluntary and can be withdrawn at any time for any reason 
and without explanation. 
Demands on Research Participants: 
It is intended to interview participants once, for up to forty five minutes, at a time and place of 
their choosing. The interviews will be recorded and there will be some contemperous note taking. 
They will take place between the 31
st
 January and the 31
st
 December 2013. Each recording will be 
transcribed. Everyone will be given a copy of their transcript for scrutiny and comment. This 
should take around thirty minutes. You will be provided with a form and a stamped addressed 
envelope which you can use to indicate your opinion of the transcripts accuracy. Clarification will 
be sought regarding perceived inaccuracies. This may prompt a request for a follow up interview. 
This will be subject to the same rules as before. Feedback on your participation will be provided 
on request. You will be given access to the final results. 
Anonymity and Confidentiality: 
The recording and the transcription will be done in a way that protects anonymity and 
confidentiality. Any information about your name and address will be removed from the 
recording and the transcript. They will be stored securely at the Strathclyde Centre for Disability 
Research at Glasgow University using individual ID numbers and a deciphering key linking 
numbers to names. This will be kept separately from the recording and transcripts. Only the 
researcher and his supervisors will have access to them. 
  
While everything will be done to protect your anonymity and confidentiality we are bound by the 
same legal duties as everybody else: we will not keep confidential or anonymous any information 
indicating any intention to behave in a criminal manner 
Contacts: 
You can contact me using the details in your letter of invitation. Alternatively you can contact my 
supervisors: Professor Nick Watson, Tel: 0141 330 3916; email Nicholas.Watson@glasgow.ac.uk 
or Professor Philip Beaumont, Tel: 0141 330 5129; email Philip.Beaumont@glasgow.ac.uk, or 
alternatively the University ethics officer Terri Hume; Tel: 0141 330 3007; email: 
Terri.Hume@glasgow.ac.uk. 
Thank you for considering whether to participate in this study. You can dispose of this 
information sheet as you see fit.         
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Appendix Three. 
Consent Form. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
  
 
 
Bernard McNally,     Consent Form: 
Freepost SCO1063,     Centre Number: 
Strathclyde Centre for Disability Studies,   Study Number: 
Room 204, Adam Smith Building,    Subject Id Number: 
University of Glasgow, 
G12 8RT.     
 
Consent Form 
Title of research project: how has Government welfare to work policies affected the 
demand from private sector employers in the Central Belt of Scotland for the labour of 
people who have been disabled by mental illness? 
 
Name of Researcher: Bernard McNally, PhD Research Student 
 
1. I confirm I have read and understood the information sheet dated the 19/01/2013 for the 
above study and have had the opportunity to ask questions about it.  Yes/No. 
 
2. I understand that my participation is voluntary and that I am free to withdraw from this 
research at any time without having to give any reason or having my legal rights affected.  
Yes/No. 
 
3. I agree to take part in the above named study.  Yes/No. 
 
 
...........................................  .....................................          ...........................................    
   Print Name of Person                        Date   Signature 
   Giving Consent 
 
 
.............................................           .........................................    ........................................ 
Print Name of Person   Date              Signature 
Taking Consent 
 
 
  
Appendix Four. 
 Ethics Consent Letter. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
Ethics Committee for Non-Clinical Research Involving Human Subjects 
Staff Research Ethics Application Outcome      
 
Postgraduate Student Research Ethics Application Outcome   
 
Application Details 
 
Application Number:  CSS20120254 
Application Type New   Resubmission     
Applicant’s Name Bernard McNally  
Project Title How has Government welfare to work policies affected the demand from private sector 
employers in the Central Belt of Scotland for the labour of people who have been disabled by mental illness?  
Date application reviewed (d.m.yr) 28/01/13 
______________________________________________________________________________________
Application Outcome  Approved 
 
Start Date of Approval (d.m.yr)   04 February 2013  
(blank of if not approved) 
End Date of Approval (d.m.yr)   31 December 2013 
If the applicant has been given approval this means they can proceed with their data collection with effect 
from the date of approval.  
______________________________________________________________________________________
Recommendations   (where application is Not Approved) 
Please note the comments below and provide further information where requested.  All resubmitted 
application documents should then be sent to the College Office via email to Terri.Hume@glasgow.ac.uk. 
You must include a covering letter to explain the changes you have made to the application. 
Major 
Not applicable. 
Minor  
Not applicable. 
Comments    (other than specific recommendations) 
The consent form should have an additional option which allows the participant to choose whether the 
interview is recorded or not.  
PLS & Research Information Sheet: The contact detatils of the Ethics Officer should be included  
 
Please retain this notification for future reference. If you have any queries please do not hesitate to contact 
Terri Hume, Ethics Secretary. 
 
 
 
 
  
Appendix Five. 
Transcript Accurracy Form. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Transcript Accuracy Form. 
 
Centre Number: 
Study Number: 
Subject Identification Number: 
Transcript Number: 
 
Conformation of accuracy of Transcript Number............              Dated: ................  
Title of research: how has Government welfare to work policies affected the demand from 
private sector employers in the Central Belt of Scotland for the labour of people who have 
been disabled by mental illness?  
Name of Researcher: Bernard McNally, PhD Research Student. 
1. I can confirm I have read and understood the transcript of the interview dated the 
.......................Yes /No. 
  
2. I can confirm I have had the opportunities to ask questions about it. Yes/ No. 
 
3. I confirm it is an accurate version of the interview that took place  
on the ....................Yes/No.  
 
 
 
...........................................  .....................................          ...........................................    
   Print Name of Person                        Date   Signature 
   Confirming Accuracy  
 
 
.............................................           .........................................    ........................................ 
Print Name of Person   Date              Signature 
Receiving Confirmation 
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Topic Guide. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
  
 
 
            
        
DD/MM/YYYY 
 
Question: how has Government welfare to work policies affected the demand from private 
sector employers in the Central Belt of Scotland for the labour of people who have been 
disabled by mental illness? 
 
Topic Guide: Interviews with employers. 
 
A. Introduction 
1. Give name, tell them a bit about yourself, ask interviewee’s name, ask how long they’ve 
been working there; about their position; what it involves; tell them a bit about the 
research how it will be conducted and why you’re doing it. 
2. As about the firm/agency what it does do, how long it has been going for, its nature its 
scope and the type of employee it has? 
B. Needs of the business. 
1. What are your main considerations when deciding to create and fill a vacancy? (Memo: 
type of post; purpose of post; seniority; degree of skill needed; opportunity cost) 
2. What are the most important attributes you look for in a prospective employee (Memo: 
honesty; reliability; competence; achievements; attitude to work; flexibility; experience; 
presentation; social skills; values; work record) 
3. What risks are involved in filling a vacancy? (Memo: nature of duty of care to whom, in 
what circumstances) 
4. How do you manage them? (Memo: reasonable precautions and due diligence) 
C. Knowledge of mental health issues. 
1. What do you understand by the term mental illness? (Memo: cause; type). 
2. What do you think are the symptoms of these types of illnesses? (Memo symptoms v 
medical side effects). 
3. Do you think a person who has had a mental illness can recover? 
D. Risk to the employer in employing someone with a history of mental illness. 
1. Ask them about their experience of managing mental illness in the workplace. Have they 
employed someone who has a history of mental illness or someone who developed a 
mental illness while employed? What was the effect on the business? What was the 
outcome for the person involved? 
2. Do they think employers would allow for the symptoms of mental illness if they were 
particularly skilled; held a senior position or had a good work history?  
  
3. Are there additional risks involved in recruiting someone with a history of mental illness? 
4. What kind of risks are they? (Memo: reliability, violence, financial? To who; customers, 
staff, image? To what; service; product; image? Is this risk dependent on the size of the 
company?). 
5. How much are the risks dependent on the type of job they would be doing? (Memo: 
seniority; location; working alone / as part of a group; dealing with customers; working 
as an expert). 
6. Can you think of how these risks can be managed? (Memo: is the answer influenced by 
employer size?) 
7. If a job candidate made you aware they had a history of mental illness, when would their 
personal attributes outweigh their health record when reaching a decision about 
employing them?  
8. Is there any kind of job a person with a history of mental illness should be ineligible for? 
9. If yes, Why? 
E. Labour Market. 
1. Are you aware of any equal opportunities legislation governing the employment of 
people with a history of mental illness? 
2. If yes, enquire about this awareness and how it has influenced their recruitment practices. 
3. Are you aware of any campaigns aimed at reducing the stigma associated with a history 
of mental illness? 
4. If yes, enquire about this awareness and how it has affected their recruitment practices. 
5. The government intends to move 90% of people who receive incapacity benefits because 
of mental health problems into the labour market by the end of 2013. Half of them have 
not worked for more than four years. Would you consider employing people from this 
pool of labour? 
6. If no, why not? 
7. If yes, for what kind of jobs? 
8. Can you think of any supports for employers that would make it more likely they would   
consider taking on unemployed people who have had mental health problems? 
9. Can you think of any supports for unemployed people with a history of mental health 
problems that would make it more likely they would obtain employment? 
F. Close. 
1. Run through what will happen to the recording and transcript, how it will be used for the 
research, the timescale over which this will occur and what they will obtain as a 
consequence of taking part in the research. 
2. Offer them the opportunity to ask any questions that occurred to them as a result of the 
interview.  
3. Let them know that if they come up with questions at a later date they can use the contact 
details to get an answer. 
Thank them for taking part in the research.          
 
